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Do We Care for Peace?

HENRY WICKHAM STEED

THIS question goes deep. It is not to be answered lightly or off-hand. Rightly understood, it searches into the hidden places of our hearts and the inner recesses of our minds. Having thought upon it, with such honesty of purpose and clearness of insight as I can command, I am not yet sure that it can be answered affirmatively.

Since the beginning of March, 1916, when I watched the battle of Verdun from a point of vantage, I have been deliberately working for peace. It is a hard task, especially for those who believe that fearless thought is essential to useful action, who accept no phrase without probing its meaning, and who guard themselves against undisciplined emotions as sources of grievous error. While it is true that feelings are the motive power in human affairs, and that, in matters political, brain-work divorced from emotion is apt to be sterile, not less true is it that the progress of mankind depends upon the harnessing of the emotions to principles and concepts which are intellectually sound.

Sixteen years is a short time in which to approach, let alone master, so vast a subject as peace. Countless centuries have been spent in the study and practice of war. They may not have been ill spent, for war has been the most widely recognized method of settling differences between tribes and nations, a supreme test of virility among individuals and peoples, a source of wealth and honor and, not least, an opening for self-sacrifice and self-devotion. Could they be compiled, the annals of the human race would be likely to record more years and decades of fighting than of the surcease from fighting which is commonly called peace. Is it not presumptuous to dream of putting an end, all at once, to the major activities of strife and to bid men eschew them because, forsooth! armed strife is dangerous and destructive?

Some things I have come to perceive in my brief cogitations. One of them is that the mere horrors of war will never frighten sturdy folk into abstaining from it. Another is that the strongest case against war is neither its horror nor its destructiveness, but its unworthiness as a human enterprise under modern conditions. And a third is that the negative conception of peace as non-war, and of periods of peace as intervals between wars, fails to stir the blood and to enlist the allegiance of the young. The valid plea for the prevention of war, that is to say, for the organization of a respite from fighting, is that the creation of peace is an undertaking so formidable

as to need long and careful preparation. Hence the utility, nay, the necessity of organizing non-war as a preliminary to any creative state of peace.

* * *

Before the United States entered the World War, in April, 1917, the late President Taft and others formed what they called a "League to Enforce Peace." On January 8, 1918, President Wilson declared as his Fourteenth Point: "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike." This "point" presently became one of the bases of the Armistice and, therefore, a contractual obligation governing the Peace Settlement. Thus the League of Nations was not the fruit of a whim, a vague humanitarian aspiration; it was a stipulation in a contract signed by the belligerents; and, as a British writer has urged, the real case for a revision of the Peace Treaties lies not in the objections which Germany or other countries may take to this or that uncomfortable feature of them, but in the degree in which the Peace Treaties departed from the contractual terms of the Armistice. It was no accident, rather was it a result of consistent probity, that President Wilson insisted on making "the League of Nations" the first item on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference. Though his subsequent insistence—partly for American domestic reasons—upon the embodiment of the League Covenant in the Peace Treaties opened the door to a process of bargaining of which France and Great Britain took sorry advantage, it is indisputable that his action created the League of Nations in the first instance, and, in the second, saved it from early decease by making the terms of its Covenant binding treaty obligations.

Indeed, had the League Covenant not been embodied in the Peace Treaties, the withdrawal of the United States from the Peace Settlement would have killed the League in its infancy. Yet that withdrawal tended to enfeeble the League in one vital respect. When President Wilson had presented the draft Covenant to the Peace Conference, on February 14, 1919, some of his fellow countrymen in Paris criticized the omission from the Covenant of any reference to "the freedom of the seas" and the rights of neutral seaborne trade. It was for these things, they urged, that the United States had fought; and "the freedom of the seas" had been the subject of President Wilson's second "Point," to which Great Britain had objected as a basis of the Armistice. Mr. Wilson answered his critics by saying that, in future, there would be no freedom of the seas since, in the League, there would be no neutrals. It is to this incident that Mr. Ray Stannard

Baker refers (on pages 382-3, Vol. I, of his *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*):

He (the President) had accepted the British modification of the Armistice terms in regard to the "freedom of the seas" because, as he told a group of his associates in Paris, when he came to examine the question of the freedom of the seas in relation to the League of Nations he saw that, in case of war in the future, there would be no neutrals with property rights to protect, for, under the League, all nations would join to enforce its decisions as against the unruly nation or nations, and the seas would be controlled by the powers of the League. The important thing, therefore, was first to get the League, with its essential guarantees of safety, and then the associated nations could work out regulations for sea traffic and provide for limitations of naval armaments.

Whether or not President Wilson's contention was watertight, inasmuch as the League Covenant admitted sundry possibilities of lawful war, and therefore of lawful neutrality, it is unquestionable that his view of League action as overriding neutral rights was well-founded. How right it was may be judged from the paralyzing effect upon British policy of American dissociation from the League, and of potential American neutrality in regard to naval operations that might be undertaken on behalf of the League. If the prospect of American membership of the League removed "the freedom of the seas" from the range of practical politics, and induced Great Britain to accept the heavy obligations foreshadowed in Article 16 of the Covenant, no less certainly did American abstention from the League revive "the freedom of the seas" by arousing fear that a British navy, in the service of the League, might come into conflict with a neutral United States. British politicians, like those of some other countries, have a rooted dislike of automatic commitments. They would doubtless have wished their country fully to honor its obligations under Article 16 if the United States had been a member of the League. But once the assumption on which Great Britain assented to Article 16 had proved fallacious the tendency in British governing circles to whittle down or even to deny the binding force of Article 16 became irresistible. Hence the British rejection in March, 1925, of the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Hence, also, subsequent British opposition to any extension of arrangements for insuring international safety against war, even as a postulate of disarmament. So strong has this opposition now become that, should the United States join the League to-morrow, its decision might not be received with unmixed delight in British governing circles, because it would mean that Article 16 would regain full force.

Only in this way is it possible to explain the lukewarm reception given

in Great Britain to Secretary Stimson's important address to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York on August 8. The importance of this address can best be appraised if it be compared with President Wilson's belief that "in the League there will be no neutrals." By implication, if not explicitly, Secretary Stimson's interpretation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact brings American policy very near to the point at which it stood in February, 1919; for his demonstration that, in so far as the Briand-Kellogg Pact outlaws war, it outlaws neutrality also, is too cogent to be readily gainsaid. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the American authors of the Kellogg proposals were well aware of the probable bearing of those proposals upon American neutrality even before they were launched on December 28, 1927.

* * *

In answer to a deputation of the British Churches which urged him to do his utmost to insure the success of the Disarmament Conference, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the British National Prime Minister, said on October 19: "His Majesty's Government at the present moment would like to do the big thing, and that has been our steady aim." He added, weakly: "I would like, if I could, and I am sure my friend the Foreign Secretary shares my view, I would like to be the head of a Government which leaves peace in Europe and the world." If Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his colleagues have these desires, it is pertinent to ask—as many Britons are asking—why they have not acted upon them. They might, at least, have given an unqualified welcome to Secretary Stimson's speech in terms as clear as those of the semi-official Paris *Temps* which, referring to the French disarmament plan, wrote, on November 1:

It must be observed that nothing more is asked of the United States than the guarantees which Americans themselves have felt able to contemplate, guarantees that flow logically from Mr. Stimson's interpretation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and concern the obligation on the part of its signatories to take counsel together in case of a threat of war. If this general pact against war is to have full force, there can no longer be any neutrals in the presence of the crime against humanity which unprovoked aggression would constitute. This implies for all nations the duty not to aid, directly or indirectly, an aggressor State—which is the very least that could be expected of Powers resolved to outlaw war in a civilized world.

In the spring of 1914, when there was some question of international co-operation for the prevention of war, I remember hearing Sir Edward Grey, then British Foreign Secretary, ask the United States in a public speech: "Will you play up when the time comes?" To-day the United States would be entitled to address a similar question to the British Govern-

ment, and publicly to ask: "If we admit that the renunciation and the outlawry of war by the Briand-Kellogg Pact imply the renunciation and the outlawry of neutrality, will you play up and help to make this principle the foundation of effective disarmament?" Such a question might embarrass Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Sir John Simon and their colleagues, but it would assuredly be answered in the affirmative by British public opinion. In Great Britain we are waiting for a great lead, a lead so big that it cannot be overlooked. Some of us would have wished our own Government to give it. Some hope that the so-called "constructive plan" of France may compel our timid statesmen to take heart of grace. But all who know how real and how dangerous is the present crisis of peace would be ready to grasp with both hands any chance of solving the crisis by thoroughgoing international co-operation.

* * *

Do we care for peace? Is the world yet fit for peace? Frankly, I do not know. Since the World War, propaganda for peace has been so ill-conceived, so emotional, so muddle-headed that the main lines of the problem have become blurred. Belief in the inevitability of another war has engendered, on the one hand, panic-stricken demands for security and, on the other, short-sighted arguments to the effect that, since war is certain, the wisest thing is to make sure of keeping out of it. To these arguments Mr. Stimson's reply on August 8 was conclusive. He said:

The mechanical inventions of the century preceding the Great War and the revolutionary changes in industrial and social organization by which they were accompanied, have produced inevitable effects upon the concept of war which I have described. Communities and nations became less self-contained and more interdependent; the populations of industrialized States became much larger and more dependent for their food supplies upon far distant sources; the civilized world thus became very much more vulnerable to war. On the other hand, with those mechanical advances, modern armies became more easily transportable and therefore larger, and were armed with more destructive weapons. By these changes the inconsistency of war with normal life became sharper and more acute; the destructiveness of war to civilization became more emphatic, the abnormality of war became more apparent. The laws of neutrality became increasingly ineffective to prevent even strangers to the original quarrel from being drawn into the general conflict.

Finally there came the Great War, dragging into its maelstrom almost the entire civilized world; tangible proof was given of the impossibility of confining modern war within any narrow limits; and it became evident to the most casual observer that if this was permitted to continue, war, perhaps the next war, would drag down and utterly destroy our civilization.

Mr. Stimson speaks sooth. No nation can be sure of keeping out of

"the next war." The conflict between Japan and China which, to most European nations, seems more remote than it appears to the American people, will end by involving the greater part of the world in another war unless it be checked and settled by international co-operation. This is why the bearing of the Lytton Report upon the Disarmament Conference, and upon the possibility of creating peace on the hither side of another great struggle, is so obvious that only the ignorant or the blind fail to perceive it. At long last the French Premier, M. Herriot, has convinced himself that, if France would find the security she needs, it can only be built on a foundation of universal principles, and that it is suicidal for her to invoke those principles in Europe while ignoring them in the Far East. He understands that the peace of Europe must be defended in relation to Manchuria. Why has the British Government not yet attained the same degree of comprehension?

The answer is not altogether simple. Great Britain has never really recovered from the rejection of the Peace Settlement and of the League Covenant by the United States. Rather has she been disposed to imitate the American example and to withdraw, as far as her geographical situation permits, from entangling commitments on the Continent of Europe. This disposition has been strengthened by propagandist attacks upon the Peace Treaties, by the German campaign against the so-called "war guilt lie" and by asseveration that Great Britain will never fight to uphold "so glaring a political monstrosity" as the Polish Corridor. Though, as the "Testament" of the late Doctor Stresemann shows, Great Britain accepted obligations under the Locarno Treaties of 1925 because she felt that she must do something to justify her rejection of the Geneva Protocol, her official spokesmen have always maintained that she remains free to judge whether or not she is called upon to make good her Locarno guarantee of French and German security in the Rhineland. And as for the Briand-Kellogg Pact, British doubts of its efficacy were aggravated by the reservations with which the United States Senate surrounded its ratification. Nor has American action during the hostilities between Soviet Russia and China in 1929, or the Stimson Note to China and Japan of January 7 this year, or the Stimson-Borah letter of February 24, availed to persuade the British Government that the Briand-Kellogg Pact is an effective instrument of peace or that the observance of its obligations is an indispensable postulate of disarmament.

What is the reason? It lies, I imagine, in the existence of a British "security complex" very different in quality from the French, yet similar

to the isolationist tendencies in the United States. As Mr. Stimson suggested on August 8, public opinion in the world has not yet really digested either the League Covenant or the Kellogg Pact. The doctrines which inspire these two treaties, he said, are "so revolutionary that it is not surprising that the progress has outstripped the landmarks and orientation of many observers. The Treaties signalize a revolution in human thought, but they are not the result of impulse or thoughtless sentiment. At bottom they are the growth of necessity, the product of a consciousness that unless some such steps are taken, modern civilization would be doomed."

Mr. Stimson is entitled to claim that the Briand-Kellogg Pact was not the result of impulse or thoughtless sentiment. Did not President Coolidge proclaim, from his "Summer White House" in Wisconsin, before the Pact was signed: "We are proposing a revolutionary policy to the world"? Now British thought is not revolutionary; and British political action is almost invariably prompted by instinct. Nothing is more certain to arouse stubborn antagonism in British minds than a logical demonstration, supported by a series of syllogisms, that Great Britain ought to do this or that betimes, instead of waiting to see how things will shape themselves, and acting, apparently, on the spur of the moment. The British people are wedded to "the rule of thumb" and can only be induced to depart from it under pressure of circumstances. If they could be convinced that circumstances now require their country to follow a definite and positive course in regard to disarmament and the organization of peace, they would compel the Government to act. The difficulty is to convince them.

They are unlikely to be convinced by any frontal attack upon their isolationist traditions. In theory they may admit that nations are interdependent, and that war could not be localized. In practice, average Britons do not feel that the danger of war is so real as to demand a concerted international policy to ward it off. They are convinced, on the other hand, that concerted international action is needed to tackle the world economic crisis and the phenomenon of unemployment; and it is here, I believe, that the most effective propaganda for the organization of peace, and for the acceptance of definite responsibilities in regard to it could best begin in Great Britain.

The abstract argument, well stated by the British economist, Sir Arthur Salter, in his great book *Recovery*, is that all efforts to revive world finance or trade must be doomed to failure until confidence in good international relations is established on the basis of peace. His counsel is: "Leave the Wilson Pact intact; make the Kellogg Pact effective; make it clear by

declaration and by act—in China for example, where the whole collective system of assurance against war is now being tested—and the world will at last have the foundation on which it can rebuild its civilization, and rebuild it securely.”

Yet this argument would seem weightier to average British minds if it were stated otherwise; if, that is to say, it set out to prove that the economic crisis of our civilization is directly attributable to fear of war and to belief in the likelihood of war. No nation will scrap its plethoric war industries, many of which are indistinguishable from peace industries, as long as it feels bound to keep them up to the highest point of efficiency because they may at any moment be needed for national defense against attack from outside. This superabundance of highly efficient industries, equipped with “labor-saving” machinery and a multitude of scientific devices, is responsible for much of the present unemployment. The productive capacity of Europe, to say nothing of the United States, is far in excess of any potential market. This excess, in its turn, creates at once the economic problem of unemployment and the social problem of leaving millions of workless men and women helpless and hopeless, prone, in their despair, to be receptive of subversive doctrines and making of them, in their capacity as political citizens endowed with votes, an element of political instability.

Sooner or later this immense evil must receive international treatment. Such treatment cannot be given by nations that suspect each other of aggressive designs. Their fears and suspicions find expression in war talk which ends by creating an atmosphere unfavorable to the acceptance of the risks of disarmament. So things go round in a vicious circle which no statesman or government has yet had the wit to break through.

As I have said, nobody can feel sure that the world will be fit for peace and disarmament on the hither side of further war and revolution. It is not certain that the nations care enough for peace to incur, open-eyed, the responsibility of saying and meaning that they will, at all costs, stand together against war and war-makers. In a concrete case like that of the Far Eastern conflict, nations and their governments weigh more or less carefully the respective advantages and disadvantages of the bold course; and some, like the British Government hitherto, have been disposed to think that, on the whole, it is less disadvantageous to let things slide than firmly to call wrongdoers to order in the name of universal principles. Moreover—and this consideration has undoubtedly played a part in determining the behavior of Great Britain toward Japan—some nations suspect

that the support which the United States Government has given to the League of Nations, and Mr. Stimson's recent interpretation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, were inspired in no small degree by a direct American interest in the problem of the Pacific. Hence the manifest tendency, in London and elsewhere, to look the American gift horse in the mouth. Only the small nations, whose very existence may depend upon the observance of League Covenant and Kellogg Pact, welcomed unreservedly the policy of the United States from the outset, and saw in it the one hope of developing a new international order. The bigger nations marked time even when they did not put sand into the wheels of the international peace machinery.

* * *

The fateful question therefore arises whether the pressure of world opinion, upon which Mr. Stimson and others rely as "one of the most potent sanctions of the world," can be brought into operation with sufficient force and soon enough to discharge its hypothetical function either in the Sino-Japanese dispute or in the correlated issue of disarmament. On one condition I think it can. The condition is that a new conception of peace be speedily placed before the peoples, and that some leading Government associate itself whole-heartedly with this conception. It must be a conception of peace as a great adventure, the adventure of winning a right of entry into a new phase of human life in which war between nations will be accounted as unworthy as armed burglary is to-day. Given such an ideal, the foremost peoples of the world would take nonwar in their stride as they marched toward it. They will never look upon nonwar as a sufficient ideal in itself.

Some months ago, one of the elder boys in an ancient English Public School put to me a searching question. It was: "If war can be got rid of, will life be worth living in a world at peace?" On the spur of the moment I answered: "Since the attempt to get rid of war is the most revolutionary thing men have ever tried to do, the adventure of building up or creating an active state of peace in a world beyond war would be thrilling. We cannot even get rid of war without changing so many of our notions and habits that our particular way of life would go to pieces unless a better way could be found. The search for this better way would tax our hearts and minds to the utmost. It would give us fuller openings for heroism and self-sacrifice than war has ever offered. It would become a constant fight against evils which men have hitherto thought unconquerable. Compared with the bad old business of killing, which has now become a sort of scientific, anonymous mass murder, it would be a glorious enterprise."

My answer seemed to kindle the imagination of the questioner and his schoolmates. On reflection, I realized its inadequacy. In truth, we have thought so little about peace that few, if any, of us are yet able to conceive, even dimly, what peace might be. We know only that peace would not tolerate such a spectacle as we have witnessed during the past few years, when some regions of the world have been stifling in unsaleable abundance while others have been starving in the direst penury. Peace would not leave control of the sources of material wealth in private hands merely for private gain, but, while safeguarding individual freedom to the fullest extent compatible with social discipline, would look upon political citizenship and economic citizenship as interchangeable terms. The subjugation of the forces of nature, the extension of knowledge, the divination of physical secrets would increase, beyond compute, openings for the efforts of the pioneers who to-day, at the risk of their lives, work in laboratories or count personal security as naught in exploring the depths of the ocean or the upper atmosphere. Endowed with the vast resources that would be set free by the elimination of military and naval costs, these pioneers would be reckoned by hundreds of thousands where to-day they are counted by hundreds or thousands. Men would perceive what seers have long known—that the supreme sanction of human life is to serve other lives in high endeavor which, whether it succeed or fail, bears the ennobling stamp of selflessness.

Above all, peace would swiftly answer, at the very outset, the enigma which broods over our civilization. It would take as an axiom the principle that the object of civilization is to make better men and women, not better machines, and that the standard by which the value of mechanical advance must be judged is its effect upon the quality of human life. Peace would meet triumphantly the challenge of such systems as Communism and Fascism to liberal thought and liberal systems of society, for it would enable liberal civilization—which is a joint product of Renaissance and Reformation—so to transform itself as to offer a more attractive and, withal, a more dynamic alternative to any apotheosis of intolerance propped up by the armed force of fanatical minorities.

Do we care for peace? The answer cannot be given solely in terms of the prevention of war. It can only be given in terms of an ideal transcending that of mere warlessness, and opening up prospects of infinite progress in mutual helpfulness among individuals and nations toward the creation of a world worthy, at last, of Man and his Maker.

The Buchman Movement: An Attempt at an Impartial Appraisal

ERDMAN HARRIS

THE movement known as "Buchmanism" is an interesting phenomenon in the religious life of our day. Its adherents prefer to call it "A First Century Christian Fellowship," or "the Oxford Groups," or, simply, "the Groups." It has no organization, no machinery, no dues, no official list of members. It has no elaborate offices, or secretaries, or executives. In the words of one of its ablest apologists, it is a "spiritual fellowship of those whose lives have been influenced through Mr. Frank Buchman or his associates." Its purpose, as stated by Bishop Roots of China, is "to reclaim for the established churches their rightful heritage of vital Christianity." Its fundamental beliefs have been stated as follows:

"1. The need for the unconditional surrender of the human will to the will of God made manifest in Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour.

"2. The need for continuous, daily contact with God through the reading of the Bible, through prayer, and through listening for the voice of the Holy Spirit.

"3. The need for every Christian to witness for Christ, and to bring others to him."

To these, thus stated in 1928, might be added a fourth: the need for working in and through and with a group of like-minded, consecrated individuals.

The Rev. Samuel M. Shoemaker, Jr., rector of Calvary Church (Protestant Episcopal), in New York City, and a leader of the movement, in commenting on these "fundamental beliefs," says: "Anyone can see that here is only what has been emphasized again and again in Christian history, generally with an arousal of the church as its fruit. There is nothing here that is novel. It is a demand for a New Testament Christianity, such as you find in the Acts of the Apostles." But in spite of this, many people do find something "novel" in it—at least, startlingly new in the way it works out in the life of our day. The informal, religious, week-end house parties, given over to group meetings of prayer and testimony, certainly hold a good deal of novelty for those who attend. It is "novel" to hear a stockbroker talking naturally about "the guidance of the Holy Spirit," to hear a society woman testifying to her observance of a morning "quiet time,"

to listen to a professor of international law publicly acknowledging Jesus Christ as the source of a life made new through conversion. It is true that there have been expressions of spiritual experience such as this all down through the history of the church, from the enthusiastic testimony of early believers around the shores of the Mediterranean to that of the men and women converted during the religious revivals of the nineteenth century in America. But there are features of this newer movement that seem distinctive, not to say unique. This may be partly a matter of emphasis. It is also partly a question of the unusual combination of elements represented by their philosophy, their practice, and their personnel. However one analyzes it, the fact remains that "Buchmanism," along with Barthianism and socialism, is one of the most frequently recurring topics of conversation among religious people to-day.

Who is the man whose name has been used as the basis for an "ism"? What is his story? What is the source of his influence? Frank N. D. Buchman was born almost fifty-five years ago in Pennsburg, Pa. He studied at Perkiomen Seminary and the Allentown High School. He took a B.A. from Muhlenberg College in 1899. In 1902 Muhlenberg awarded him his M.A., and in 1926 conferred a D.D. upon him. After graduating from college he studied theology at the Mount Airy Lutheran Seminary in Philadelphia and, later, at Westminster College, Cambridge, England. He was ordained to the ministry in 1902, and received his first call from the Church of the Good Shepherd, Overbrook, Pa. For the next seven years he was engaged in founding and building up what is said to have been the first Lutheran Hospice in America as well as the first Lutheran Settlement. One of his summers during this period was spent in an intensive study of evangelism in Europe.

In 1908, Mr. Buchman traveled throughout the Near East. A year later he was requested by Dr. John R. Mott to take up the secretaryship of the Student Y. M. C. A. at State College, Pennsylvania. It was there that he spent another period of seven years, working out the implications of his religious message and approach, which have remained essentially the same ever since. His program in this academic community was regarded, among those *en rapport* with the Student Christian movement, as an extraordinarily significant piece of work. Some of the most widely known stories of conversion effected by him come from these years. The "Bill Pickle Story" is perhaps the most famous. It is an account of the transformation of three lives—the most popular undergraduate, the college dean, and the chief bootlegger of the town—and may be found in a recently pub-

lished account of the movement written by a sympathizer, *For Sinners Only*, by A. J. Russell.

During 1915-16, Mr. Buchman traveled through India, Japan, and Korea with Sherwood Eddy. He became convinced that what the missionaries almost universally lacked was a technique of winning individuals, even when they possessed the necessary message and consecration. Howard Walter of India, the author of *Soul-Surgery*, was also concerned about the lack of methods and motives for personal evangelism, and urged Mr. Buchman to accept a call to become extension lecturer on work with individuals under the Hartford Theological Foundation, on his return to America in 1916. Mr. Buchman took the position, and attracted a great deal of interest by his unusual approach to the problem.

In May, 1917, however, he severed his academic connections, and organized a "team" of fifteen or twenty peripatetic evangelists. The next two years were spent with this group in China, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. In 1918, in Peking, Dr. Samuel M. Shoemaker, Jr., met Mr. Buchman and his party, was challenged, converted early in 1919, and added to the personnel of the "team."

During this period the group became convinced of the necessity for getting away periodically from the whirl of activities for quiet, refreshment, prayer, and planning. For this purpose retreats were held. At these, experiences were shared and methods discussed. Others than the workers themselves were included. Those definitely interested in deepening their own Christian life attended, from time to time. Individuals found it possible to speak more frankly of their inner struggles and aspirations than they had imagined they could. Mr. Buchman learned how to create the atmosphere in which testimony seemed natural, confession appropriate. And these group meetings and week-end retreats came to be known as "house parties." Bishop Whitehead once indicated his belief that these were not new in religious history by speaking before a gathering of the Fellowship at Limpley Stoke, England, on the topic, "A house party in Judea and what came of it." But certainly the term, as used to-day in connection with the Buchman movement, has a special significance.

From 1919 to the present time, "Frank" has been steadily at work. He has worked hard and long. His capacity for sustained and disciplined activity is little short of amazing. He never even gives the impression of being hectic, or in undue haste, yet his time is as completely filled with appointments as that of a high-powered business executive. The movement has spread all over the world. Everywhere it has gone it has won

vigorous converts and made violent enemies. It has been a bone of contention among Oxford and Cambridge undergraduates, with controversies raging in the London papers. It has stirred up the campuses of Yale, Colgate, Smith, Vassar. At Princeton, Doctor Shoemaker and other members of the Fellowship were, for a number of years, the dominating influence in the voluntary religious organizations. The undergraduates and the administration finally got so upset about the undercurrent of rumors concerning the group's emphasis on sex, confession, and emotionalism, that an investigation was conducted by a supposedly impartial committee; the rumors were in the main proved to be either exaggerated or false, but the subsequent reverberations caused the withdrawal of Mr. Buchman's followers and the establishment of quite a different religious policy, in charge of an experienced dean of the chapel.

The movement has spread to Germany, Holland, and South Africa. Mr. Buchman is known the world over in religious circles. He has had the ear of queens and maharajahs, of generals and diplomats, of bishops and college presidents. Some of these high-placed people count themselves members of the groups. The funds for the support of this world-wide activity come, in the main, from unsolicited voluntary subscriptions. The rich who have become interested have been generous to a fault.

There have appeared three types of writing about the movement: books and articles by members and defenders of the Fellowship, written from the inside; articles and chapters written in violent opposition and criticism; and a very few attempts to describe and appraise it in a judicial way, neither excessively pro nor con. The best books representing the first type are: *Life Changers*, by Harold Begbie (published in England as *More Twice-Born Men*); *Children of the Second Birth*, and *Twice-Born Ministers*, by Samuel M. Shoemaker, Jr.; and *For Sinners Only*, by A. J. Russell. These are all well written, but they have the enthusiasm of devoted partisanship in them, and there is found, here and there throughout, a tendency to romanticize: rather ordinary members of the Fellowship are called "troubadours," "gamblers," "adventurers," "princesses"; the charm of certain characters is exaggerated—of one fairly but not notably popular man it is said, "Everybody knew him, everybody liked him"; another man of fair-to-middling literary gifts is called "a brilliant writer"; the adjectives and adverbs are chosen to heighten the effect; the testimony to vivid personal experiences is also highly colored. But the books are decidedly worth reading.

The definitely critical essays are well represented by the chapter on

"Buchmanism" in Charles W. Ferguson's *Confusion of Tongues*. In this we find that "Buchmanism is a religion with sex appeal," that it attracts a "respectable grade of convert" and works in a "plush environment." Ernest Mandeville, writing of the Fellowship in the *Forum*, betrays his bias by his phraseology. In describing the welcoming of guests to a religious house party, he talks of them as the "sheep" who are led in for their "spiritual shearing."

Of the more objective and impartial accounts, perhaps the best is a series of two articles which appeared in *The Churchman* for December 1 and 8, 1928, written by J. T. Addison, Angus Dun, and Charles L. Taylor, Jr., of the faculty of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Here we find no violent indictment and no propensity to romanticize. This sort of material is not as interesting to read as that representing either of the two other types, but it surely should be studied along with them, if one would get a complete picture of the movement.

Let us now examine a few of the methods by which the Fellowship carries on its activities. One of these is the house party, the genesis of which has already been indicated. The procedure for setting one up is somewhat as follows: A place is chosen, often an attractive hotel or country home. People are invited. An inner group of fully committed individuals meet in advance to decide upon the program "under the guidance of the Holy Spirit." Usually a number of the avowed sympathizers are asked to come, but along with these will be invited the men and women who "need changing." In most cases a good deal of preliminary work has been done with these interested outsiders by members of the Fellowship. They are not unprepared for what is to take place. Only rarely do they come in ignorance of the procedure. Nowadays, they are practically never inveigled into attending under false pretences. An informal committee of welcome makes everyone feel at home. People call each other readily by their first names or nick-names. The group sessions of the house party are held in as comfortable and attractive room as can be secured. If it is in winter, there may be easy-chairs around an open fire, with bowls of apples and nuts on the tables. The leader of the opening session makes sure that people know each other, and then proceeds to create the atmosphere which is one of the unique contributions of the movement to the life of our time.

This is done first by a few disarming opening remarks about the naturalness of fellowship and the foolishness of self-consciousness in the presence of other human beings. There may be a good deal of humor

sprinkled through the discourse. This is to be no ordinary prayer-meeting. Everyone is to feel at his ease. He may stay or leave. He may talk or remain silent. He may laugh or, perhaps, be moved to quiet tears. He may sit still or move around. Or he may ask a member of the group to leave the meeting with him and talk privately. After all this has been made clear, a number of self-confessed insiders may testify briefly to their own spiritual experience. They will tell of their lives before conversion, or "B. C.," as one of them used to put it. They will tell of the difficulty they had in bringing themselves to the point of surrender to God, and their unhappiness in being challenged by something to which they did not have the courage to yield. Then comes the story of their conversion, the happiness that accompanied it, the spiritual results that flowed from it. Gradually those of the group who have not themselves squarely faced the need for this same unconditional consecration of life to the will of God begin to feel uncomfortable, and to wish they had something—some vital experience of life—which was as worth talking about as that to which these ardent and happy people are testifying.

Things begin to happen. Men and women who have never spoken about the things of the spirit publicly begin to tell where they are falling short, and confess their need of Christ. Others follow. A few in attendance may be nonplussed, or baffled, or shocked, or disgusted with these revelations. But humor and sanity and a healthy positive moral atmosphere are usually maintained by those in charge. The group meetings are followed up by individual interviews, walks through nearby woods or parks, and earnest discussions far on into the night. And at the center of it all is the emphasis on the same old fundamental principles: the necessity for surrender, for spiritual food, for winning others, and for working with the group. This, in the barest and most insufficient outline, is the truth about house parties!

Now what do people object to in all this? Of course, the question almost answers itself. First there is the charge of emotionalism. It is declared that the stage is set, the atmosphere created, the old members and recent converts primed to tell of their experiences. It is made almost too easy to confess. And then one may be led to say things which he regrets in the cold sober light of the morning after. Furthermore, some of the converts undoubtedly like the attention they secure by the recital of their spiritual autobiographies; and there is occasionally noted a tendency to heighten, in the telling, the dramatic elements in one's past. Then again, in order to have something to confess, a person may be lured into ran-

sacking the cellar of his consciousness for forgotten peccadillos. Now and then as serious a bit of bad behavior as marital infidelity is owned up to in public in such a way as to involve other people, whereas at other times a bit of petty dishonesty, such as hinting that one has read a book when one has not, is related as an example of the kind of thing that can stand between a person and God. Often really remarkable things happen: a man confesses to his falsification of his income-tax report and then and there resolves to make it right, no matter what the consequences; a woman may testify to the jealousy and spite which have poisoned her relationships with a certain member of her family, and thereupon resolve to admit her unchristian attitude and start over again. But there are many who object to having these things said in a meeting. They feel that confession should be to God, or the person or persons wronged. They believe that the procedure of the Fellowship encourages psychological exhibitionism, self-dramatization, and, at times, insincerity. They even question the strong emphasis upon positive personal testimony about the inner life as fostering a propensity to speak beyond conviction and to testify beyond experience.

One further difficulty has been the supposed prominence of confessions (at house parties) about unconventional sex behavior. In a society such as ours tabus about sex almost universally exist, and are very generally disregarded. Mr. Buchman and his associates know this. If one accuses them of being unrealistic or morbid in their belief about it, all one need do is to appeal to the practicing psychiatrists, who certainly agree with them about the extent of unsanctioned sexual thought and action. The psychologists' attitude toward the problem is quite different from that of the Fellowship, but both groups understand its magnitude. Now it is to be expected that from time to time those who confess to sin at all will mention their sex transgressions. Confessions at group meetings have sometimes been of this nature. All sorts of exaggerated stories have been told about the frankness of these admissions. There is some truth in the reports, but it can easily be overemphasized, and the movement has grown away from stress upon the seriousness of sexual sins out of proportion to their results in life and their importance as over against sins of the spirit. Since sin is defined as anything which separates an individual from God or from other people, and the therapeutic value of confession is firmly believed in, it is inevitable that sex difficulties will be revealed, or at any rate suggested, during sessions of "sharing." But the leaders of the Fellowship, conscious of the problem and sensitive to legitimate criticism, feel that there is no cause for alarm about this feature of the work.

The Fellowship is accused of other things: of advocating the passive acceptance of "divine guidance" in place of hard thinking, of neglecting the social gospel almost entirely, of kowtowing to the rich and the socially prominent, of maintaining a pharisaical and holier-than-thou attitude toward others engaged in religious work along different lines, of not making earnest with the findings of modern psychology, of being incurably old-fashioned in theology (in regard to the nature of both man and God), of "buttonholing" individuals against their will and forcing religion upon them, and of emotionally unsettling nervous people. Many of these charges are untrue in the form in which they are made. Some of the more judicious criticism comes from a real conviction that the Fellowship represents an unbalanced emphasis in religion; some antagonism comes from misunderstanding of and ignorance about the movement; some opposition probably proceeds from jealousy that such vital results should be produced by a comparatively young group of workers; and much criticism undoubtedly comes from troubled consciences.

But, leaving these things to one side, let us now examine another cardinal belief of the group: the availability of God's guidance for the conduct of one's daily life. In Harold Begbie's *Life Changers*, there occurs this passage:

Fuller acquaintance with F. B. brings to one's mind the knowledge that in spite of his boyish cheerfulness he is of the house and lineage of all true mystics, from Plotinus to Tolstoy. His mysticism, indeed, might suggest even a surrender to superstition. He attributes, without question, to the Deity certain motions in himself which another might well assign to movements of his own unconsciousness. For example, it is his habit to wake very early from sleep, and to devote an hour or more to complete silence of soul and body; in this silence he is listening for the voice from heaven, and the voice comes to him, and he receives his orders for the day—he is to write to one man, he is to call upon another, and so on. Psychologists would tell him that those orders proceed from his own unconsciousness, and are the fruits of sleep's mentation; the harvest of yesterday's thoughts and solitudes.

Such an explanation, of course, does not rob these motions of their spiritual value. But it is an explanation, I think, which may help those whose conception of the Deity entirely prevents them from believing either in his interposition or his colloquies with the human soul. It may help such as these to realize that a sincere acquiescence in the divine Will may enable the human will more perfectly to apprehend the spiritual influences of its environment, and to act more concordantly upon the intuitions of its own spirit. Mystery remains; but it is a mystery which neither detracts from the unimaginable glory of God nor degrades the human spirit to the mechanical level of a gramophone.

The mysticism of F. B. shows itself more normally, and one might say more old-fashionedly, in his unquestioning conviction that there is a blessing in reading the Bible (quite apart from the literary blessing of feeding the mind on such beauti-

ful English), and also in his faith that sincere prayer, even for material help, is constantly answered. But his great emphasis, I think, is laid on spiritual silence, and the article of his faith which more than any other seems to give him his unique power is the mystical notion that in every man there is a "piece of divinity" hungering and thirsting for expression, a piece of divinity which best makes its presence felt to the soul in periods of silence.

He sees a significant parable in the scriptural incident of the blind man healed by the touch of Jesus. . . . F. B. tells those who come to him that so long as they see men in the mass, see them as a forest, their spiritual eyes are only half opened; to see them individually, man by man, and each man as a piece of divinity, an heir of eternal life, requires the second touch of the spiritual hand—the miracle of conversion.

I have quoted at length from one of the leading apologists of the movement because of the lucidity of his presentation. The members of the Fellowship strive for the attainment of these mystical experiences. Most of them claim to have had them. After the preliminary disciplines have been faithfully observed (disciplines which will be described in a moment), the converts testify to a vivid and bracing and vital sense of union with God. This affects the whole life—the whole outlook on life. First of all, it consists of a tingling sense of happiness that one is right with God, that one's sins are forgiven, that one has been born from above. This is coupled with a belief that temptations can be overcome and other people be won to Christ through the Holy Spirit. The intellectual accompaniments of this are a vision of the world as a unified system with the will of God ruling and able to function through anyone who will surrender completely to him. But this is not all, as Harold Begbie has pointed out; the unique feature of the experience comes in the belief in the possibility of God giving one directions—detailed directions—for the proper living of daily life. These directions are often specific, and, when literally followed out, lead to the most amazing results. The genius of this mystical approach to God seems to me to lie in the fact that when the members of the Fellowship pray for guidance they actually count on getting it! They do not merely say, "O Lord, give me strength for my day's work;" they say, "O Lord, I am ready to hear what you want me to do at 9 o'clock this morning." But this experience of peace, power, joy, and direction is not won easily. It is the direct result of fulfilling certain conditions. There must be preparatory disciplines. Exponents of this religious approach often use the words of Jesus about "seeking," "asking," and "knocking," pointing out that to "find," to "receive," or to have the door "opened," means our first fulfilling the conditions. What are these conditions?

The process may be slowly gone through or suddenly consummated, but it usually consists of the following steps:

1. *Conviction* of sin. It is necessary that an individual first come face to face with the fact that he is a worthless, miserable sinner. If there is any doubt about that fact all a person has to do is to contrast his own unworthy and impure life with the spotless purity and holiness of Jesus. This profound humiliation and sense of guilt is the necessary prelude to any complete and satisfactory surrender to a Holy God.

2. *Confession* must be made. Often confession is made simply to the person to whom one is talking when the conviction of one's own unworthiness sweeps over the soul. The confession does not necessarily have to be in detail. It may be simply to God. The relief which comes when one shares one's failures with another is part of the process of being born again, and is best done to another, who sympathizes, or, better yet, to a group.

3. *Surrender* to God, complete and unconditional. There must be no reservations about this. It must be a complete willingness to do whatever God says, to go wherever he directs, to be whatever he desires one to be. The content of what this involves has usually been interpreted by the Fellowship along strictly orthodox puritanical lines (as regards sex morality), absolute honesty, willingness to dedicate one's life to Christian work, willingness to try to bring others to this same condition of unconditional surrender.

Now, when these steps have been taken, the promise is that the vital mystical experience, which is the living dynamic of the movement, will be felt, and it happens in case after case, according to the testimony of the converts. This experience is the thing which they say makes life worth living, makes the reborn life absolutely different from the ordinary life of the once-born soul or the person who is living in sin. Hence mysticism is no peripheral matter with these people. It is central. The achievement of the experience, and the helping others to achieve the experience, is the *summum bonum* of the Christian life. The whole concept of the kingdom of God is based on the idea of a community of spirits bound together by the common consciousness of having passed through similar experiences and of having achieved similar visions of reality. And these enthusiasms in turn are based on the practical results of the whole thing: peace, power, joy, and guidance.

In Mr. Begbie's *Life Changers* you will find examples of individuals who have gone through the process and achieved the result. Even more striking is the testimony found in Doctor Shoemaker's *Children of the*

Second Birth, which records the "spiritual miracles" that took place at Calvary Church, of which he is rector. Here one reads stories of people vitally changed: a sex pervert, a conventional young business man, a social worker. Each and every one testifies to the experience of conversion. Each and every one has found the mystical result to a greater or a less degree. Some of the very best stories of all are included in the recently issued *For Sinners Only*.

We need spend no more time on the actual transformations that have occurred. Anyone interested can consult the literature on the subject, or go to a house party, or talk to a member of the Fellowship. Neither need we analyze further the general mystical experiences of union and exhilaration and poise which are universally acknowledged, for this is in no way unique; it is to be found in many places to-day. The aspect of the Fellowship's mysticism which is most interesting, unusual, and compelling is their idea of divine guidance in the form of "hunches," which are detailed directions for the conduct of life.

Let me give a few random examples. Mr. Buchman was once in a certain steamship office, about to buy a ticket. He was especially anxious to get on a particular boat because some people he wanted to "reach" were planning to travel that way. Just as he was preparing to make his reservations he received an unmistakable message to go to the office of an entirely different line and purchase his passage on one of their boats. He did so, following what he believed to be the direct guidance of God. Sure enough, when he got on the second ship, the very people with whom he was so anxious to sail were also aboard.

He tells also of the time when, on his way from New York to another city by train, he received a clear call to get off the train and take the next one back to New York. The name of an individual flashed through his mind. He must see him. When he arrived he went straight to the man's hotel. He went to his room, knocked on the door. The man appeared, white-faced and shaken. He had been about to commit suicide. "Frank" helped him to piece his life together; saved him, in fact.

These "hunches" are usually for the guidance of the people to whom they come. However, sometimes "hunches" come about what someone else ought to do. Then, if the other person does not receive the same message, a real difficulty arises. The theory is that if both people were completely God-guided, both would receive the same message. Once Mr. Buchman had a persistent message involving another's marital plans, and told the other person how he had missed the way owing to his insensitivity

to guidance. The secretary of the Christian Association at one of our Eastern colleges received guidance that a certain undergraduate was to give up his leadership in the university musical-dramatic club in order to devote more time to the Christian Association. The undergraduate did not receive a similar "hunch." Whereat the secretary told him that he was missing the will of God for him, and accused him of seeking social advancement through the heading-up of an important organization. Maybe he was right; but there is surely room for a difference of opinion about both the conviction and the method.

Some very wonderful things have happened as a result of "guidance." Those who do not believe in all this would call them coincidences or explain them by some such mechanism as telepathy. When guidance to do something conflicts with an obvious earthly duty, the guidance must often be followed even at the risk of seeming neglectful.

The secretary of a college religious society was preparing to have a meeting of the board of directors. Important men were carving out precious hours from busy programs to be present. The day before the gathering the secretary got guidance to go elsewhere, and went. The directors arrived in town for the meeting with no adequate provision having been made for a substitute leader. The secretary had followed guidance as over against the dictates of ordinary obligation.

How is one to know when "hunches" come from God? The answer is, even from the Fellowship's point of view, that you cannot be sure. However, the first thing to inquire, with regard to any prompting, is this: does it check with the spirit of Jesus and the New Testament? Is it *pure*? Is it *honest*? Is it *unselfish*? Is it *loving*? If it passes these four tests, it must be tried. If it "works," that is, if it seems to have led to some useful end, then it is from God. If it does not work, then it is either not from God, or it is an example of God's testing whether one will be obedient in advance of all possible verification. It should be added that, more and more, individual members of the Fellowship check their guidance on important matters with that of others in the group. The authoritative treatment of the whole subject, from the Buchman point of view, is contained in a charmingly written pamphlet, *The Guidance of God*, by Eleanor Forde.

Now, obviously, if all the promptings to activity that come to us during the day were checked up as to whether or not they were pure, honest, unselfish, and loving, and only those acted upon which passed the test, we would probably live far better lives than we do. Many Christians have observed the psychological and spiritual equivalent of this from time im-

memorial, if they have been true Christians. "Walking with God" or "keeping close to Christ" are formulæ with identical meanings. Living a "Christ-centered life" is the same thing. In one form or other, ordinary Christian mystics have appropriated the reality behind this particular discipline.

The thing which worries many of those who follow the ideas of the Fellowship as far as the necessity for a Christ-centered life, but who cannot go on to the detailed guidance program, is the reliance on "hunches" which cannot be tested by common sense until after they have been acted upon. This seems to them rather ghoulish, weird, creepy, spooky. It partakes of clairvoyance, second sight, and so forth. It smacks of superstition. It does not seem to have psychological standing, or scientific reinforcement, with the possible exception of its depending upon some form of telepathy, the very existence of which is still in dispute.

However, Mr. Buchman and his followers are not primarily interested in explanations but in experiences. The movement in England has attracted into it a few philosophically minded men and women, who will probably work out some sort of *apologia*, which may have an effect upon the movement itself. In America and in most other places it has appealed very largely to people who are not primarily thoughtful, but metaphysically uncritical and practically active. They are much more interested in sharing their vital experience with others than in formulating a *rationale*. And in this, as in many other respects, they are actually quite like those from whom they take their name, the Christians of the First Century. They have the same simple and dynamic enthusiasm for Christ, the same belief in the ever-present power of the Holy Spirit, the same interesting combination of faith and daring. And for one who, like the writer of this article, was deeply and helpfully affected by them at a critical time in his career, but who now cannot agree completely with either their message or their methods, they nevertheless have a fascination and an appeal from which he is not likely ever to escape.

Religion and the Dynamic of Progress

THOMAS NIXON CARVER

UNTIL the middle of the nineteenth century there was no generally accepted belief in progress. Whether the world was, on the whole, progressing or retrograding was a much-debated question, and each side had its proponents. From the middle of the nineteenth century until the cataclysm of the World War, progress was pretty generally accepted as a reality, almost as a matter of course, by the Western World.

Two things seem to have turned the scale in favor of the belief in progress. The opening up of the vast food resources of the New World, through transportation and machinery, seemed to have permanently solved the food problem and given men a sense of security, even a sense of mastery over their own fate. Then came the Darwinian theory of evolution. Darwin did not, of course, invent the idea of evolution. He simply convinced the scientific world that it *did* take place by explaining a method which showed how it *could* take place. When men began to feel that they had gained some degree of mastery over their own economic fate, and were no longer battling with forces which were beyond their understanding, and when they began to believe that evolution or development was the order of nature, a sort of universal law, they naturally "perked up" and began to talk about progress as though it were a demonstrable fact. Disbelievers were a small and cantankerous minority.

With the belief in progress once firmly established, men began to concern themselves with an analysis of the factors which tend to accelerate or retard it. Religion came in for its share of commendation and criticism—commendation by those who believed it to be a factor in progress, criticism from those who believed that it retarded progress. Its relation to human progress became a sort of philosopher's stone with which to evaluate religion. In order to get a satisfactory background for this discussion, it is necessary to review, at some length, the various uses that have been made of variation and selection as the method of evolution by social philosophers and others who have identified evolution and progress.

Darwin's formula was simple enough. Individuals within a group or species vary. They are born in slightly varying sizes and shapes, with slightly varying strength and brain capacity. Unless they all live, which rarely happens because of food shortage, the ones best adapted to their environment are selected by the environment to survive and to propagate

their fitness for living, while those least adapted perish. Briefly, variation and selection describe the process by which evolution goes on. Naturally, nothing in the nature of life can evolve from creatures that die before they can propagate themselves. Life itself, and therefore biological evolution, Darwin showed, is in the hands of the best adapted. Professor Karl Pearson explains the Darwinian concept as follows:

"The main principle of evolution by natural selection is based upon four factors: (a) that characters are variable, (b) that characters are inherited, (c) that there is a selective death-rate, that is, that individuals possessing characters or combinations of characters in a higher or less degree than other individuals die, on the whole, sooner or later than the latter; (d) that those individuals who die early leave fewer offspring than those who die late."¹

This formula of Darwin's has become so much of a truism in biology that it is difficult to realize what an important part it played, during an age still ruled by theological dogma, in turning the idea of evolution into a scientific tool. Biologists have already gone far beyond Darwin. They are asking now, What causes variation? What makes individuals different? They believe if they can only learn how to control variation, they can, knowing the requirements of a given environment, make adaptation, and so survival, more or less automatic—for whom you will. They simply ask to be given a free-hand with the germ plasm. They took their hint, none the less, from Darwin.

It would have been strange if a convincing demonstration of the method of biological evolution had not been full of leading strings for the sociologist. Remember—the idea of social evolution, in Darwin's time, while existing, was hardly more than a philosophic hope. Social progress was an idea hardly more substantial than a dream. The writers who took up the Darwinian formula and applied it to the study of society were able at least to demonstrate an exact method by which social evolution could take place. As Karl Pearson remarks,

"The insight which the investigations of Darwin, seconded by the suggestive, but far less permanent work of Spencer, have given us into the development of both individual and social life, has compelled us to remodel our historical ideas and is slowly widening and consolidating our moral standards."²

We thus find, for instance, that Vacher de Lapouge organized the facts of social life rather neatly around Darwin's theory.³ He simply

¹ Karl Pearson: *The Function of Science in the Modern State*, Cambridge University Press, 1919, p. 3.

² Karl Pearson: *The Grammar of Science*, Adam and Charles Black, London, 1911, p. 1.

³ The three important books of Lapouge are: *Les Sélections Sociales*, Paris, 1896; *L'Aryen; Son rôle social*, Paris, 1899; *Race et milieu social*, Paris, 1909. The first is enough to give even the more than average student on sociology a sufficient idea of Lapouge's general theories.

transferred and applied the Darwinian concept of evolution to human societies considered as living entities. In racial evolution, he argued, there is variation and selection just as there is in all the world of life. Races are varieties of men that struggle for survival. They cannot all live and expand for lack of space and food. If there is such a thing as human progress, it is because the race that is better adapted than others to its environment lives longer as a race and prospers, while the others fade away into historical oblivion. Men, he reasoned, have no more of an innate tendency to progress than have plants and animals. If progress comes, it comes because the unfit fail to propagate their kind.

This sounds like pure biology. But Lapouge explains that human evolution is social and not biological, because the human environment is social and not merely physical. Life in general has to adapt itself to a purely physical world; nature is the only judge of what varieties of life shall survive. Human beings, as individuals, have to adapt themselves to social institutions—to war, politics, economic competition, the church, morals, legal control, jails and gibbets. It is conformity to social standards which determines what individuals shall survive. Only indirectly and ultimately is physical nature the arbiter of individual survival.

But what determines which groups shall survive? This is a question which is not likely to occur to any but a trained sociologist. He realizes that the process of selection is the weeding out of social groups as well as of individuals. While the individual's survival depends, to a considerable degree, upon his conformity to the mores of the group, the survival of the group depends, to an equal degree, upon the conformity of its mores to the conditions which surround it. When surrounded, for example, by hostile groups who have easy access to its hunting grounds, the group's survival will depend to a considerable extent upon its fighting power; and this, in turn, upon a multitude of factors—mores, institutions, organizations—which contribute to that fighting power. When surrounded by barriers which shut out invaders, or when occupying a territory so poor as not to tempt invaders, its survival will not depend so much on fighting power as on productive power. Productive power, in turn, depends upon factors different from those which contribute to fighting power.

There are variations among groups as among individuals. There is also selection of the favorable variations and extinction of the unfavorable variations among groups as well as among individuals. The actual process by which the evolution of social groups proceeds is identical with that by which individual evolution proceeds. The difference is in the factors

which determine group survival on the one hand and individual survival on the other hand.

Yet there is much in Lapouge's work that is of very questionable value. There is not much doubt that he made a fundamental error in picking out the survival of race rather than the survival of the social group as the key to social evolution. There may be such a thing as race.⁴ If social institutions affect the survival of one race or another, racial evolution may be called social. But social evolution is much more than the survival of races best adapted to social institutions; it is also the survival of social institutions themselves, of political systems, religions, moralities and other organized means of social control. Social institutions are themselves socially evolved through the struggle of political rather than racial groups for political ascendancy. Political groups are socially more fundamental than racial groups.

When political ascendancy hangs in the balance, it matters very much to a group how efficient are its social institutions in making men willing and able to live and work together. If one group is more socially efficient than other groups, it can usually starve these out—sometimes into physical death, always into political oblivion.⁵ It lives longer as a group. It propagates itself in a social way, through the imitation of its institutions. If social progress means anything in a Darwinian sense, it means that, through the struggle of varying political groups for political survival, human beings are adapting themselves to group life, and through group life, to the universe of nature.

Benjamin Kidd caught at this idea. He talked, it is true, about all kinds of struggles for existence—between individuals, classes, races, nations—and not always very clearly.⁶ This much, anyway, he emphasized to the profit of sociology: the struggle of social groups for survival results in the success of the socially efficient. Social progress is possible, but only through the sacrifice of individuals that are least adapted to social life.

Leaning always on Darwinism, Kidd developed his theory that religion has played a leading rôle in social progress. While men were still animals, he argued, and struggling with other animals for survival the human brain evolved; and reason, evolving, was victorious in the struggle. But men, with their greater intelligence, while they were slowly becoming

⁴In biological evolution race has clearly been important.

⁵Numbers and material resources, naturally, must be somewhere nearly equal, or they must be considered as upsetting factors.

⁶See the excellent account of Kidd by Bristol in *Social Adaptation*, pp. 85ff. Bristol discusses, among other things, Kidd's law of "projected efficiency," which it does not seem necessary to consider here.

social creatures, were not at all exempt from a struggle for survival; there was struggle among individuals within a group and between groups. In the struggle for group survival, individuals have to be sacrificed. Now, how, asks Kidd, could intelligent individuals accept the sacrifice that the struggle involved? Is it not true that intelligence is egotistical? Would there be any rational motive for hermit-minded, egotistical individuals to sacrifice themselves for the group, in order that sociable groups might survive? Kidd saw that social progress necessarily involved a sacrifice. Religion explained for him what seemed quite incomprehensible. Religion he saw as the irrational faith that could lead men to accept social life, at any cost; religion made men socially efficient.

"No form of belief," he said, "is capable of functioning as a religion in the evolution of society which does not provide an ultra-rational sanction for social conduct in the individual. . . .⁷ A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing."⁸

Kidd did not altogether substantiate his theory that religion is the leading factor in social progress. He showed, perhaps, that a group held together by strong religious institutions might survive a group weak in sociability, because it lacked churches. He did not show convincingly that other institutions might not take the place of churches, that a group might be held together, not in an ultra-rational faith, but in a perfectly rational conviction of the usefulness of co-operative labor. He did not see, for example, that men might be led to give active assent to an abstract principle of distributive justice—such a principle as this: that each should share in the joint product of industry in proportion to his contribution to that joint product. Knowing that one man can contribute more than another, the majority may accept smaller individual shares than go to the minority, and not insist on killing the goose that lays the golden eggs by trying to grasp larger shares for themselves. Perhaps Kidd might have insisted that assent to such a principle of distributive justice is a kind of religion.

A more questionable assumption of Kidd was that the great mass of individuals must necessarily be sacrificed under economic competition. The possibility that competition might be so controlled and directed as to enable the great mass to succeed and only the defective minority to fail, seems to have escaped him. He never grasped the fundamental difference between

⁷ *Social Evolution*, New York and London, 1894, p. 101.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

economic competition and the struggle for existence as it is carried on in the sub-human world. His insufficiencies, however, ought not to be allowed to overshadow the importance of the problem which he was, in all his work, trying to solve—the problem of social efficiency and its survival value in the struggle among social groups.

Two sharply contradictory notions divide the camp of those who hold, in common with Kidd, the view that religion and morality are necessary agencies for leading men to subordinate their personal interests to the social interests. One notion is that both religion and morality are merely inventions of a few designing individuals to hold the masses in check; the other is that it is a product of the mass mind to hold the superman in check. According to the former notion, they serve to persuade the masses to behave in such ways as are advantageous to the few who exploit them, and to refrain from using the power which their numbers give them by throwing off their yokes and working for themselves.⁹ This seems to be the notion of Kidd. According to him, religion and morality, having such basal elements, are nevertheless essential as instruments of progress. Their justification lies in that great fact. Unless the masses can be persuaded by religion and morality to accept their hard lot, they will take control of government and industry, run them for their own advantage, and sacrifice the interests of the competent few to those of the incompetent many. This, according to Kidd, will reverse the Darwinian principle of natural selection, and be the end of progress.

Marx, like Kidd, held to the notion that religion and morality are designed to hold the masses in check and to induce them to refrain from using their power to overthrow the social system. Instead of justifying, he condemned both religion and existing moral systems on this ground, holding it to be the privilege and opportunity of the masses to throw off these shackles and exert in their own interest the power which numbers give them. Religion and morals are, in other words, merely agencies of tyranny and exploitation. They retard rather than promote progress.

Out of this general notion that religion and morals are agencies for inducing the masses of men to submit to their lot, to subordinate their own interests to something else, are generated two opposite practical policies. One policy is to promote religion and morality on the ground that, under the Darwinian principle of natural selection, progress depends on the sacrifice of the masses of low ability and the survival of the few of high ability.

⁹ See Carver, *The Present Economic Revolution in the United States*. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1928, pp. 15-26.

The construction and maintenance of a social structure which keeps competition alive is necessary to progress. By teaching obedience, religion and morality act both as a check on discontent and as a consolation to those who find the road of life hard. The other policy, based on the same notion as the source and effect of religion and morality, and on the assumption of the democratic ideal of equality, would banish religion and morals as hindrances to progress. On this point, the Bolsheviks are consistent followers of Marx.

Both notions are fundamentally opposed by the view that religion and morals are products of the mass mind and are designed to hold the superman in check. They are successful devices of the mice to persuade the cat to wear a bell. Religion and morals consist of a vast number of threads of inhibition with which the Lilliputians of the social world have succeeded in binding the limbs of the gigantic Gullivers. From this point of view, religion and morality repress progress. Such is Nietzsche's view of Christianity and its ethical teachings.

Christian ethics is, according to Nietzsche, the invention of the masses—the lowest classes of society—for their own benefit to be used against the superior few who are really the makers of progress. It thus impoverishes humanity and stifles progress:

"the greatness of advance (in civilization) is measured by what had to be sacrificed for it. Humanity, as a mass, sacrificed to the welfare of a single stronger species of man, that would be an advance."

According to Nietzsche, a cultural paralysis has crept over civilization ever since the dark and disfiguring shadow of Christian morality fell upon the fields of human life. A slave morality, he maintains, by its very nature sets up standards of behavior that retard rather than stimulate progress.

It would, according to this view, be in the interest of progress if the cat would refuse to wear the bell and would prey successfully upon the mice. It would be a better world, from the standpoint of evolution, if the giant Gullivers would snap the threads of conventional morality with which the Lilliputian pygmies have bound them, and then prey upon, exploit or even exterminate the pygmies.

Now both views overlook the possibility of establishing and maintaining, through group action, a rational standard of fitness for individual survival. They fail to see the possibility of a sound concept of justice under which each individual who contributes to group success may be favored and each one who subtracts from group strength may be put under a severe handicap. The supporters of both the above views are thinking in terms

of strength and weakness instead of in terms of social usefulness and social harmfulness as a basis for individual survival and extinction. They make the mistake of thinking, on the one hand, about protecting the weak against the strong, and on the other, of protecting the strong against the weak.

A more constructive policy is to forget about strength and weakness, and concentrate on the problem of protecting production against predation. Whether the productive individual be strong or weak from other standpoints, he is fit to survive from the standpoint of group interests. A group which hopes to be a strong, successful, and surviving group must lend encouragement to its productive individuals. Whether a predatory individual be strong or weak, according to other standards, from the standpoint of the group interest he is unfit to live and must be repressed. The group that hopes for success must find some way of converting, repressing, or eliminating him. For, as Karl Pearson rightly points out:

"It is the herd, the tribe, or the nation which forms the fundamental unit in the evolution of man,"

and only such individual morality should be considered essential as makes the group more capable of mastering and controlling its environment whatever its nature may be. The group must never look upon morality as anything else than a means to survival.

Since 1918, there has been little cock-sureness about progress. Large numbers are expressing doubt of its reality, even of its possibility. The war seems to have shocked men into questioning how substantial is material success, what values it holds, how far it can go. Scientists are turning to religion, to philosophy, to find the *meaning* of their work.

Is it possible that the wave of pessimism which has swept over the Western World is a premonition of a turn in the cycle of progress? Such, I find, is a rather widespread belief. Men have come to apply a cyclical theory to almost everything. The life cycle of the individual organism—an observed fact—is imputed to national life, the social organism, the industrial system, Christianity, and civilization itself. However, it is as yet only an imputation. No physical necessity inheres in the social system, making decay inevitable. Societies decay only because men change their behavior. They cease behaving in ways that contribute to social life and begin to behave in ways that are destructive to social life. Religion influences their behavior. If it can influence them to continue behaving in constructive ways, progress will continue. If religion can not so influence them, of what use is it?

The Spirit in Man

ALBERT E. AVEY

TO the serious student of human nature the springs of religion are of prime interest. Does the religious sense come as a consequence of gradually accumulating experience, as the summing up of the details of life met with from moment to moment and day to day? Or is it an expression of an inner impulse, *sui generis* in its essence, an innate idea if you will, whereby man organizes the confused and confusing details of life into some kind of comprehensive and significant totality? Does the source lie primarily without or within? Does man passively receive or actively create his religious conviction? Does the detailed study of the development of religion throw by implication any light upon the nature of that Ultimate Reality whose products we are, and upon the evolutionary process through which it works?

Much has been written during the past half-century on evolution—the evolution of everything, the arts, the sciences, religion. And the impression one often gets from the discussion is that evolution has been the construction of a mosaic, a piecing together bit by bit of component units assembled by chance, but revealing in time some apparent pattern: a sort of building-block procedure in which the blocks have separate and relatively permanent existence, while the whole is but a derivative, dependent, and perhaps ephemeral product.

Pluralism and monism in the interpretation of Reality have of course played large parts as the arch rivals in theory. Natural science has been traditionally the partisan of pluralism. Atomism in some form, whether materialistic or energistic, has been its persistent conviction. Philosophy, on the other hand, in its major tradition, has favored monism. It has not felt content until it has run all things down to some basic One, whether mystical or rational in character, which regulates even if it does not produce the manifold of details. Science has seen in universal history a process of gradual integration. Philosophy has thought primarily in terms of differentiation.

From the standpoint of scientific study it has been held that religions have been chiefly products of experience and have followed practical and social conditions. The conservation of values has found its content in the elemental needs of life, food, shelter, clothing and family. The central prayer of man has been: Give us this day our daily bread. Indeed, some social groups have never risen above these elemental demands, though for

others progress in civilization has transformed the content of value from elemental, chiefly material, details to demands for power, reputation, exercise of imagination and reflective culture. The values of modern religion are more complex, and involve more intangibles than did ancient religion; but, it is contended, the essential spirit is the same.

This we may in a sense admit. It is an acknowledgment that religion is a vital thing. It takes hold upon the concrete facts of life. Its content is the mass of actual experience lived through by man. Yet the interpretation put upon it therefore is not wholly acceptable. Its concreteness of expression does not necessarily commit us to a conviction of materialistic and unideal origin.

From the point of view of empirical-inductive interpretation religious and philosophic convictions should be gradual growths in the direction determined by individual and social history, without interruption and without gaps. As experience accumulates moment by moment, the world outlook of man should concomitantly expand. Evidence has seemed forthcoming in the historical records which show the change of theological belief attendant upon expanding political outlook. Natural increase in population led in ancient days to enlargement of tribes and tribal settlements. Need of greater supplies of the necessities of life led to conquest and appropriation of additional land and natural resources, and when this brought one group into contact with another war resulted, followed by the subjection of the vanquished tribe to the domination of the victor. Defeat of the army meant defeat of the tutelary god also. But religious beliefs are serious things, the most serious in life, in fact, and it was not easy for a vanquished tribe to give up old traditions and mental habits. Defeat might be only temporary. Power and prestige might return again. Consequently the imperfectly amalgamated groups gave divided allegiance to two divinities, that of the victor and that of the vanquished. With the continuation of national expansion this process continued, gods became multiplied, and polytheism was inevitable.

This account seems satisfactory, perhaps, until we raise the question why the history of religion has not been a record of increasingly complex polytheism. That it has not been the historical evidence clearly shows. Polytheism developed to a certain point, then it was modified, first of all from its crude pluralism into organizations of gods—triads, enneads, etc., then into family groups with determinate genealogies, such as that presented in Hesiod's *Theogony*. The tendency thus manifested reflects a demand for unity, in the first instance a logical unity of system such as is implied

in classification, in the second a vital union such as implied in family connection.

The basis of this unifying tendency has been found in the strain upon the memory involved in the attempt to retain side by side the increasing number of gods. But what this explanation takes for granted and fails to inquire into is the reason for dissatisfaction with endless plurality, and why the human spirit does not merely stop with an acknowledgment of its helplessness in the presence of the problem. That it has not is, again, abundantly witnessed by the historical evidence. Instead of passively acknowledging defeat humanity has sought and found a new resource—the organic unification of things. Where that unity has not been obvious the human spirit has demanded it, searched for it, and found it. Religious, scientific, and philosophic history are abundant evidences of this.

The analysis of human experience, then, must reckon with two factors—the details which make up the contents of experience, and the attitude which organizes and interprets, the *a posteriori* and the *a priori* factors made famous by Kantian philosophy. But the recognition of the second factor not only makes intelligible the organization of ideas; perhaps it offers also the best explanation for the irregularity in the development of ideas. The course of ideational organization might have been quite even and regular. Growth of experience and reformulation of idea might have been very gradual and continuous, if the function of the *a priori* factor had been merely organizing, and not creative. But such a view would plot too smooth a curve of progress. The actual evidence shows it to have been irregular. The history of ideas has had its ups and downs. The course of evolution is not uniformly smooth.

Furthermore, the logic of the theory which regards organization as a cumulative product of experience would lead to our placing absolute monotheism or monism at the end of history. Indeed, it would become the final goal of an infinite regress. But as such it would be inherently impossible of attainment. According to this view there should be no monotheism nor monism yet. These could, in fact, find no place anywhere in time. There should be a progressive decrease in the independence of the separate gods, but no inclusive monotheism. Doubtless in so far as strict interpretation would take this to mean a reduction of all detailed reality to a single conception it has not been fully attained yet, and shows no possible prospect of final attainment. But here again comes our theoretical problem: how is it that the human mind so far grasps the total situation as to speak even *formally* of a final monism? How can it grasp the meaning of *absolute*

monism sufficiently to deny its existence? Somehow the human spirit has here leaped to infinity. How can these things be?

Just here is the point of interest. The mind repeatedly o'erleaps experience, spoiling the theory that it is a mere product of the past. This is easily said; but to fully appreciate its meaning we must follow in detail the historical evidence of the path of ideas. In such a study chronology is important; and chronology of early civilization is a difficult field of investigation. But relying upon the judgment of our most competent authorities we may feel confident that the evidence is sufficient at least for the point we are making.

Apparently as far back as the Memphite Dynasties in Egypt, in the days of the great Pyramid Builders, there is historical evidence of a mental revolt against the accumulations of the past, an instance of a leap forward to a nobler conception. The reformation of Akhenaton, with his attempt to displace the multifarious gods of tradition and substitute the worship of the sun god alone, as manifested in the sun disk, has become matter of common knowledge. But remarkable as it was this was comparatively late, in the Eighteenth Dynasty, in the fourteenth century B. C. Even fifteen hundred years earlier, some time in the Fourth Dynasty, about twenty-eight hundred B. C., there is evidence of an earlier outburst of monistic belief.

Erman and Breasted have called attention to an Egyptian stele, standing now in one of the bays of the Southern Egyptian Gallery of the British Museum. There the visitor, if he peers about, will find a black basalt rock, nearly square, six or seven feet in dimension, standing against the wall in a corner, behind more conspicuous but less interesting because less important sculptures. The rock is much worn, and is marked by a half-dozen depressions radiating out from its center, as if it has been used as a millstone or for some such practical purpose. Columns of hieroglyphics have become badly worn, many of them completely erased.

Sir Wallis Budge and Mr. Hall, late directors of this section of the Museum, have not apparently found in the monument the significance which Erman and Breasted see in it. The *Introductory Guide to the Egyptian Collection* merely describes it (p. 90) as: "An example of a rare class of work. . . . The text states that it was copied from an inscribed board which had become worm-eaten in the reign of Shabaka, king of Egypt, about 700 B. C. From what is legible on the slab we are justified in assuming that the work contained a sort of philosophical statement of the religious beliefs of a priest who was trying to systematize certain of the old

traditions of the country, and to evolve a system of belief which should be consonant with the special traditions current at Memphis at that time concerning the god Ptah."

According to the inscription on the rock its own date is about 700 B. C. But its reference to the worm-eaten board from which it was copied carries its origin back to a time much more remote. From other resources we know that the central *locus* of the worship of Ptah was Memphis; and the time when the power of Memphis was at its height was during the Third and Fourth Dynasties (the time of the builders of the great pyramids at Gizeh), and the Sixth Dynasty (the era of those pyramids of Sakkarah in which were inscribed the Pyramid Texts, giving our earliest extensive view of the Egyptians' conception of the Universe). The inference of Erman, accepted by Breasted, is that the original inscription on the "worm-eaten board," of which "British Museum 797" is a copy, was made at Memphis. And this "priest who was trying to systematize certain of the old traditions of the country, and to evolve a system of belief which should be consonant with the special traditions current at Memphis at the time concerning the god Ptah"—this priest was living at that early day. The rareness of the work means that it does not belong naturally with the type of product, material and intellectual, common to the later flourishing periods of Egyptian history. Its philosophical nature sets it apart from the mass of literature of the country at any period, and places it in a small group of reflective documents which have survived to our time—for example, the Dialogue of the Misanthrope with his Own Soul, and the Song of the Harper. That a priest of Ptah at Memphis should undertake to systematize the old traditions of the country, and "evolve a system of belief which should be consonant with the special traditions current at Memphis at that time concerning the god Ptah," is a point of outstanding interest. What were these "special traditions current at Memphis at that time concerning the god Ptah"?

As reported by Breasted the inscription, while recognizing the existence of Osiris, Horus, Isis, Nephthys, Geb, Set, and other gods found even in the oldest portions of the Book of the Dead and in the Pyramid Texts, gives supreme place to Ptah as the power behind all. We must, of course, take care in our interpretation, lest we misinterpret henotheism into monotheism. Henotheism accepts the existence of many gods, but selects only one for adoration. The adoration may be for the moment only. In another moment some other god will be receiving attention. The immediate object of worship receives the highest ascriptions of power and wis-

dom; the god adored at the moment seems to be supreme over the universe. It is as if the compilers of the sacred literature were afflicted with amnesia, and expected their gods to be likewise, with an ear only for their own names, never overhearing the equal praises ascribed to rival deities.

The worship of Ptah in this instance does not seem to be of quite this sort. It acknowledges the existence of the other gods, but relates them organically to each other and to Ptah, whose position is very clearly that of an Ultimate Power back of all. There seems to be something of an anticipation of the doctrine of the Neoplatonists which later became so important in Egyptian thinking. Ptah, the great central figure, has eight emanations or manifestations. One of these, Atum, becomes creator of all things. He is "heart and tongue" of the ennead. But since to the Egyptian heart and tongue were the organs of feeling and thought, to be identified with these is to be identical with "mind." Whatever other aspects of being Ptah might possess, Atum was that part of him which functioned as mind. Thus from Ptah proceeds the power of mind and tongue controlling in all gods, all men, all animals, all reptiles, which live, thinking and commanding that which he wills. Ptah thus working through Atum fashioned all gods, kas, qualities, food, offerings, by his word. All things in fact, life, death, love, hate, works and handicrafts, are his products. He made cities and names, assigned to the gods their jurisdictions, and made holy places.

In this suggestion of creation by way of mind Breasted sees the earliest anticipation of the Greek conception of the rule of Reason in the universe, which was the basic conviction of all Greek philosophy, and was explicitly expressed in the Logos doctrine of Heraclitus of Ephesus. It assumed Christian form in the Johannine literature, disguised for English readers under the term "Word." For when at the opening of the Gospel of John we read, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God," we have phraseology which is meaningless from our point of view. It remains meaningless even when we restate it: "In the beginning was the Logos, etc.," until we transfer ourselves in thought back into the atmosphere of Greece, in which "The Logos" as a definite factor in the scheme of things had some intelligible significance.

The Logos for the Grecizing Christians of Alexandria in this very land of Egypt of which we have been speaking was the expression of the Ultimate Divine in the form of the most rational of creatures, man. (Has not Professor Glover argued that the conquest of Christianity over the other ancient religions was due to the fact that it was the most reasonable of all?)

The classic writers of Greece often give credit to Egypt for the origin

of Greek conceptions. While the Logos doctrine does not receive explicit ascription to this source (the Greeks looked upon the Egyptians, according to a classic phrase, as a nation of shopkeepers, not of reasoners), yet it is possible that in this instance Plato himself overlooked a point which was obscured by more obvious features of Egyptian character, and which was not really typical of it—a point at which the exceptional mind of some individual “priest who was trying to systematize certain of the old traditions,” and evolve a belief more acceptable to thinking minds, builded better than he knew, built in fact a structure so much beyond the foundations of his own time that it could not serve as a habitation for his own fellows.

If this interpretation is not straining the point too far, then here we see one of those interesting, rare cases in which the conceptions commonly attributed to the Greeks can be traced to origins still earlier than they. We are commonly satisfied to have traced our civilization back to Greece, and fall into the assumption that its absolute origin was there. But certainly history did not begin with the Greeks; nor did ideas occur only to them. Professor Abel Rey, of the Sorbonne, has traced with clarity the origin of important mathematical and natural scientific ideas to Chaldea, Egypt, and China. And certainly in the possession of some kind of world view the Greeks were anticipated by the religious philosophies of more ancient peoples.

What interests us most, now, about this ancient Memphite priest, is that at so early a period in the history of thought, he should be concerned with systematizing the traditions of the country, and that he succeeded so far, even by placing the patron god of his own name in the basic position. That he should formulate a conception of any one ultimate power whose emanations constituted the being of the other gods was wholly out of place at this early point in intellectual history! By doing this he spoiled a fine theory to the effect that human ideas are built up gradually by the slow accumulation of experience. The old priest, whoever he was, was certainly a heretic from the standpoint of the majority conceptions of his people. To us he is a grand obstacle in the way of an otherwise plausible theory of human thought. But like other heretics, who always make things interesting by presenting phases of experience which fit least comfortably into our theories, he makes us do some careful thinking, and revise our hypothesis into a more subtle, more accurate, but more difficult form. It is regrettable that the basalt block has not preserved to us the name of this old systematizer that we might do him reverence. He should be regarded as

one of those pioneering personalities who determine the course of great thinking. But, as in many other instances, history has preserved his achievement, but obliterated his name.

The old systematizing priest of Memphis has served us well, however, in compelling us to consider the factors which go to make up the warp and woof of experience. By departing so far from tradition and anticipating so loftily the most dominating line of later thought he has suggested to us that the human spirit is at least in some degree self-determining, injects its own demands into the stream of history, and exercises its active, creative influence upon it.

"Evolution" has been a word to conjure with. To many it has served as an ultimate category for the final explanation of things. But to others it has constituted not a solution, but a problem, not an answer, but a question. The early Greek thinkers found motion and change a problem. Aristotle, *il maestro di color che sanno*, regarded growth as the chief problem of thought. Bergson, Alexander, Whitehead, have taken central positions in recent philosophy by their attempt to answer the question: How is evolution possible? Back of the scientific question: What has been the course of evolution? they have raised the metaphysical one: What are the presuppositions of any evolution whatever?

All current schools of philosophy accept the doctrine of evolution. Each has its account to give of it. Perhaps the crucial test for the acceptance and rejection of systems will be the adequacy of the account given.

The theories differ as systems of metaphysics differ, ranging from materialism (or physicalism) at one extreme to pure idealism at the other, through intermediate doctrines of neutral monism, or dualism, physicalism accounting for spiritual development on the basis of the infinite potentialities of matter (or physical energy), which from this point of view, beginning with utmost physical simplicity, has expanded into chemical, biological, psychological and spiritual complexity. Since the facts even of complex civilization must be recognized and incorporated into the doctrine, in order to prove adequate to the situation the original physical substance has had to be endowed with all capacities world history has actually displayed, these spiritual capacities being regarded as epiphenomena, inert affervescences from the Physical Real.

Idealism has objected that in making itself adequate to its task physicalism has stretched itself to the bursting point. Physical substance has become endowed not merely with those properties of which any treatise on physics deals and which any competent physicist regards as within his field;

it has become endowed also with all the spiritual properties revealed in human society. From this point of view, if self-consistent, the properties of matter are not merely inertia, elasticity, malleability, etc., but also capacity to feel, to will, to think, to long, to err, to hope (even for immortality and God). But that which expresses all the essential attributes of a substance is that substance. (How else does a chemist identify his elements?) And by this token that which has all the attributes of mind is mind! Its manifestations may have been simple at first, but with the passage of time it has revealed its true character, and has shown itself to be Spirit, not Physical Energy by any interpretation of physics accepted by physicists! To escape their own inadequacy physical theories have had to transcend themselves, to burst the very shackles originally self imposed. In doing this they have perished through their own inner inconsistency. In addition to the original space-time of Emergent Evolution there has perforce been posited also Deity, the real power in things, the *nisus* or urge from every stage of reality to the next higher. But this determining force is spiritual in its essence, not physical. It finds its promise of completest manifestation in the infinite future, not in the infinite past.

Compromise doctrines sense limitations in each of the other views. Each seems onesided, too extreme. Physicalism perishes in its attempt to do justice to the facts of human aspiration and ideals. Idealism fails to account for the difficulty of self-realization of the supposed Ultimate Spirit. Reality, it is concluded, must be neither strictly what we mean by matter nor what we mean by Spirit, but rather some neutral substance which shows itself now under physical properties, again under spiritual, and the strife of the opposed currents or tendencies produces the struggle of life, the opposition of the animate and the inanimate. Or theory turns to frank dualism, which has had and still holds its place in the thought of the centuries, maintaining that Reality is twofold, pure matter (or Physical Energy) and pure Spirit; the interests of the two are hostile to one another, and the struggle between them is in evidence every day of life.

The early heretics destroyed our facile theories, but at the same time contributed to the conviction that there is in Reality a spiritual factor which refuses to submit to the tyranny of the ordinary and the physical. The hope for the increasing mastery of this spiritual factor must be the ultimate ethical and religious hope of man.

Fate, Faith, and God

JOSEPH FORT NEWTON

ANDREYEFF, the Russian, in his tableau of *The Life of Man*, would tell us the bitter, old and haggard truth. In the background stands a mysterious Being in Gray, inscrutable, imperturbable, implacable, loveless, hateless, holding a dim Candle in its hand. When it is said that a man is born, the Candle blazes up brightly, and we are shown, in five episodes, the Life of Man—his early love, his struggles, his worldly success, his sorrows, his final despair, and the heirs assembled impatiently at his bedside as his life ebbs out. Slowly the Candle dwindles down until only a guttering stump is left, and the last spark is extinguished as the curtain falls. It is the Being in Gray that speaks the prologue, in which the utter vanity of the life of man is foreshadowed:

"In blind ignorance, worn by apprehension, harassed by hopes and fears, he will complete submissively the iron round of destiny. Coming from the night, he will return to the night. Bereft of thought, bereft of feeling, unknown to all, he will perish utterly, vanishing without a trace into infinity."

Here, picturesquely stated, is all that pessimism predicts, all that skepticism surmises, all that terrifies the human soul, beclouding faith and obscuring hope—man, pursued by Time, overtaken by Death, defeated, helpless, forgotten, his life a futility and a foolishness. While we dare not accept such a reading of nature and the life of man as final, none the less many facts array themselves in its behalf; and man must somehow adjust himself to the shadow of the universe in which our supreme human values seem insignificant, and he himself no more than an insect in the evening air. Otherwise he is doomed to the dualism of Dostoevsky, who accepted God but refused to accept his world, with its hideous, senseless cruelties, even though its horrors should vanish at last, as he believed they would, into a pitiful mirage, revealing a harmony so complete as to justify all that humanity has suffered.¹ Indeed, when all those horrors rise in a dark cloud before the imagination, it is not difficult to understand the mood of all the Conrad stories, in which good and bad alike sink into one "vast Indifference"; the hard Fate that hovers over the pages of Hardy, whose pessimism, even if mitigated by pity, is as bitter as the salt sea and as black as the hour before dawn; or the glittering essay of Russell on the worship

¹ *The Brothers Karamazov*, Chap. on "Rebellion." Also a psycho-critical study of Dostoevsky, by Janko Larvin.

of a free man which, he says, must be offered in a universe alien to our ideals, to an altar founded upon a hard, unyielding, defiant despair.

Nevertheless, by a strange paradox, the Shadow which threatens to destroy Faith—making it seem futile and foolish—is the very thing that created the ancient, high, heroic religion of humanity. At the moment when nature appears to turn traitor, and man stands forsaken of God, there rises in the human soul a white splendor of spiritual vision which all the tragedies of time cannot extinguish. Over against a wild rebellion or a grim resignation—whether angry, cynical, or sad—it is the glory of religion to seek a way of reconciliation with the mysterious and awful order of the world, finding an insight, an experience, an interpretation so revealing that it justifies nature and explains the life of man. Amid the clash of forces, the faith of religion affirms not only that moral values and spiritual personality have abiding worth, but that they are the clue to the meaning of an else ambiguous and disheartening existence. But Faith must face Fact, if it is to be anything more than a happy fiction, a pleasing fancy, a fond delusion to hide reality; and the first fact is Fate.

I

From earliest time, in all lands and all ages, men have been aware that they are in the hands of a Destiny which they can neither elude nor long defy. Nor is this original intuition of the race an error. Fate is a fact, profound, elemental, overwhelming, inescapable, held in solution in all religions, the first fact of experience if not the final conclusion of all philosophy. It is a tyrannous fact if taken out of its context and misread—as, alas, it nearly always is—terrifying if wrapped in superstition, appalling in the Hindu dogma of Karma, benumbing in the Moslem Kismet; but if interpreted aright, it is like the sky above and the river-bed below the flow of mortal years. At least it implies order, in contrast with the awful miscellaneousness of mere Chance, in which forces move at haphazard; a direction and rhythm in the nature of things which, if men follow it, leads to power; but

"Omitted, all the voyage of their lives
Is bound in shallows and in miseries."

One way is right to go; wisdom is to discern it, obey it, and move on that aim; then all things work together, and the Seven Stars are the friends of men.

Not unnaturally, it is in vast, level, low-lying lands that the shadow of Fate has been heaviest and most often misread; no doubt because in such

lands life comes all at once, revealing its endlessness and bottomlessness, and men open their eyes on the Infinite, with a sense of overwhelming and paralyzing immensity of depth and distance. Whereas in hilly, undulating lands, or in lands with an intricate and indented seacoast, like Greece, Denmark, or Britain, men are apt to be of quicker and more venturesome spirit, because life comes to them, so to speak, in small manageable portions, broken into bits by hill, sea, or mountain barrier, and they feel that they can somehow deal with it. Anyway, in vast flat lands, like Egypt, Arabia, India, or Russia, men are more ready to yield to an enervating fatalism, quietism, or pessimism, and to make little advance; and the more so if the climate tends to debilitate the native vigor and initiative. While we may not go so far as to say that geography explains everything in the spiritual outlook of a people, yet such natural features have undoubtedly a pervading, incalculable, and unconscious effect in shaping the impulse, no less than the framework, of religious faith.

As a child begins its life in the world with a sense of utter dependence, and only slowly wins its way to some degree of liberty and initiative, so it has been with the race. All primitive men were fatalists, as men are to-day in primitive conditions, in face of the profound facts and forces of life—farmers, soldiers, and men who go down to the sea in ships. Anyone who has studied the old symbolism and sign language of mankind knows how dark was the shadow of Fate which hovered over the morning of history. More than five millennia ago, Prah-hotep, the Egyptian sage, wrote of the hidden will of Fate by which all things come to pass. Escape there was none; even the gods had to bow to it. By magic, by incantation, by many methods—hinted to us in his marvelous mythology, which Plato held to be the essence and prophecy of all thought—man tried first to placate the power of Fate; and later, by his religion and philosophy, to discover its nature and will. Often, in times of crisis, his mind fluctuated between Fate and Fortune, but in the end he fell back upon Fate, preferring a tyrant rather than a clown. Fate at any rate is dependable and intelligible; it imparts a kind of unity to the world and even a dignity to human life.

What was true of the race has been true of its greatest men. No matter what others may think in the rarified air of philosophical debate—remote from the sagacities of living wisdom—all masterful men know that they are mastered, and how small a part their wills play in the march of events and affairs. They take life in the rough, and their religion is more often a coarse, coercive force; which is the sundering difference between great men and great souls, since a man may be great only in physical force,

in intellectual ingenuity, or in influence of genius—lacking refinement, and that delicate, elusive quality we call spirituality. Men of action—from Cæsar to Lincoln—have nearly all been fatalists, nothing certain save a Hand put forth from the Unseen shaping their ends, rough hew them how they will. They know that “there is a tide in the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune,” and their wisdom is to follow the curve of Destiny, to resist which is to invite defeat, if not destruction. Nature is what we can do, said Emerson, in an essay in which he traced the workings of Fate in matter, mind and morals, in race, character, and society—by far the most luminous exposition so far written of the meaning of Fate.² But, he adds, touching with fine insight upon the immemorial paradox of the human situation: if Fate is all-pervading, man is also a part of it, and a part of Fate is the freedom of man—albeit not such freedom as man often imagines that he has.

Such is the dilemma of the human lot, divided between a vital instinct of freedom and a world which wears the aspect of stern inevitableness. Of this contradiction nature knows nothing, all her life being one ordered and unbroken compulsion. The stars in their steadfast shining, the earth in its orbit, the ebb and flow of tides, the ritual of the seasons, all move in obedience to law with no variance between constitution and necessity. How different it is with man, though most of his life is also ordered by Fate, hemmed in, limited, fixed in grooves, deep-set, in which it must run; much of it, indeed, ordered before he arrives on the scene! He is born into the world with no choice of time, or place, or ancestry, and without his own desire, his life largely the outcome of far-off lives. His heredity from the past may be dower or doom, since it decides his mental ability no less than his bodily vitality, but he cannot vacate it for another; hands cold and dead seem to mold him from the grave. He is born into an environment which fixes his color, his training, his creed, his thought-world, and the fashion of his life. To all this constant compulsion by the world about him—whether of physical or social condition—he is inured by use and habit; but it is none the less real and powerful. Tethered alike by nature and history, he does not realize how beset he is until he begins to think of the meaning of things, moved by an instinct which many waters cannot quench. As Emerson asks, if Fate be not more than natural history, “Who and what is this criticism that pries into the matter?”

For, after all, even limitation has its limits, and it is the Fate of man to be free, if he has the wisdom to win his freedom and the wit to keep it.

² *The Conduct of Life*, Chap I.

At first sight he looks like a fly enmeshed in a network of laws and forces, which allow no scope for freedom; but that is only appearance. No matter how many webs are spun round the will of man, or how tightly they are woven, he knows that he is free, however limited his liberty may be. Hemmed in, restricted, beset, his liberty is not the less real because it is limited, as it must be of necessity by the fact that he is finite, as well as by the nature and purpose of his life. Indeed, it is better so, because even a relentless, iron-bound Fate were happier by far than the misery, terror, and slavery of a fetterless freedom. By the same sign, all real freedom is ever the fruit of obedience—a trophy to be won, a treasure to be kept—and the great Freemen have always been the great obeyers. So far as man thinks, loves, and obeys, he is free. Wisdom annuls Fate by obeying it; knowledge masters it by using it; love triumphs by learning its secret. Is it a paradox? Yes, for life is a paradox, and man the meeting place of all contradictions—one of which is that by as much as he wins his freedom by a wise obedience, by so much does he discover the higher fatalism.

II

Since Fate is a fact which none may deny, still less escape, the real questions before us are: What is Fate? and what kind of Fate is it by which the world is ruled? What is the inner nature of this compulsion, now so rigid, now so gentle, and ultimately so resistless? There can be no reconciliation for us with the inevitable in life until we find some hint or token within answering to the inexorable without; and it must be a Voice, not an echo. Dumb, uncomprehending surrender means the death of aspiration and adventure—making endurance hard and entreaty hopeless. Defiance is disaster; the old-worn human way is strewn with the bones of rebels who refused to obey, and perished. The consolations of philosophy are not enough, if they be only a buffer to protect us from the thing as it is. Even the faith of religion is futile until we see that it is rooted in reality, its truths not only facts of the inner life, but forces of the cosmic order.

Of Sophocles it was said that he saw life steadily, and saw it whole; and such vision we need in dealing with these high matters. For we must think things together, not mistaking a part for the whole, if we are ever to find a clue to the riddle; and we have in man himself the token we seek, once we know how to interpret it aright—a key to unlock the secret from within. For, consider: the soul of man, appearing like an apparition in the physical order, a free spirit in a fated world—endowed with thought, moral sense and creative power—is the pledge and prophecy of all the

sanctities. Not only is man the measure of all things, as the old Greeks saw long ago—by which they meant “the perfect man,” as Aristotle added—but, as we now see more clearly, he is an epitome of all things. Indeed, he is a microcosm, “dragging together the poles of the Universe,” as Emerson said; a blend of mud and mind, dirt and deity; a kinsman of animal and angel; his nature the playground of all the forces—physical, psychical, moral—making his life the theater of a stupendous drama; a romance more fantastic than any tale ever told in fairyland. Thus in man nature is brought to a focus and glow-point of revelation in which the dark mystery of Fate drops its veil, and we discern the hidden spirit within, as in the Ezekiel of the wheels. Also, since man is so far the flower of nature, in man at his highest we have a hint of the purpose implicit in the whole and the direction in which it is moving—man the interpreter, God the interpretation.

When we fail to follow this token we are left in a divided world, torn between two realms of experience so opposite that they cannot be brought to terms. Nature, if taken alone, makes the spiritual life seem as frail and fleeting as the rainbow colors on a cataract, its ideals illusions, its faiths as lovely and as unreal as foam and iridescent mist. All man can do is to build up within a nonmoral order a little dream world of duty, love, and kindness, much as he reclaims a garden from a marsh, or shelters a delicate flower in a wintry climate. To such a plight we are driven by mistaking a part for the whole, by trying to live in a world with but one hemisphere. But there need be no such dilemma. Man is neither exile, alien, nor exotic in nature; he is her child born out of her deep heart through ages of travail—he of her dust, she of his spirit—and his moral life is as much a part of her process as his physical frame. Moral law must somehow be mixed in the stuff and fiber of things, else men would not know it at all, much less be ruled by it. Nor does it matter to what far past the moral sense of man is traced, or to what lowly beginnings: it is here; it rose with him, a life star, out of the depths; it abides and grows—a ray of white light in the dim country of the world. The great mystery of the life of man is not sin, but that which reveals it, condemns it, and makes it at last unbearable. Either we must admit the miracle of a moral being in an unmoral order, or the moral sense of man must be allowed to interpret nature; the more because it points the path along which the line of advance lies. Or, finally, if nature be unmoral, the moral life of man bears witness that she is not all—there is something more and higher in the constitution of things.

Thus, by thinking things together, we find that the higher life of

man has a basis and background in the order of things, and is not a plant growing in the air. Man can neither reconcile himself to nature nor separate himself from her, because he is a part of her order, yet he knows a secret entrusted to no other being, making the human heart, as Turgenieff said, "a great voice of Nature"—at once her child and her prophet. After all, nature is a medium only, *through* which a higher end is to be attained. But man is no mere medium; it is *in* him that higher values are to be realized. Even the harshness of nature, as we begin to see, makes for a higher end—like a mother bird pushing her brood from the nest to make them fly—forcing man to study not only his acts, but the results of his acts. As it is, while he is free to act, he has no choice of the results to follow his action; the moral order being as obstinately conservative as the material. Both put a limit to his will, and impose upon him the necessity for ordering his inner life, which is the birth of his being as a moral personality. Not otherwise, so far as we can see, would he attain to character at all. Justice is hidden in nature; we must look for it where it is revealed—in the life of man. If the moral law were always visible and radiant in nature, the moral life would sink to the level of a mere calculating prudence, and lose its heroic grace and verve.

Fate, in the physical order, is largely a matter of machinery; in the moral world it is a power making for righteousness; and the two are interwoven. Man, though only a tiny speck, requires a solar system for the nurture and development of his brief life. The vast universe with its laws and forces, the earth with its winds and rains, all are needed to make the kingdom of man, wherein lies his duty, his labor, and his expectation. By learning the secret of its laws, by harnessing its forces, man makes the fated world his workshop and his theater of achievement. All nature is ready to serve his ends, friendly to his effort, responsive to his intelligence, so long as he obeys. When he defies and disobeys, it is his foe, ruthless as the Furies of old. As life advances, by trying many doors, many roads—including, alas, blind alleys and many devious ways—man learns that the physical is for the sake of the moral; nature but the environment and opportunity for character. Animal pleasures are rigidly circumscribed, ending in ennui or nausea. Not so the higher joys, which not only endure, but increase in depth and satisfaction, opening new vistas, developing new capacities—thus pointing, by the plainest of tokens, to the one path in which lies real freedom and happiness.

Here, then, is a higher fatalism by which man learns, or soon or late, by defiance and defeat if in no other way, the path marked out for the soul.

It is not an accident that physical impurity ends in moral anarchy, and moral anarchy in physical decay; the two interpenetrate. No man ever breaks the moral law; in the end he is broken by it. He may rebel and resist and wander afar, misspending his beautiful vigor in riotous folly, but he will return ragged, footsore, and weary. Even when he obeys outwardly rather than inwardly, his life may be seemingly happy, but it is hard and narrow, "a ghastly smoothe life, dead of heart." So runs the record of all the ages, whether we read it in Hindu Karma, in the Greek Nemesis, or in the majestic moral vision of the Bible. Always the first advance from the fact of Fate toward a lofty Faith is the discovery of a sublime Moral Fatalism, in which the noblest souls of the race have found peace, patience, and a profound pity. For, to say no more, the stately order of the world, now luminous and lovely, now dark and terrible, in which man finds his duty and his destiny, is the organized will of God—what He has willed and will not unwill till it has served its end, because it is wise and, in the long last, benign.

III

So, inevitably, by a mortal leap of faith, we find in God the meaning of the universe, its purpose and its reason for being: His will its rhythm, His love its final fatalism. In short, God is the fourth dimension of existence without whom our little sums do not work, and our philosophy ends in futility with no authentic clue to the riddle. Nay, more; without God in all, over all, through all—His moral will slowly working through the tumult of time toward an end worthy of the enterprise—human life and history are the most hideous nightmares that a devil ever dreamed. There is nothing for it, when we think as far as thought can go: either we must lay hold of a dim great hand in the dark, and read the meaning of life and the world by what is true and eternal in ourselves, or face the raw horror of a Fate which we can neither resist nor escape. When, in hours of insight and revelation, the clouds are off our souls, and we hold communion with God, rejoicing in His light, and in the real and wonderful goodness that is somehow indubitably here in the world, for a brief time we forget pain, sorrow, sin, death, and the rest of Fate—yet the mystery is never far away, like a shadow upon the hills.

No sooner do we confess faith in God, than we are confronted by conditions existing in the same world with Him which seem to belie faith by impugning either his character or his power. Nature deals ruthlessly with humanity; one moment she is our mother, the next our

murderer. History is beclouded by the same shadow of pain and death, due to the brutality of man derived from his animal ancestry, and darkened by his own depravity—his senseless cruelties, his shameless sins. Indeed, the indictment of nature by Mill is not more terrible than the equally famous arraignment of humanity by Dostoevsky, whose vision of the waste and suffering of child life is a thing to stagger and dismay.³ Unmerciful pain, unmerited suffering, unspeakable iniquity are realities, so much so that James once exclaimed that "a God who can relish such superfluities of horror is no God for human beings to appeal to."⁴ Further, the good itself seems unstable, as if it had to be upheld against intractable opposition; life ever a fight against decay, virtue a trophy of struggle, culture every day menaced by savagery. Hence the dilemma of faith, as Mill put it; either God permits these things to exist, or they exist in spite of Him—that is, either He is not all-good or not all-powerful. If God is all-powerful, the defects of the world disclose defects in His character. If He is wholly good, but not all-powerful, He may not be able to cope with the mass of evil in the world, and our fight for the good is a dim battle in a doubtful land.

After such manner the issue was drawn; but in our generation, led by a profounder insight, we decline to be impaled upon either horn of the old dilemma. Slowly, in the midst of tumult, haunting anxiety, and agitation of spirit, we are winning a clearer and more satisfying vision of God, which not only brings Him nearer to us and makes Him more real, but gives us a new courage in face of sin, pain, and death. For more than a decade it has been increasingly difficult to think of God as aloof, dwelling in static bliss and blessedness, still less to interpret Him in terms of arbitrary, irresponsible power. To-day God is thought of as finite as well as infinite—involved in our agony no less than our aspiration—working under limiting conditions of His own ordaining in a world imperfect and still in the making—limited not by something outside of Himself, but by His own nature, by the fact of creation, as well as by His purpose in the human enterprise; so that in the human world His moral action is conditioned by the character and development of man. It is not too much to say that the most significant fact in the faith of our day is the rediscovery of "the weakness of God," to use the phrase of Saint Paul; and if rightly interpreted—if, once more, we think things together—it is not only true but luminously revealing.

³ *The Brothers Karamazov*, Part 2, Book 5, Chap. 4. Also *The History of Pessimism*, by James Sully.

⁴ *Pragmatism*, p. 143.

When a deeper word of truth is won from the mystery of the world, it is the poets, the artists, the free and adventurous spirits who are the first to see and proclaim it—though they are apt to state it in a form fantastic and exaggerated. Thus in the poetry and fiction of recent years—notably in *Jean Christophe*, by Romain Rolland, the greatest novel of our generation—we have heard of a finite God, limited, struggling, “unfinished,” whom we somehow, by heroic moral effort, may not only serve, but save from defeat. As expounded by Shaw and Wells, who have had such a wide vogue, it is an inverted truth read out of its context; the deep difference between them being that Shaw holds the triumph of God in the world to be questionable, while Wells sees that it is inevitable—though it is difficult to divine the grounds of his assurance. So read, it looks like camouflaged atheism; but in reality it is only a protest against the thought of an absentee God remote from the tragedy of man; what James meant when he said that God is not a gentleman with gloved hands disdaining the dust and dirt of the world. If this protest had been forming in the minds of men before the World War, that disaster made it at first poignant and then illuminating. Early in the conflict many were asking why God allowed such a calamity to befall humanity; but those questions were soon hushed. For, not only did man discover that the war was due to human improvidence and stupidity, but perhaps its most deeply felt religious truth was that God, instead of being outside and a looker-on, revealed Himself anew in the new crucifixion—Himself more wounded than any man or nation.

Clearly, we need interpretation, if we are to relate our modern experience of God to the ancient faith; remembering that “the balance between the denial of God and a right perception of Him is most delicate, and difficult to maintain”—remembering, at the same time, that atheism lives on the perils and failures of theism. It may be put briefly and simply after this manner: to deny the power of God to limit Himself is to deny the infinity of his power; and, besides, it is to make the finite world impossible and unreal. But if by the limitation of God we mean His *self*-limitation—not by anything external or alien to His nature—then it is not only possible, but necessary, if the human world is to have reality at all. Also, if we think of the material world as a specialized aspect of the self-limitation of God, not simply a means to that end, materialism and pantheism are alike avoided. Indeed, to attribute purpose of any sort to God is to imply that He is working under limits in which He cannot have all at once what He wants. Otherwise, in the present world, we deny His goodness: “for if

the good end could have been had immediately without the intermediate process laden with pain and evil, it would have been wicked not to do so."⁵

Thus, in matter, in the fated world everywhere, we see God in humility, God veiled, God self-limited, God making room for man; giving us a little province in His eternal providence, as separate as possible from His own, where we, as well as He, may be moral creators; God fettering Himself that man may be free. It is this seeming weakness and withdrawal of God—His reticence, His restraint, His renunciation, so to name it—which makes the glory, the terror, and the pathos of mortal life; since God must needs hide Himself if we are to have a life of real worth, and in seeking Him find ourselves. Nor, so far as we can see, could it be otherwise, if, as Keats said, this world is a vale not only of tears, but of soul-making; else man could have no moral character, no authentic experience. If it is impossible for God to give us the highest life on any other terms, the only question is whether, on the whole, it is worth while. In answering this question, if we reckon the darkest facts of life, its pain, its peril, its sin, its burdensomeness, its waste and cruelty, its black griefs, its fleeting joys—so brief at its longest, so broken at its best—alongside the moral nobility which but for the terror and trial had never been—what Royce learned as much by experience as by philosophy, the thrill of "finding even in the worst of tragedies the means of an otherwise impossible triumph."⁶—who but a coward can doubt the result! So Browning reckoned in *The Ring and the Book*, with an insight as swift as zig-zag lightning:

Beyond the tale, I reach into the dark,
Feel what I cannot see, and still faith stands.
I can believe this dread machinery
Of sin and sorrow, would confound me else
Devised—all pain at most expenditure
Of pain by Who devised pain—to evolve
By new machinery in counterpart,
The moral qualities of man—how else?
To make him love, in turn, and be beloved,
Creative and self-sacrificing too,
And thus eventually God-like.

IV

Aye, when we utter the word Love we have found the key to the higher Fatalism, its motive, its method, and the prophecy of "the far-off

⁵ *Essays in Christian Thinking*, by A. T. Cordoux.

⁶ *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 310.

Divine event" toward which it moves. Here, no less, is the motif of the universe, the secret of its coherence, its cohesion, its relentless integrity, its haunting beauty, and the pledge of its benign destiny. Stated starkly, it is that the stupendous adventure of creation was conceived in Love—because Love alone is creative—and that because God, by an incredible act of faith, trusts the power of Love, nothing less, nothing else—Love all-daring, all-enduring, unwearied, implacable—His passion and purpose cannot fail of fulfillment. Put otherwise, it is that God, in spite of all cost—including "The Cost of Moral Movement," as a famous sermon reckoned it,⁷ only far more dreadful—is leading the world toward that perfection which will make it a true expression of His nature, an enterprise in which man is a partner, by as much as he seeks the truth and serves it in holy love. Looking into the "old, dark, backward and abysm of time" by the light of this vision, the unintelligible and bewildering tragedy is transfigured, as Shelley saw, by the splendor of

"that sustaining love
Which, through the web of Being blindly wove
By man and beast and earth and air and sea,
Burns bright or dim as each is mirror of
That fire for which all thirst."

There is no need to say that by Love is meant something more than sentimental fondness, or soft and wayward emotion; something finer, firmer, and far more enduring. Love in God is vision and power, impassioned reason, spiritual intelligence, self-giving and self-sacrifice; the energy of a steadfast holy will bent on creating fellowship, character, perfection. Aye, it is the unutterable thing for which words were never made, august in its humility, awful in its patient wisdom, infinite in its willingness to suffer all evil for the sake of all good, heart-breaking in its beauty, smiting us mute by its ineffable wonder. After all, God may not be a struggler, as we have been wont to think, but a "non-competitive power,"⁸ waiting in brooding stillness; not so much fighting evil as seeking to overcome it with good, leaving things to work out their destiny, and trusting to win by His own tranquil goodness. Anyway, if He is disobeyed, He does not crush the disobedient in anger or impatience; He suffers all pain, believing all things, hoping all things, enduring all things—knowing a power to which even brute force must yield. It staggers thought that such an irresistible, atoning Love should exist, working in all things, un-

⁷ *Logic and Life*, by Canon Scott Holland.

⁸ *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, by W. E. Hocking, p. 224.

hasting and unresting, nearer to us than our own souls—the still, small voice heard when the storm and fire have swept by—forever moving toward its ideal. Such must be the meaning of omnipotence, the secret of which man has hardly guessed; the power of an Eternal Love unweariedly winning good from evil, transmuting loss into gain, turning tragedy into joy, undefeatable because it is able to bear æonian defeat. Nor is it a far-off metaphysical mystery, but, God be thanked, the one indubitable reality to which we can trust our souls, and which we can test any day, anywhere.

Such Love works by freedom, not by force; otherwise it would defeat its own high end. For that reason man can defy God indefinitely, fight Him desperately, and flee from Him into a far country; and the stage is set for the tragic drama of human history, with its blood and terror and shame. Even the fate of Jesus—mocked, beaten, and crucified between two thieves—was not exceptional, save in the character of the Victim. There, by the outworking of motives and events, love and hate, purity and impurity met the same bitter, muddy death: it is an epitome of the long tragedy of the world. Yet, because God fights with the weapons of love, and man with the weapons of hate, folly, and the stupidity which he calls cunning, in the end God is victorious but crucified, and man spiritually defeated but uncoerced! The patient purpose of God prevails, but in tragic manner; His holy will fulfills itself, but by way of the Cross. Deep mystery is here, even the final mystery of our being, in which fate and freedom are blended; a paradox but no contradiction—since love cannot compel, but can only endure and suffer and wait—yet evermore God finally triumphs by “a strange power which men call weakness.”

So it is not true, as Nietzsche said, that faith—indeed, all idealism of every kind—is a “flight from reality”; for here is a reading of life as realistic as that of Hardy—facing, resolutely and without mitigation, the full poignancy of the human tragedy—but without defeat or despair. No, faith is not folly; it is genius; and it is astonishing how, when we face the ultimate and most somber fact, we learn what deep reality is revealed in the fundamental insights of Christian faith. Perhaps one may put it after this fashion: there is a heart of fire in the universe, as there is an undying fire in the soul of man; the flash and glow of fellowship between the two is life, power, religion! Slowly, by ways inexplicable to us, man emerged from the depths of the cosmic order, its child and spokesman, with moral sense and spiritual vision—dim, untaught, but real—and stood, “God-conquered, his face to heaven upturned.” Then follows the story of man, heroic, pathetic, thrilling—“pent up in the kingdom of pity and

death"—cast amid sunshine and storm; his slow ascent, his starts and wanderings; his dark brutalities, his grotesque religions; his strange sins—survivals of ape and tiger, and, as Creighton said, of the primeval donkey, too;—the organization of his life in home, state, and industry; his selfishness and his sacrifice; his quest of truth, his love of beauty, his fight for liberty; the growth of pity, justice, and a nobler thought of God; above all, the history of moral heroism and the triumph of human love, rising through a holy tradition of poets, prophets and father-mother hearts to the supreme Lover of man, "whose love transcends us as the tragic but triumphant harmonies of the orchestral symphony transcend the plaintive melody of the folk-song from which their theme is taken." So, by the logic of reality, we have a right to ask: What must be the Heart and hidden Fate of the universe that bloomed in the life, the mind, the personality, and character of Christ?

Also, the very idea of the Incarnation implies a God working under limiting conditions, identifying Himself with our finitude, sharing our pain and struggle, tempted, despised, rejected, facing the worst and unveiling the best; His self-limitation, like His self-impartation, necessitated as much by His own nature as by the need of man. Only, we must not think of the Incarnation as an isolated act in time, an interpolation in history, but an eternal process—"the climax of immanence in the world,"⁹ as Illingworth used to say; not a belated device to set straight things that had gone wrong, but the fulfillment of an age-long dream. If the dream was delayed, it was because, by His limitation, God must needs wait for the developing capacity of man. At last, in the fullness of time, out of the troubled and aspiring human world there grew a Man—born of a race whose genius for the Unseen is the master fact of history—in whom God could manifest Himself; One who by His purity and valor, His joyous obedience and heroic patience, became the human voice of the Eternal Love:

"He walked here, the shadow of Him love,
The speech of Him soft music, and His step
A benediction."

⁹ *Divine Immanence*, p. 77.

The Problem of an Ordered Society

ROSCOE POUND

IF we are to begin at the beginning in any consideration of securing social interests through the criminal law, or at any rate if we are to begin with something fundamental, we may take for our starting point *the idea of civilization*—the idea of raising human powers to their highest possible unfolding; to the maximum of control over nature for human purposes. Through the physical and biological sciences we learn to master external nature and harness it to man's use. Through the social sciences we organize our knowledge of internal nature or human nature and acquire an increasing mastery of it. Indeed, this mastery of internal nature or human nature makes possible the mastery of external nature by making possible division of labor and setting free of inventive genius to discover things. At bottom it is because man has been able to a large degree to master himself that he has been able to inherit the earth and to maintain and increase the inheritance. The philosophical anarchist of the nineteenth century believed that this mastery of human nature might be achieved and maintained and should be maintained solely by voluntary individual self-restraint. But the rest of mankind has always assumed that some external agency, such as the internal discipline of a kin group, or of a religious organization, or of a political organization, is required to bring it about and maintain it.

This regime of control through political organization of society involves trusting men with wide powers of saying what their fellow men may do and may not do, with wide powers of directing and ordering the conduct of their fellow men in their everyday relations, and wide powers of valuing and judging the conduct of their fellow men after the event. And here we encounter the fundamental difficulty in an ordered society. On the one hand, we must reckon with the will to power. We must recognize that men love power over their fellow men and delight to exercise it for its own sake; that men "clad with a little brief authority cut such fantastic tricks before high heaven as make the angels weep." On the other hand, we must reckon with human resentment of exercise of arbitrary power over them by others and suspicion of arbitrary power even under reasonable orderings. Under the name of civil or political liberty, this freedom from arbitrary exercise of governmental authority is prized above the ordered life which alone makes liberty worth having. As the great Puritan preacher put it, we are to be "with one another, not over one another."

It is worth a moment's digression to note how men have preferred

liberty to justice; how they have preferred unjust results under arbitrary rules to just results under what they feared were arbitrary men. So the rules operated equally and without distinction upon all, they preferred certain rules to just and upright men. Few things are more striking in legal history than the fondness of men for arbitrary mechanical disposition of causes, not on their merits, but on technical procedure and rigid rule. For example, the English Commons petitioned against Chancery ten times between the reign of Richard II and the time of Lord Coke. The lawyer who wrote the Replication to Doctor and Student in the sixteenth century, considered that the practice of equity in allowing a defense to one who had paid a bond without taking a formal release was contrary to the law of God, since it introduced uncertainty as to the individual conscience of the individual chancellor where the law of God called for certainty. The Parliament of the Commonwealth sought to abolish Chancery. In the new world, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania long rejected equity. Even the enlightened Jefferson balked at "Mansfield's innovations," chief of which were absorptions of equity into the common law. The earliest modes of trial are mechanical—ordeals, record, compurgation, the test oath, even in its first form the jury. They were believed in at first and tolerated long afterward because when controversies were determined in this way no one was subjected to the will of a fellow man as his judge.

Thus we see a quest for uniformity of action and certainty of result from the very beginning of public administration of justice. This quest has two bases. One is psychological—human distrust of our fellow men when given power over our conduct or our substance. The other is economic—the need of predictability of judicial action as assuring economic activity, long term enterprises and investments of energy and money therein.

But the end of law—the maintaining, furthering, and transmitting of civilization—involves much more than the quest for certainty and uniformity which reflects the exigencies of the economic order. They are chiefly demanded to maintain the general security on which the economic order rests. The individual life, however, is of no less importance. There must be a balance of the two, and, as the general security calls pre-eminently for stability, while the essence of life is change, this means, on one side, a balance between a need of stability and a need of change. On another side, it is a balance between free spontaneous self-assertion and a general regime of regulating the relations of man with man and governing conduct in minute detail. In law we begin with an antithesis of men and

rules which runs through every problem. In jurisprudence there is the antithesis of the individual life and the general security. In government we start with a like antithesis of free spontaneous individual self-assertion and an ordered society. In philosophy of law and government we start with an antithesis of personality values and community values.

These antitheses have given men trouble since the Greek philosophers of the fifth century B. C. began to think about the rational basis of law and government. Nor has the practical ordering of society escaped these difficulties. From the beginnings of legal history there has been a swinging back and forth between reliance upon a government of men, emphasis on the individual life, faith in individual free self-assertion and valuing in terms of individual personality, on the one hand, and reliance upon a government of laws, emphasis upon the general security, faith in an ordered society and weighing in terms of community values, on the other hand. In consequence, eras of what seems to be deep-seated disrespect for law, periods in which enforcement of law seems to break down and the machinery of the legal ordering of society seems inadequate to its task, are a common phenomenon.

Probably Solon is the one authentic, non-mythical lawgiver of antiquity; and we find Solon, in his reflective old age, as he came to think what had happened to his code in action, saying that laws were like spider's webs in which small flies were caught but the great break through. Again, at the other extreme of classical Greek history, we find Demosthenes arguing almost pathetically that the Athenian people should obey the laws. As he explained to his fellow citizens, a law was a discovery of the truth and a gift of the gods, and a teaching of wise men who knew the good old customs. Also, as he explained, it was a common agreement of the state, a bargain of the citizen with his fellows, as to how every one in the state should live. Yet, as his speech indicates, the citizens would not obey these laws.

Turn to English legal history. The first monuments of our law are the dooms of the Anglo-Saxon kings, and they are filled with exhortations to keep the peace as a matter of Christian duty. Further down in the course of our legal history, Sir John Fortesque, Chief Justice under Henry VI, tells us that in his day there were more men hanged for violent crimes in England in a year than in France in ten. Two centuries later Lord Coke, in his Third Institute, bewails the large number of Englishmen who were hanged each year for violent crimes and that despite this enormous number of hangings, crime was as rife and violence as common as ever. Indeed,

this was the golden age of banditry and highwaymen in England. Finally, an Englishman, writing in 1925, has this to say: "Something has happened to the young men who served in the War. There is noticeable in them a change very marked to social conditions and social relations. In some this is manifested in a profound contempt for law and for order, for place and for privilege, for love and for human affections. In others it is manifested in a dissatisfaction no less profound." This, let us remember, is written of the land which is held up to us as an example of a people obedient to law.

Look at our own legal history. The period after the Revolution is a striking example. The books of that period are filled with references to lawlessness and disrespect for law. That was the time of Shays's Rebellion and the Whiskey Insurrection, and the Dorr War. However much disrespect for law and lawlessness there may be to-day, we have not yet come to rebellion, insurrection, and war. But those were the good old days of our God-fearing fathers, to which we are so often asked to compare the lawlessness of the present.

If now we look critically at each of these recurring periods of disrespect for law and failure of law enforcement, we shall find that in every case there was a period of social and economic transition. Solon wrote in the transition from a kin organized to a politically organized society. The discipline of the past had been the internal discipline of a group of kindred, a patriarchal discipline. The discipline of the future was to be the discipline of a body of citizens making law for themselves and enforcing that law through political agencies. Likewise Demosthenes spoke in another era of transition, on the eve of the transition from the city-state of classical Greece to the Hellenistic world; the transition from the politically organized neighborhood with its local self-government, to the empire of Alexander and the great states ruled by his successors.

Again, in the period of the Anglo-Saxon kings, a people freshly converted from heathendom to Christianity was trying to learn to live a Christian life. The old religious organization, the old religious ties were broken down and new ones were formative. Sir John Fortesque wrote during the Wars of the Roses, at the breaking down of a feudal society, when the ties of lord and man were dissolving and our competitive individualistic society with its regime of economic discipline was still in the future. Lord Coke wrote in a period of transition from the local self-government of medieval England to the centralized almost absolute government of the Stuarts. The local agencies of discipline had decayed. The centralized government at

Westminster was fighting to establish itself. Moreover, the period after the World War is too obviously one of profound readjustment to call for comment.

As to American legal history, the period after the Revolution was one of emergence from a colonial regime to a national; of economic, geographical, political expansion; of the steady acquisition of territory to the westward and successive setting up of new commonwealths; of the exploitation of natural resources on a scale such as had not been known before.

In all of these periods a condition of transition, of the breaking down of an old social order and building up of a new one, led to a temporary disturbance of the mechanism of social control, a temporary ineffectiveness of the legal order.

We are in a like condition of transition in twentieth century America in more than one respect. A decade ago the census of 1920 told us that the center of gravity of population had shifted definitely from country to city. The census of 1930 shows the change from a rural agricultural to an urban industrial society intensified. But our institutions, our modes of thought, our political maxims, our legal ideals are still those of the pioneer, rural, agricultural society of the formative era. In that pioneer society the individual man was economically self-sufficient and was freely finding a place for himself by self-assertion and competitive acquisition. Also each neighborhood was economically self-sufficient. The problem of an ordered society involved no more than a union of these neighborhoods for defense and a minimum of activity of politically organized society to keep the peace.

To-day the task of ordering society so as to maintain, further and transmit civilization has become more complex and more difficult. The days when the local miller ground the flour for the local community from the grain grown by the local farmer, and this flour was baked by the local baker and the local housewives, are hardly even remembered in our great urban communities and are passing in their last rural strongholds. The days when the local butcher provided the local meat from animals sold him by the local farmers, and the hides were tanned by the local tanner and made into shoes for his local customers by the local cobbler are utterly gone. Gone, too, are the days when the local founder provided materials for the local blacksmith and the local carriage maker made the local vehicles. These days of local economic self-sufficiency are wholly in the past. Hence the individual can no longer do single-handed the aggregate of things demanded by the minute division of labor in a complex economic organiza-

tion. The situation created by the economic order is analogous to that presented by the social order in the Middle Ages when the individual land-owner, unequal to protecting himself, entered into a relation of service and protection with a lord. For the days when the individual business man was self-sufficient are also in the past. More and more he has proved insufficient for any but the smallest businesses. He has had to commend himself by transferring his business to a corporation and taking shares in its stead.

Recall the broad lines of the feudal organization of society. A feudal society was organized about relations. It was not a competitive society of self-sufficient individuals. It was a co-operative society of men in relations. It rested on relations and duties, not on isolated individuals and rights. Every one, no matter how great or how small, was in a relation to some one else—a relation involving reciprocal duties of service and of protection. The original fundamental idea was co-operation in defense. The single individual had not proved equal to defending himself. Hence he was not thought of as self-sufficient. In the beginning he commended himself to some lord, that is, he surrendered his land to some lord who then owed him protection and to whom he owed service. If a lord acquired a new domain, he gave interests or estates in it to his retainers, and was bound to protect them therein while they were bound to do the services and perform the incidents attached to their estates. The typical man did not compete. He had his place in a co-operative organization. The several economic activities, in such division of labor as obtained in a medieval community, were conceived as services. Thus the services due the lord from the holder of an estate might be services to the feudal community in which he had his estate. He was held in his place by duty of service instead of by pressure of competition. He found his individual greatness in the greatness of his lord, not in competitive achievement. He did not own land. He had an interest in it; he owned an estate in it. Hence whoever owned anything for that very reason stood in a relation. Estate and relation, relation and reciprocal duties were inseparable. The emphasis was on duties, not on rights. Duties of service and of protection were reciprocal. The watchword was co-operation. The significant thing was relation, with duties of doing the several tasks which the community required resting on those who had interests to which those duties were attached. It was not what men undertook from interest or caprice. They were held to what their position in the relationally organized society made it their duty to do.

What was the society of the last century to the ideal of which our political and legal systems have been shaped? It was one in which relation was ignored and each man stood out by himself as an economically, politically, morally, and hence legally self-sufficient unit. He was to find his place by free competition. The highest good was taken to be the maximum of free self-assertion on the part of these units. The significant feature of these units was their natural rights, that is, qualities by virtue of which they ought to have certain things or be free to do certain things. The purpose of an ordered society was to give the fullest and freest rein to the competitive acquisitory activities of these units. Society was ordered through competition.

In the economic order of twentieth-century America, business and industry are the significant activities. They stand toward the social order of to-day where land holding stood toward the social order of the Middle Ages. Every one in business, great or small, is in a shareholder relation in which things are due him as shareholder, not because of any special undertaking. He is not freely competing. The great bulk of the urban community are upon salaries and owe service to corporations which of late have sometimes shown consciousness of owing a reciprocal protection. The individual businesses are more and more giving up and going into corporate form. The corporations are more and more merging. Chain stores are bringing about a feudal organization of businesses which until now had been able to exist on the older basis. If a new domain of business or industry is opened, those who have conquered it distribute stock as a great feudal lord distributed estates. It is coming to be the general course that men do not own businesses or enterprises or industries. They hold shares in them. Moreover, as one who held several tracts of land might owe service to more than one lord, so one who holds investments may be a shareholder, with the reciprocal duties that relation implies, in more than one corporation.

To-day the typical man (for the city dweller, not the farmer, is the type for this time) finds his greatness not in himself and in what he does, but in the corporation he serves. If he is great, he is published to the world not as having done this or that, but as director in this company or that. If he is small, yet he shines in the reflected glory of the corporation from which he draws a salary. Moreover, the chain of subinfeudations, of subsidiary companies, and affiliated companies, and holding companies has come to be as intricate as the chain of subinfeudations and mesne tenancies in the English land system before Edward I.

But the significant point is to contrast the feudal self-sufficient com-

munity with the individualist self-sufficient man, and then contrast the latter, as he had a real existence in the pioneer, rural, agricultural society of the past, with the employee, shareholder, investor of to-day, held at least in one and often in many relations, with shares or interests rather than ownership in the things which count; co-operating rather than competing; finding his satisfactions in the achievements toward which he contributes rather than in what he achieves of himself.

For centuries our modes of legal and political thought have been molded to the exigencies of a competitive rather than a co-operative society. Our political tradition comes from the Reformation by way of the Puritan Revolution. It believes in private interpretation of the Scriptures and so why not of constitutions and laws? It is a Whig tradition, putting its faith in private reason as against authority, in a right of revolution as against passive obedience, in nonconformity as against an established religious organization, in consent of the governed as against a divine right of governors. We cannot expect that institutions made to such patterns will conform overnight to the demands of a new economic order. Much of our problem of ordering the American society of to-day is one of bringing our machinery of social control into relation with its new tasks.

Talk of stubborn facts, said Doctor Crothers, they are as babes beside stubborn theories. Let us look, then, at some of the stubborn theories with which we have to contend in seeking to adjust the ordering of society to the phenomena of the society to be ordered. The theories in our way are (1) juristic, (2) political, (3) philosophical.

No problem of enforcing law was known to the legal science of the last century. To the analytical jurist the whole matter was one of executive efficiency. It was enough that a rule of law had obtained the guinea stamp of enactment by the legislature or establishment by the courts. The jurist had nothing to do with questions of enforcement. If the executive did not make some rule of law effective in action, why then the executive was at fault. To the historical jurist the whole matter was one of whether the precept did or did not correctly express human experience. If it was a formulation of what had been discovered by experience, enforcement would take care of itself. It would be rooted in habits and customs of mankind and would be secure on that basis. If not, it was a futile attempt to do what could not be done and all effort toward enforcement would in the end prove vain. To the philosophical jurist the whole matter was one of the intrinsic justice of the precept—of its appeal to the conscience of the individual citizen. If as an abstract proposition it was inherently just, its appeal to

the reason and conscience of the individual would secure obedience from all but a negligible minority who would persist in going counter to their consciences and might have to be coerced. If not, the attempt to enforce an unjust rule, contrary to the conscience of the individual citizen, ought to fail, and we ought not to feel badly if it did fail.

A second type of theory looks at the question of enforcement in terms of politics. It held that if laws were imposed on the people from without, the people would ignore or even disobey them. But if the people themselves made the laws or consented to them, they would obey the laws they made or assented to.

These simple legal and political theories of enforcement of law, each of them expressing much truth with reference to some conditions of the social and economic order, fall to the ground under the conditions of the urban society of to-day. We have seen that efficient and inefficient executives alike encounter certain obstacles which seem beyond the reach of efficiency. We have found that in such matters as traffic regulation, the general security requires us to make habits instead of waiting for them to develop at the expense of life and limb. We have come to see that the exigencies of the general security and of the individual life require prescribing and prohibiting of many things the reasons whereof are not upon the surface and the justice whereof, clear as it may be to the expert, will not appear at once to every reasonable and conscientious citizen. Also we have had to learn that the people will make or assent to many laws as to which the individual citizens are wholly indifferent, and that the machinery of making and consenting may be wielded by persistent minorities imposing a perfunctory consent upon easy-going majorities. The consent of the governed is no guarantee either of obedience or of enforcement.

Chiefly, however, our concern is with philosophical theories. For these go to the root of the matter. They determine whether we shall think wholly in terms of the individual life or wholly in terms of the general security, wholly in terms of free individual self-assertion or wholly in terms of an ordering of this self-assertion by the agencies of politically organized society; or shall seek to reach and maintain a balance between them.

Relativity has done a great service in setting us free from the dilemma in which we had put ourselves quite unnecessarily in the sociological and political and legal thinking of the past. We had assumed that in every connection in which we were confronted by what seemed a choice, we must inevitably and inexorably choose one to the exclusion of the other. We could only look at things from one standpoint. We could only and must

needs emphasize some one feature, which alone had real significance. At any point of divergence we must irrevocably follow out one path to the logical bitter end. Hence as between the free individual and an ordered society, as between a regime of full and free competition and one of co-operation, as between natural rights and the general security, there was of necessity one exclusive choice. We must range ourselves with the one series or with the other. We must put the whole stress on the one or on the other. We must let everything be fought out in an ordered struggle or else commit everything to an omniscient state. A superlative valuing of individual personality or a superlative valuing of organized society were necessary and all excluding alternatives.

This narrow mode of thought long stood in the way of an effective philosophy of law. Now that it is dissipated, now that we know that the universe can be both finite and without bounds, now that we realize that we are not held eternally to a rigid choice of an absolute personalism or absolute transpersonalism, it is possible to look on competition and co-operation as sides or phases of something which transcends both. We are not held to stress individual free self-assertion at the expense of all other aspects of human life. We are not bound to lay the whole stress upon the unique side of the individual man at the expense of control over internal nature which makes it possible for man to inherit the earth and to maintain and increase that inheritance. In civilization, in the raising of human powers to their highest possible unfolding, in the maximum of control over nature, both external and internal for human purposes, we have an idea which transcends both the individualism and the socialism of the last century. As exaggerated versions of equally valid sides of civilized life there is both truth and untruth in each.

It has been usual to contrast personalism and transpersonalism, or, as it is more commonly put, individualism and socialism, as exclusive alternatives. Hence many have conceived of the increasing emphasis upon civilization values, which is marked in the law of to-day, as a movement toward collectivism or socialism. But it has no necessary relation to the controversies between adherents of an atomistic and those of an organic conception of society. I repeat. It is not necessary to make an out-and-out choice, once for all, between nineteenth-century abstract individualism and nineteenth-century orthodox socialism as inevitable alternatives. It is not necessary to make a thorough-going choice, once for all, between looking at all things from the standpoint of the individual personality—reckoning community values and civilization values in terms of personality values—

and looking at all things from the standpoint of organized society—reckoning personality values and civilization values in terms of community values or political values. Everything that is not abstract individualism is not therefore socialism in any but a propagandist sense of that term. To lump the reckoning of human claims and desires in terms of civilization values with the reckoning in terms of community values under an epithet of “socialism” is superficial. The two modes of valuing are quite as distinct from each other as each is distinct from the abstract individualism of the last century.

We must remember that individualist at the one pole and collectivist or socialist at the other were nevertheless at one in the last century as to the highest good. Each believed in the individual free will as the starting point. Each believed in freedom as the end of social control. Each strove for political and legal institutions which would promote the greatest and freest self-assertion. The one sought it through a regime of all-embracing legal and political action. The other sought it through a regime of legal and political hands off. For the orthodox socialism of the last century was in effect a social individualism. It sought a maximum of free individual self-assertion through a maximum of collective action, as orthodox individualism sought it through a minimum of collective action. When individual self-assertion is thought of as means rather than end, we have something which is neither “individualism” nor “socialism,” as these terms got their settled application in the last century, but a distinct mode of legal and political thinking, more and more characteristic of the present century.

It would be idle to pretend that we have here an absolute and final solution for all time of the problem of an ordered society which has vexed thinkers since men became aware of the need of balance between the general security and the individual life. All solutions are relative to the problems as they are practically presented. All philosophical theories are but universal statements of such practical solutions. Hence philosophical theories are apt to be like the hero of the freshman's theme who made himself immortal for a great many years. What we can do with assurance is to give over the extreme insistence on the individual life at the expense of the general security, which has governed the formative era of American political and legal thinking and shaped the institutions of our past, without going to the other extreme of over-insistence on the general security at the expense of the individual life. A valuing in terms of civilization is more likely to lead to a just balance than the theories which obtained in the last century.

Religion in the Higher Life of the Human Race

JULIUS RICHTER

THERE are at present strong currents trying to eliminate the religious factor from the life of the human race. It makes no very great difference whether they take the alluring form of philosophy or the meaner forms of secularism, agnosticism, and materialism, or the repulsive form of anti-religious Soviet communism; in every form and phase they are among the most dangerous enemies of the higher life of the human race.

The dwindling of the religious fervor is one of the most disastrous signs of decadence of European and American civilization. It is easy to prove that as far as we can trace the history of the human race religion has been the backbone and the mainstay of every real culture. We know, of course, of terrible upheavals in the past which have been devoid of religious content. Yet invariably these have meant catastrophe and destruction for the countries affected by them. In Africa kingdoms and even empires have come and gone through the centuries of seclusion; instead of helping their people, they have only scattered desolation and ruin. We know of terrible outbursts of the nomadic tribes of Inner Asia—the Scyths, Huns, Uigurs, Mongols, Seldshuks, and Turks. They have swept with irresistible force over Asia and Europe. The most terrible devastations of which history knows were the campaigns of the Mongols under Timur, Tamerlan, Jengiskhan and other chiefs. For all these peoples there was only one hope—to become amalgamated and assimilated in the new religious surroundings into which they were swept. Otherwise they left only destruction and untold misery in their trail. Expansion of nations without a strong religious backbone always means disaster; religious expansion means uplift, culture and social progress. I will illustrate this thesis by a few striking facts.

1. It is now a universally acknowledged fact that the inner life of all primitive peoples was religion pure and simple. All attempts to find animistic tribes devoid of religion have proved futile. The more we learn of the real life of African, American, or Oceanic tribes the deeper becomes our admiration for the almost absolute sway religion commands over them. If it is to be the fate of these peoples to become submerged by the deluge of Western secularism, their real friends know that the only way to guard

them from hopeless proletarianization is to propagate a new and higher religion in their midst. I must make my meaning a little clearer. Tribal life rests on the clan system which is closely connected with ancestor worship (particularly the worship of the ancestors of the ruling family) and the religious awe in which the chief is held for his magical powers, particularly his power to make rain. From birth to death the whole life of the Negro in Africa is surrounded by numberless taboos which demand intrinsic obedience. The younger generation is initiated into the mysteries of tribal life by a long series of secret rites which are supposed to bring them into close relation to the ancestors of the tribe. The land is communal property and neither chiefs nor other persons have the right to sell any of it to foreigners. Outside of their native district begins "foreign country" with a population probably hostile, and the wise stay at home to avoid unheard of dangers. Into these narrow surroundings modernism breaks at every turn. Land is bought or otherwise brought into the possession of foreigners. Roads are opening the country and inviting all to travel. On the coast and in the plantations there are numberless alluring chances to earn money with which to buy wives and pay the government taxes. In the army and the administrations well paid offices invite clever young people to remunerative occupations. Schools and missions bring in strange ideas and stranger ways of life. New horizons appear. The belief in the rain-making power of the chief is shaken. Evidently the foreigners command higher powers than were at the disposal of the natives' ancestors. Is it not wise to imitate and then profit from their untold riches? The colonial administration is changing the tribal districts, so the old clan system is disappearing. Shall the consequence become chaos? Evidently the natives need a new, a modern foundation for their life, a sounder substitute for the lost guarantees of their former ancestor worship. Otherwise they will disintegrate into an unwieldy mass of incoherent proletarians, an easy prey to moral and social disintegration. The question of a new religious foundation of life for these primitive peoples is of vital importance to them and should not be an innocent hobby of some pious foreigners. One might even venture that the necessity of choosing between Christianity and Islam or between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism is of minor importance, though, of course, every intelligent surveyor of the situation will have definite convictions in that regard.

2. Let us look for a moment at Southern Asia, particularly the sub-continent of British India which had three or four great immigrations before the advent of the Aryans. Yet as far as we know they did not create

a new religious background for the country. About two thousand years before Christ waves of Aryans came down from the highlands of inner Asia by the narrow passes along the Kabul River. Probably they were not very numerous. Unhappily they were split into divers warring clans which for generations lived in hostile antagonism. They very slowly wended their way from the Indus to the Ganges and the Jumna. Seldom were they able to start big kingdoms or empires, and when they did these usually disintegrated within a few generations. Only in North India were they able to substitute their own Aryan languages and dialects for the speech of the aborigines. They were in very serious danger of being lost as a minority in the overwhelming mass of natives, just as the German nations conquering Gaul, Spain, North Italy, and North Africa were assimilated by the original inhabitants of those countries. It is one of the wonders of history that these Aryan immigrants have been able not only to maintain their identity, but to remold the character of the whole land and to recast it into their own type. What has been their secret power? Evidently their religion only. This Aryan religion, manifold in its form, inexhaustible in its changes, in every century alive to accommodate itself to its new surroundings, without losing its identity or vigor, now for four thousand years has been the center and core of Indian civilization. India has lived by and from religion. It has never had a great political experience. Its economic development always has been precarious. Yet it has an incomparable religious history, fascinating in its mystical fervor, soaring in its philosophical systems, perplexing in its polytheistic vagaries. Cut out religion from the history and the civilization of the Indies and you have lost almost all its higher values. If you would try to evaluate the factor of religion in the life of a nation, go to India. There you will find overwhelming proof of its overmastering power, and you will get a deep impression of the untold riches it can give to poetry, philosophy, architecture, and many other higher expressions of life.

3. The situation in the Malayan world is quite different, yet just as instructive. The term "Malaya" is somewhat indefinite, since probably the Malays, the great wanderers and seafarers of the Southern Seas from time immemorial, have wandered from Madagascar in the west to Tristan da Cunha and the Easter Island off South America, and from New Zealand in the south to Japan in the north. Yet we may distinguish clearly four or five groups of Malays. The original Malays in their mountain fastnesses have remained stagnant and undeveloped. Yet in the last two thousand years they have come in close touch with four great religions. And it is

always interesting to study how these religions have molded the crude Malay man and nurtured in him higher principles and forces of life.

The first religious wave came from India in the form of Hindu-Buddhism. It has left its impress, particularly on the islands of Bali and Lombok, which to this day are Hindu islands in the midst of a Moslem sea, and on Middle Java, where the whole civilization is the best which has existed in Insulinde to date. Remember such wonderful and impressive monuments as the gigantic Borobudur. The second wave in that part of the Malay world, which advanced farthest to the north and occupied Southern Japan, was the Chinese Confucianism, which, besides the native Hinto, has influenced very definitely the Japanese character and produced the particular Bushido ideal of the Samurai. The third religious wave, and by far the mightiest, was Islam, which, coming from the Malacca peninsula and Northwest Sumatra, has completely submerged the big islands of Java and Sumatra, has occupied the coasts of most of the islands, and has become altogether the central religious factor in the life of the Insulinian peoples. The fourth wave was Roman Catholicism, which, in connection with Portuguese and Spanish colonization, swept as a swift but not very deep current over that extended island sea and remained as a great and impressive factor in the Philippine Islands, the only great Roman Catholic province in the Pacific. Though the Malaysians never have produced a religion of their own, it is exceedingly interesting to observe how the most diverse religions have taken them in hand and have molded them according to their own patterns. Compare the savage head hunters of the interior of such islands as Borneo and Celebes, and the Hindus of Bali, with their refined manners and interesting customs, and the fierce and fanatic Mecca pilgrims from Java, and the proud and noble Samurai of the southern Japanese islands, and the priest-ridden Visayans and Togales of the Philippine Islands. Every religion has taken its adherents in hand and has given them a very definite character. No other factor equivalent to religion has, before the present-day wave of imperialism, commercialism, and secularism, exercised so decisive an influence on those one hundred million people.

4. Quite different is the development in China. It is a well known fact that China is one of the four spheres of our globe where originated a distinctive civilization. We do not know how far it goes back into antiquity. Yet it is evident that this type of Chinese civilization, which in the course of centuries has expanded over most of the Far East from Manchuria in the north to Annam and Tongkia in the south and has made its imprint on

one third of the human race, has remained independent of outside influences to a greater extent than any other civilization. And this civilization, too, has a very definite religious character. It is difficult to decide which parts of it have had the greater formative influence—whether the simple animistic foundation with its numberless deities and ghosts and spirits and goblins with sacred mountains and dragon feasts and a carefully elaborated ancestor worship, or the stately imperial religion of sacrifice at the solsticia, reserved to the son of heaven and the hierarchy of the mandarins, yet on which the welfare of the empire was believed to depend, or the deep mystical and philosophical Taoism with its pope on the Dragon hills in Kiangsi, its alchemistic hocus-pocus, and its speculations of immersion and dissolution in the universe, or the practical and ethical system of Confucianism which by the nine classical books of the great sage and of his disciples has become paramount in the educational system of the country. We do not know how often foreign religions have attempted to get a foothold in China. Yet it is evident that never has conquest pure and simple, even if it was as overmastering as that of the Mongol in the middle ages or of the Manchus since the seventeenth century, materially or spiritually changed the Chinese civilization. Strong remolding influences have come only from outside religions, such as Indian Buddhism, Christian Nestorianism, Near East Islam, and ascetic Manicheism; but even Buddhism, by far the strongest of these outside influences, in spite of the very great improvements it has brought to China, has been relegated to a small percentage of the population and to secret sects in out-of-the-way regions. There is something imposing, in view of the decidedly rationalistic tendencies of the Chinese character, in the homogeneity and cohesion which this religious groundwork has maintained through twenty-five or thirty centuries. We can perceive the terrible dimensions of the present breakdown of Chinese civilization only in the light of this wonderful religious consistency of the two or three preceding millenniums.

5. By far the most interesting and surprising evidence of the overwhelming power of religion is in our own sphere of Europe and America. It is a well known fact that the origin and the foundation of what we now call Occidental civilization was in Southeastern Europe, particularly in the countries round the eastern Mediterranean, Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Italy. As far back as we have historical records there has been through the centuries a constant exchange between the East and the West, sometimes in the form of cultural expansion, sometimes of imperial conquest, sometimes a combination of both. We do not exactly know how

many gods of ancient Greece were imported from the East, yet nobody can stand on the ruins of such old cities as Mycenæ or Tyrius or look at the remains of Cretan or Trojan civilization in the national museum of Athens without being deeply impressed by the influence of Egyptian, Syrian, and Phrygian ideals. Then came the glorious period of the Persian wars, one hundred years of ever-recurring attempts by that great Eastern world power to extend itself beyond Asia Minor into Europe and of the heroic resistance by the small yet energetic city-states of Greece and Ionia, and immediately after that the counter attack of Greek Macedonia under the brilliant leadership of Alexander the Great and of his successors, the diadochs. At that time, in the third century before Christ, the fate of the East seemed doomed. The political power was in Greek hands, and Greece had already produced such a wonderful civilization in architecture, sculpture, poetry, and philosophy that the East seemed to have nothing to compare with it. The whole Mediterranean sphere, from Spain and Gaul in the West and to Persia and Inner Asia in the East, seemed to be subjected irresistibly to the Greek culture and civilization. Yet immediately the reversal set in, and it was religious through and through. The East revindicated its spiritual power to such a degree that it was able to subjugate spiritually and religiously not only the Mediterranean world but the whole Occident, comprising even both Americas. And the East has maintained this spiritual mastery to the present day! We must look at this most surprising phenomenon of world history a little bit closer.

It is one of the most surprising facts of history to observe how since the year 206, the year of the terrible Roman defeat of Cannæ, not less than seven or eight waves of Eastern religions have swept over the Occident. To enumerate them: the Phrygian religion of the Great Mother Kybele and of Attis; the Egyptian religion of Serapis, Isis and Osiris; the Syro-Chaldeæ religion of the invincible sun and of astrology; the Persian religion of Mythras; the Judaic religion of the Old Testament; the Christian religion of Jesus of Nazareth; the Manichean religion of a stern dualism; and the Islamic religion of the Prophet of Mecca. Of course, these divers religious waves were quite different, and they have never been equally strong. Yet all of them were religious emigrations from the East into the West, from the Orient into the Occident, and all interchanging their cults and even their phraseology in the most surprising way. Some were short lived and held their constituency only for a few generations; Judaism was so closely and narrowly nationalistic that it could endure all changes of time as a racial religion. The two Eastern religions which

emerged victoriously out of this competition of almost a millennium were Christianity and Islam, one occupying the northern and the other the southern half of the Occident. One has extended in the west to America and Australia, the other in the east to British India and the Dutch East India. At first sight it seems an almost incomprehensible fact. Christianity as it emerged from the culturally and spiritually desert lands of Palestine and Syria, and Islam as it cropped up from the deserts of Arabia, had nothing to compare with the brilliant civilization of Greece and the overwhelming political mastery of Rome; yet both were religions, and as religions they proved stronger spiritually, culturally, and even politically than all the resources of the Greek civilization and of the Roman Empire put together. Religion in the forms of Christianity and Islam has become the paramount power in the world, Islam from the seventh to the sixteenth-century, Christianity from the sixteenth century to the present day. Our eyes are overshadowed to some extent by the multifarious and perplexing variety of political events, of coming and going kingdoms and nations. Yet taking a broad view the cultural history of the human race, as far as our own worldwide sphere is concerned, is quite clear in its outline; it is the history of Christian and Islam expansion over the globe in a hot competition, the end of which nobody can yet see. In view of such overwhelming facts who dares to doubt the paramount importance of religion in the life of the human race? It is with this background of facts that we must try to understand the complicated situation surrounding us in this present day. He is foolish who in contemporary perplexities despairs of the overwhelming powers of religion in the higher life of humanity. The forces which for five thousand years have molded the destinies of our race are not spent even in the confusing muddle of modern civilization. Our eyes may be blurred for a time and our ears deafened by the noise of the day, but it will remain true in the present as in the past: Our faith is the conquest which conquers the world.

John Henry Jowett

J. T. WARDLE STAFFORD

AN appreciation, not a biography, is intended by this character-sketch. Jowett is rapidly becoming merely a name to the present generation: but he ought not to be forgotten. In an age when preaching is in danger of eclipse, he stands for ideals which the younger school of pastors will do well to keep to the fore.

Jowett was described at the time of his passing as the greatest preacher of his generation. I confess that I think the tribute excessive. I do not forget Joseph Parker, who died in 1902. He drew undiminished crowds to the City Temple right through his illustrious career. Alexander MacLaren, who passed into the unseen world in 1910, is worthy to number with the princes. Nor can I banish from my mind the name and fame of Henry Ward Beecher, great as a citizen, greater as a patriot, greatest of all as a preacher. Then there was Charles Haddon Spurgeon, who, if facility is the test of genius, was easily ahead of his contemporaries. I heard them all in their day: Parker and MacLaren approximately a score of times each: and in their own spheres there was none to dispute their primacy. Then Phillips Brooks is worthy of front rank place among the outstanding pulpit forces of the last century. His life no doubt was prematurely cut short by the Episcopal burdens which he had to carry. But even to-day his sermons as literature rank with the very best; and as preached, we are told by those who heard them, they were overwhelming in their influence and effect.

This estimate does no injustice to Jowett, who remained a pulpit prince to the last. Still Jowett was a reservoir; and Brooks, Beecher, Spurgeon, MacLaren, and Parker were fountains.

In some respects Spurgeon was the most remarkable of them all. I often turn to his sermons for spiritual refreshment; and I never turn in vain. In many ways Spurgeon did not attract me. His Calvinism antagonized my Arminianism. Yet he preached them both, and if asked to reconcile the inconsistency he said he found them in the Bible. Then I have no sympathy with Spurgeon's aversion to organs. He would have no organ at the Metropolitan Tabernacle, London. A Precentor started the tunes, and the singing was very elementary. I like music; none of it comes amiss to me, so long as it is neither over my head nor under my feet: that is, if it is neither too classical on the one hand, nor too common on the other. Musicians who make themselves intelligible to my average understanding at once conquer me.

Spurgeon always had 5,000 people at both services, without either organ or choir. To me, that was the least attractive feature of a visit to the Metropolitan Tabernacle. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and in spite of a service which was to me insufferably dull, Spurgeon gathered the largest congregation in the world, and maintained the interest with unabated power till the day of his death.

The late Sir W. Robertson Nicoll, of the *British Weekly*, who though sanely conservative was both scholarly and modern, thought Spurgeon the greatest pulpit phenomenon of the century. His sermons were not written before delivery. They were specially reported and were published, often without revision, from stenographer's notes. Many of them were profoundly theological, yet they were preached *extempore*. Read them carefully and you will agree with me that as pulpit classics, judged in the light of Spurgeon's rigid views, they are even to-day almost without a rival. I hasten to make this confession because Spurgeon's theology is not one which I could make my own. Spurgeon's genius baffles all analysis: and I say again, if the hall-mark of genius is facility then surely Spurgeon had that hall-mark. He was one of the greatest spontaneous orators of his own or indeed of any generation.

On the other hand Jowett prepared everything with meticulous care. He used to rise at six in the morning, have the lightest breakfast, then remain in his study until luncheon. Everything was made to bend to his preparation. For years it was impossible to get him on the phone in the morning. It was detached: and during the hours set apart for pulpit preparation, he would not talk to his most intimate friends. Parker, MacLaren, and Spurgeon often prepared on the highways and byways. Jowett ran no such risks; all was got ready in the study, and every item centered in the sermon. He sat, pen in hand, for the afflatus to come upon him; and as God spoke to him, so he wrote, and so he spoke to the people.

My personal knowledge of Jowett was mostly gained at first hand. I used to meet him in the early days of my ministry in the city of Birmingham. We were near neighbors. I had charge of Islington Methodist Church: and Jowett was in the pride of his power at Carr's Lane. On occasion I preached for him, when he was called elsewhere.

In his Birmingham days I had frequent opportunities of hearing him at the mid-week service. Here he was at his best. The ground floor of Carr's Lane was always well filled. Some seven or eight hundred people would be present, and a feast of fat things was spread before them. Jowett generally took a series. He rarely preached for more than twenty-five

minutes, and finished the service within the hour. The Sundays at Carr's Lane were great occasions. In the morning the church was usually full, and in the evening crowded.

Carr's Lane Chapel seats 1,250: and for a century it has been the Cathedral of the Birmingham Free Churches, with none to dispossess it.

It was first made famous by John Angell James, an eloquent evangelical preacher, and a true exponent of the times in which he lived. Angell James was succeeded by Robert William Dale, who was the outstanding figure of Mid-Victorian Nonconformity. Dale was a great scholar, a greater preacher, and as a bulwark of Free Church life he was even greater still. For a generation before Jowett went, Dale filled Carr's Lane: and he kept it full for such expositions as those on the Epistle of James, and the Epistle to the Ephesians, which he afterward gave to the world as published volumes. I have always thought it a wonderful tribute to the intelligence of Birmingham, England, that such huge assemblies gathered to hear these closely reasoned discourses.

Dale's was a bigger brain than Jowett's: but Jowett had compensating qualities. It was remarked at the time of Jowett's death that "Dale was made of granite: Jowett of alabaster. Dale's face always seemed as if he was wrestling with problems. Jowett went serenely on his way apparently problemless." This is a true witness. They admirably supplemented one another: and Jowett never ceased to pay tribute to his "great predecessor," as he was wont to call him.

In after years I met Jowett at intervals. He preached the annual sermon of the West London Mission during the lifetime of Hugh Price Hughes, who was greatly impressed by his power. Hughes stood out in those days both as an Ecclesiastical and as a Social Reformer: but he was first and foremost an Evangelist. He always preached to win a verdict for Jesus Christ. I met him after Jowett's sermon, and he exclaimed, "We must make an Evangelist of that man. If he were an Evangelist he would be the mightiest soul-winner in the world."

In 1912 I was appointed by the Wesleyan Methodist Conference in England as its representative to the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. I heard Jowett preach, during my visit to the States, at Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York. It was a memorable sermon, and he had a great, though by no means a crowded congregation. He remained in the New York pastorate for about six years. It is an open secret that the conditions of the work tried him. After the crowds he had gathered to his evening services in England, the second service in New

York, when ordinarily the church was never really full, puzzled him greatly. I heard him speak with disapproval about visitors being made to stand in the aisles, when rented pews were kept vacant for uncertain tenants.

The last time I saw him was at the Anniversary of the Manchester Mission, England, in 1921. He preached the sermon on "O Lord, Revive Thy Work." It was a great achievement. He told me he had not preached for two years outside his own pastorate. But physically he was an altered man. I had an uncomfortable presentiment that I should not hear him again—a presentiment which was fulfilled in fact.

It is always easy to be wise after the event, but personally I felt sorry that he ever left Carr's Lane, or at any rate England. He exercised a great ministry in New York; but in England his name penetrated to every corner, and when we lost him there was no one to take the place that he vacated. But once in New York, in my judgment he should have stayed there. In any case Westminster Chapel, London, hidden away amid the flats and warehouses of Westminster, and in bad weather almost inaccessible, was not the ideal sphere for his special ministry. He ought to have gone to the City Temple, the shrine of London Free Church life. The voice of Nonconformity indicated that position as the ideal one for him: and it is my deep conviction that the unequal fight at Westminster, with failing health in addition, finally broke and overwhelmed him.

We are told that Jowett lived to preach: and that thought must dominate this sketch. He was fortunate from the first in being the minister of churches which stressed the preaching gift. All his pastorates were primarily preaching stations. The preaching gift comes first, and the pastoral gift comes second. I am keenly alive to the importance of pastoral visitation and, as opportunity is given me, I seek to pursue it. Yet pastoral work is much in danger to-day of being stressed to the subordination of the greater and more important gift. Pastoral diligence will enable the preacher to keep those whom he has won by preaching. It is supplementary, and it should be done. But pastoral activity alone will never fill a church. We are told, in the life of Doctor Alexander Whyte of Edinburgh, that he and his assistant, Dr. John Kelman, began their visitation each year at opposite ends of the city. They visited systematically the members of the church of Free St. George's, and they met in the center of the city at the end of the year. The next year they began at the alternate ends: so that each family received a pastoral visit once each year, and therefore saw each minister in the home once in two years. Yet Free St. George's was and is still one of the most successful churches in Scotland. Other churches in Great Britain

might be named which are equally successful under a similar regime of pastoral work. There are churches which are in danger of being debauched by third-rate pastoral visitation. A minister may run in and out of houses so frequently on trifling errands that he degenerates into a gossip, and his presence in a crisis does not count. Cases of sickness and sorrow are in a class by themselves, and ought always to receive special attention. But there is a certain sort of pastoral work which is a tragic illustration of the adage that "familiarity breeds contempt." Jowett could always be counted on in the hour of real need: but I heard him clearly say on one occasion that healthy people should assist in the visitation of the church, and that they should not make unreasonable demands on the over-driven preacher.

JOWETT PREPARED HIMSELF FOR THE PULPIT PHYSICALLY

I am not sure that he always adopted the best means. Getting up at six A. M. is not necessarily a council of perfection. I believe that such rigorous discipline helped to shorten his life. But all this was done with preaching in view. When he walked two or three miles in the afternoon, it was to make himself fit for his study in the evening. If he golfed, he had the same purpose before him. Now I believe that a minister should take recreation for recreation's sake. He ought to surrender himself wholly to the influences of the hour, and for the time being to banish preaching from his mind. Jowett remembered that his body was the temple of the Holy Ghost and he sought to prepare himself physically for his great calling.

HE ALSO PREPARED HIMSELF INTELLECTUALLY

He read that literature which would help him to a true understanding of the word of God. He was an expert in exposition because he knew the exact meaning of the text. He would track down a Greek verb until it had yielded all its secrets. He would examine an English word, and turn it over in the sunlight, until it flashed like the facets of a diamond.

It follows of necessity that if a preacher chooses his words with such fastidious care he cannot often surrender to the *extempore* impulse. He must write laboriously and either read or repeat from memory what he has written. Jowett read: but he made himself such a consummate master of his manuscript that only the expert knew that he was reading. Yet such laborious preparation was ultimately a killing process. The preacher may be inexact at times: but it were better so, if inexactitude spells the prolonging of his life. Punshon was the outstanding British Methodist preacher since Wesley's day. The present generation can form no idea of his spell-

binding influence upon audiences to whom he ministered. But he preached from memory, and he died at 56. Jowett was the greatest pulpit orator of our time: but his efficiency was purchased by his life's blood. He labored persistently: he left no stone unturned, and his message was wrought into form as perfect as was possible to him. Great congregations inspired him, but his sermon was ready for delivery before the inspiration came upon him. He placed his best upon the altar, and the crowning fire descended and consumed the sacrifice.

MOREOVER HE PREPARED HIMSELF SPIRITUALLY

Jowett had great natural qualities. He had a voice like the bells of heaven—a voice that could thunder, and die away in silvery cadence. It was a voice in a thousand and he played upon it like a skilled musician. He was not easily approachable. He admitted few to his counsels. There was a certain nimbus of reserve around his personality through which few seemed to penetrate. He was graciously distant. He had strong views on public questions: and his Peace Campaign, to bring to an end the era of international strife, no doubt hastened his end. In America he was criticized because he played so small a part in public concerns. But he knew what he was doing and that he would probably achieve the best results by concentrating on his pulpit work. For all that, he knew what was going on in the world. He read his papers, especially his religious papers, and he was in touch with the times in which he lived. But he spent his days on the mount when he was not with the multitude: and it was in the spiritual world that he lived and moved and had his being.

Jowett had a more sequestered life than falls to the lot of many pastors. He took long holidays; not for idleness, but to replenish his nerve force. When at Fifth Avenue, New York, he ceased his work in America at the end of May, and did not resume until October: and when in an English pastorate he always insisted on one Sunday's absence in the month. On this Sunday he usually preached elsewhere sermons which he had already preached at home. It was the ceaseless production that tried him, and no wonder when we consider what it cost. He used to say that his absence once a month from his own pulpit enabled him to maintain his ministry, and that otherwise he could not have continued so long. The drain of real preaching is tremendous, and all churches would do well to remember that in asking their ministers for less they would probably get more—more in quality, and possibly more in quantity too.

It was sometimes laid as a good-natured charge against Jowett that

he kept himself largely aloof from the controversies, ecclesiastical and theological, of his time. As to his ecclesiastical views, he held them in subordination to his spiritual affinities. To him the church was more than the churches. His sympathies included all who loved the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity: and, in latter days especially, he addressed himself earnestly to the healing of the wounds which furious sectaries had inflicted on the body of the church. As to his theological views, his sermons revealed them. He took big texts. One who knew him well said that he preached the doctrines of Wesley, with his own accent and with such new light as modern scholarship supplies. He was an outstanding exponent of the doctrine of grace. It was an education to hear him pronounce the word. He moved easily among the great themes of the Bible—which explains no doubt his absence from the fields of controversy. He was so occupied with meditation on those truths which filled his life that he had nothing left for subjects which, even though they concerned, did not immediately affect them. He was a modern Evangelical, and he spoke in his own tongue of the wonders of redeeming mercy. He lifted his hearers into immediate contact with the verities of faith, and left them in the clear sunlight of the presence of God. Jowett's ministry was an influence rather than an activity. No preacher of our day so easily created his own atmosphere. He was an artist in the use of words: and yet his words were but the vehicle of that spiritual vitality inherent in one who lived in continual communion with Christ.

Jowett's career reminds us that preaching is the life's blood of the Free Churches. On either side of the Atlantic we have colossal church buildings; and unless there are prophets in the pulpit, there will increasingly be a wilderness of empty pews. It is ten-fold as difficult to-day for the best of preachers, even with the accessory of attractive music, to gather congregations as it was a generation ago. All around us there is to-day a clamorous demand for preachers who will declare in the speech of our own times the everlasting gospel. If you ask, "What sort of preaching?" I reply, "Any sort that has the distinctive note and is good after its own order." You cannot compare preachers who are experts in their own craft any more than you can compare the lily and the rose. Every true preacher—to use the homely words of Spurgeon—"sits on his own gate and whistles his own tune." Jowett fulfilled his own vocation. We shall not see his like again: for when God has made a prophet he breaks the mold and flings it away. Other preachers will arise and preach the Gospel of the Grace of God. For the kingdom of Heaven is at hand: and gifted, God-inspired men are needed to proclaim its approach.

The Artistry of the Gospels

FRED D. GEALY

THE traveler in Rome who visits Santa Maria Maggiore, the largest of the eighty churches in that city dedicated to the Virgin, is shown in the Borghese Chapel, over the altar richly decorated with lapis lazuli and agate, an ancient portrait of the mother of Jesus said to have been painted by Luke. Whatever the origin of this particular altarpiece may be, there is here as in many traditions a sound intuition. In the light of his superb literary craftsmanship, it would seem almost inevitable that tradition should pronounce Luke an artist. And the deeper truth is that those who told the stories of Jesus, those who fixed their forms, and those who wrote them in our Gospels were, in their own various ways, essentially poet-artists, portrait-painters whose colors are words.

It is now certain that a good deal of the gospel material came to our evangelists essentially in the form in which we find it. That many of the narratives existed prior to our Gospels in independent form, that they were self-contained units, that they were completed wholes, is one of the sure conclusions of recent gospel investigation. Our Gospels thus stand at the end of a more or less long period of literary activity. They are not the work of only four men. They have come out of the life of a multitude of those who had various contacts with Jesus and had experienced in him the living presence of God and consequently a new meaning of life. Much of the power, the vividness, the spiritual suggestiveness of the gospel narratives is due just to the fact that each separate story is the result of a more or less extended evolution which has meant the disappearance of the irrelevant, the non-essential, the superfluous. The brevity, the conciseness, the directness, the compactness, of the gospel stories has often been observed. This is due largely to the fact that our narratives are the product of growth, which, strangely enough, has not so much added to as it has subtracted from. Plutarch's criticism of the style of Demosthenes, that it "had no prettiness or pleasantry, and was condensed with a view to power and earnestness,"¹ is quite applicable to the gospel forms. But theirs is the unstudied artistry of common life. Out of the precious fragments of experiences which men had with Jesus, his followers cut cameos; they became carvers of jade; they handled their material with all the affection and care of a worker in ivory. And the separate stories often have the perfection of a Japanese netsuke or sword-guard. The impression should of course not be given

¹ *Lives*, Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero, I, 3, Loeb Classical Library, VII, B. Perrin, transl.

that the gospel accounts represent conscious art. They surely do not. But their artistry is therefore the greater. It is spontaneous, free, inevitable. It is the beauty of sincerity, of reality, of life. It is the beauty of holiness which is the beauty of wholeness. There is the natural symmetry, orderliness, and proportion which characterize life that is sincere. It is the loveliness of life that has been lighted by Christian gentleness, strength, and love.

When, then, our synoptic evangelists came to draw up a narrative concerning those matters which had been fulfilled among them, they found to hand precious stones which had already been cut and polished, jewels for which they needed only to provide settings, fragments which, like mosaics, could be fitted together to form a full picture, bits of stained glass which, taken separately, transmitted their own peculiar beauty, but taken together enabled the very glories of heaven to shine through. Thus the Gospels present us with the work of a series of artists. It is not that four Gospels give us four portraits of Jesus. It is this and more. For each portrait is a composite of portraits. It is a strange picture which, when we stand at a distance, reveals to us the living Christ as in a seamless robe, and yet, when we examine it in detail, we find that it is composed of miniatures, each one of which gives us its own individual character sketch. We can now understand why Erasmus could write in the introduction to his Greek New Testament,

"These books bring back the living image of that most holy mind, and Christ himself . . . the whole of him, is here so rendered present that you would see less of him if you beheld him before your eyes."

And the method of biography-writing employed in the Gospels is one which would be approved of by no less exacting a critic than Mr. Strachey:

"The method of enormous and elaborate accretion which produced the *Life of Johnson* is excellent, no doubt; but, failing that, let us have no half-measures; let us have the pure essentials—a vivid image, on a page or two, without explanations, transitions, commentaries, or padding."²

This is, indeed, an exact description of the gospel material: pure essentials, vivid images, on a page or two, without explanations, transitions, commentaries, or padding; the stark impressions which Jesus made; swift strokes of the brush, bold outlines, vigorous contours; intensity of emotion together with restraint in expression. It is here that much of the persistent power of the Gospels lies.

It now becomes clear that these lives of Jesus were created after the true manner of the Oriental artist, who is not so much concerned with show-

² *Portraits in Miniature*, p. 29.

ing how things look as with what they spiritually mean. When, for instance, the Westerner first approaches Japanese art, he is often offended and perplexed at the fact that the artist will often deliberately flout anatomy, he may ignore perspective, he will be indifferent to what seems to the Occidental the stern realities. The key to understanding here is that the true Oriental artist is not concerned with mere physical fidelity, or with the mere beauty of appearance; he is concerned rather with the intimations of spiritual reality which insight can sense in an evanescent world. It is not the facts of nature or history, as such, which are of significance to him. *It is what they mean. It is what they intimate. It is what they manifest.* The Japanese artist, then, does not seek to create his effects by depicting form in such a way as to call attention to it, but so far as possible he simplifies, conventionalizes, generalizes. This he does that through the evanescent one may sense the eternal, through the changeable, the changeless, through the perishable, the imperishable, through the accidental, the real, through the historical, that which lies beyond history and gives meaning to it. For him "the truth of art is higher than the truth of fact."³

Now the careful student of the Gospels cannot but notice that it is just this point of view from which these accounts are written. Recent studies of the "forms" of the gospel material make it clear that there was a natural tendency for sayings and incidents to shape themselves into certain types of narratives; that is, we note simplification, conventionalization, generalization. Often, indeed, conventionalization has advanced to such a degree that all suggestion of historical probability has vanished and one is left with an impression that the event described is quite as unreal as seems the face of an Utamaro or a Shunsho figure. Again, one notes in the Gospels the constant repetition of the same motifs. And there is the annoying uncertainty in geographical and chronological data. There is almost nothing here that the critical historian wants. And we find ourselves confronted by the strange paradox that whereas on the one hand we know so little about the life of Jesus, yet on the other we know so much. The ordinary Christian of all time has not been greatly troubled about the fact that we do not know beyond dispute the day or the year in which Jesus was born or died, or that we have no knowledge of his boyhood and youth, or that we do not know the length of his ministry, or that we cannot construct any satisfactory itinerary of the movements of Jesus. He has been at least vaguely aware of the fact that attempts at "harmonization" of the gospel material have not been very successful, and that there is constant room for debate over

³ W. Hamilton Fyfe, Introduction to Aristotle, *The Poetics*, p. xiii, Loeb Classical Library.

almost every aspect of the life of Jesus. Yet the relationship between the Christ and the Christian has been so compelling, so vital, so real, that his knowledge of Christ has seemed the most certain, the most satisfying, the most complete knowledge which the Christian has had. It has been deemed sufficient. What is important to know about Christ, is known; what is unknown, may be of interest but is essentially superfluous. It is like the question I used to hear discussed in a country Sunday-school class: was the golden calf hollow inside, or was it solid? In any case, the Gospels have succeeded in doing what they wanted to do; namely, they have brought a historic figure out of the past and made him live in every present. They have made of Jesus a contemporary of every generation. They have done what M. Jusserand says historians must do: they

"must select; they cannot write history life-size; among thousands of facts they have to choose those especially important or especially characteristic."⁴

The evangelists were not impersonal and dull chroniclers like the official historians of China under the influence of the T'ang Emperor T'ai Tsung of the seventh Christian century, whose efforts to eliminate all possibility of a subjective viewpoint resulted in the attainment of objectivity at the cost of life and spirit. They are rather to be compared to the historians of pre-critical times who were minstrels, singers, whose histories were poems. They did not attempt to photograph the story of Jesus life-size; in Rembrandt-style they looked for the high lights, and were content to leave much in the shadows.

It is, then, this peculiar artistry of the Gospels which is at once the joy of the mystic and the despair of the historian. It is the eternal freshness of these stories which makes it possible for Miss Kirkland to write,

"I believe there is no one in the world to-day so alive as Jesus of Nazareth. . . . For me, Jesus of Galilee is the most living fact of the present, the burning, never-to-be-answered Enigma of every day. Always he is there, standing by my window in the barred light of each new morning, a young Jewish rabbi, vital as if he had drunk the sunrise. . . . I did not choose this Presence in my life. In many ways existence would be easier without it. . . . Does that Presence make for quiet in the soul or disquiet? One thing only I know, Jesus is for me an inescapable and constant challenge. He is a comrade terrifying in demands. I doubt my strength to follow where he may lead. Unchosen and in sober literalness, Jesus of Galilee has become the beckoning adventure of all my thinking."⁵

It is this which created the background out of which J. Middleton Murry wrote in the Preface to his *Life of Jesus* that

⁴ *The Writing of History*, p. 4.

⁵ "The Inescapable Galilean," *Century Magazine*, March, 1929, pp. 549ff.

"The time had come when it had become urgent upon me to make up my mind about Jesus."⁶

There are few historic characters about whom we must make up our minds. But Jesus will not let us go. And the Christian conviction that he lives is due in no small part to the fact that in the pages of the Gospels he is so essentially alive. These evangels are out of life and unto life; they are concerned with the Word of life. The accidents of geography and chronology have disappeared in order to make Jesus live in all time and in every place. The writers are not the least concerned to make their accounts seem historically reasonable or probable to us. The certainty which Luke wishes to make Theophilus to know is not that which arises out of a detached knowledge of historic facts, but which is derived from living experience. The Christian experience was based not simply on what had happened once, but on what was always happening. It is "that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled."

How tantalizing all this is to the modern historian is evident to anyone who reads the abounding critical investigations of the Gospels. The critic does not want art or poetry, he is afraid of them; he does not want impressions; he does not want disconnected traditions floating about like detached water lilies. A Melchizedek, without father or mother, is only an annoyance. He wants dates and places, details, settings, contexts, links between phenomena, lines of development. He wants prose, objectivity, disinterestedness, reasoned hypotheses, orderliness of movement, uniform progress. But none of these he finds. On the contrary he quickly detects inconsistencies, incompatibilities, and even contradictions, and often hurries to the conclusion that a mischief-making interpolator has been at work, or indeed that the narrative is based on no historic fact whatsoever. The truth is that neither of these facile adjuncts may be quite sufficient to account for the case at issue. While it cannot be denied that there were interpolators and that there are legendary features in the Gospels, yet a good case can be made out for rejecting a good deal of the extreme skepticism which has more recently appeared in their interpretation. If we can understand the literary nature of the gospel material we can probably become at least less confident than some apparently are in regarding its origin as due to well-meant fabrication.

The principles which should govern interpretation of the gospel pericopes may best be set forth in illustration. Many narratives might be

⁶ P. 7.

chosen, but one which well serves our purpose is the two compact verses in Mark 2. 13-14,

"And he went forth again by the sea side; and all the multitude resorted unto him, and he taught them. And as he passed by, he saw Levi the son of Alphaeus sitting at the place of toll, and he saith unto him, Follow me. And he arose and followed him."

In the first place, one should notice how simple, how conventional, and in what general terms the narrative is written. Here we have our Oriental artist in his true form. The call of the disciple has been compacted into really but one verse. Verse 13 forms its setting. It stands a completed picture. It is quite independent from its context. One cannot determine whether "again" refers to 1. 35 (Lagrange), or to 1. 16 (Swete, Loisy, K. L. Schmidt), or whether it is simply intended to serve as a transition word from 2. 12 to the new story. The point is that Jesus often went to the sea shore to teach. It is not so much a specific act as a general habit which is the writer's concern. Or we may say that he is interested in disentangling from specific incidents the general principles which characterized the life of Jesus. Again, the historian may ask when Jesus went forth by the sea side, at what time of day, or what day, or month, or year; or why he went forth; or where he went forth. But to the narrator to be interested in such questions is to get tangled up in the trivial, the accidental, and to miss the real significance of Jesus' life. Jesus is always going forth. He is always passing by. We do not ask whence he comes or whither he goes. It is his presence which is of importance. Jesus is thus essentially set free from time and place. Geography and chronology are irrelevant. He is above and beyond them. Hence the frequent indefinite place-indications: a house, a boat, a mountain; the timeless quality of the narratives.

One notes further the conventional description, "all the multitude resorted unto him, and he taught them." This description seems artificial enough. Who are these? How many are there in this "multitude"? What does he teach them? There is nothing here to suggest the concrete, the specific, in other words, the historic. What we really have is an abstraction of that which is characteristic from that which is individual. It is the popularity of Jesus that is suggested; he cannot be resisted; where he goes, men follow. It has often been pointed out that although Mark emphasizes the fact that Jesus taught, he records little of the teaching. This is at least in part due to the fact that he is more interested in the teacher than in the teaching. His point is therefore made when he states that Jesus was to be characterized as one who taught.

It is now quite commonly the fashion to dismiss such a verse as verse 13 as simply editorial. But this does not say quite enough about it. In the light of the literary nature of the passage we seem warranted in stating that we are no more justified in supposing that because the narrative is conventionalized it cannot therefore have been drawn from life than we should be justified in thinking that because Utamaro has conventionalized his women's faces, they do not therefore represent individuals. The likelihood is that we have here a simplified, conventionalized, generalized event. After all, there is no reason to doubt that Levi was by the sea shore when he experienced the event which changed the direction of his life. And if we understand how to use conventions, we may learn more, not less, concerning the historic life of Jesus.

It may appear, perhaps, that Levi is a very specific person, since the name of his father is given as a means of identification, and since his profession is described as a toll-collector. But when we look more closely, we see that the details are not really filled in. We have not heard of Levi before, we shall not hear of him again; the pericope does not tell us whence he came nor whither he followed Jesus. We should like to know what kind of man he was, why he appealed to Jesus. But such considerations lie quite outside the interest of the account. In the description or in the paucity of description there is a double significance: (1) Levi was just Levi, that is all. He was a man, and men were all of significance to Jesus. It was not necessary to describe Levi, but only to name him. (2) There is pregnant significance in the fact that Levi was a tax-collector. It was his contacts with this despised group that the peculiar concern of Jesus for men showed itself most uniquely. His vigorous and aggressive piety appears in one of its most characteristic forms in the contrast of his own attitude toward "publicans and sinners" with that of the Pharisees. As Israel Abrahams graciously wrote,

"It is part of the distinctive glory of Jesus that he tried to win over and win back the 'publicans and sinners' of his time by friendly and reassuring association with them. Throughout the ages, men of genuine but conventional faith have been apt to draw aside their mantle from contact with social outcasts. . . . Against all such the example of Jesus stands out as a rebuke and an inspiration."⁷

Levi is, then, not described as a toll-collector merely to give information about his profession. The purpose is to show the catholicity of the mind of Jesus.

Most striking of all, however, is the almost cryptic phrase, "Follow

⁷ Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels*, 2nd. Ed., II, Note, The 'Am ha-'Arec, p. 669.

me." Its brevity and pertinence tend to make us forget to ask whether Jesus had known Levi before, and whether, perhaps, this conversation was the climax of a series of conversations, and whether these two words were the climax of the present conversation. In dramatic form the story presents the critical moment in any such longer acquaintance in such a way as to show the regal authority of Jesus and the purpose of all his relationships with men. There are two characteristics of the form which enhance the dramatic intensity of the saying: (1) we have the historic present tense: "He saith unto him." The suggestion is that this is what Jesus is always saying to men. (2) We have the direct quotation form: the indirect discourse would have been possible, but much less effective. There are also two important connotations which should not be overlooked. (1) Jesus is made to say, not "Follow my teaching," but "Follow me." Jesus is here put into the very center of his kingdom of God preaching. And we may have fresh evidence that the very activity of disciple-making was derived from his conviction that men could only come into the kingdom of God as they learned its meaning through him. That he sought to create loyalty to himself may deserve more consideration in the study of the vexed Messianic problem of Jesus than it generally receives. In any case, in this narrative, following Jesus is regarded as the essence of Christianity—or should we say of Judaism? (2) The command is unlimited. Where should Levi follow Jesus? Everywhere. When should Levi follow Jesus? Always. This is the meaning of discipleship. Specifications and qualifications are unnecessary. The command is absolute. Perhaps Mark is thinking already of the road to the cross. But then following Jesus always leads to this road.

It is finally to be noted that only Jesus takes part in the conversation, according to the report. Levi doesn't speak; he acts. Jesus commands; Levi obeys. But, we protest, did Levi have no word to say? Did he abandon his toll table and money boxes? Did he instantly change his profession? We should certainly mistake the simple conventions of our artist if we came to any such prosaic conclusions. The story describes in the call what the ultimate issue was. In high lights it portrays the great renunciation which following Jesus always demands. Unhesitating and spontaneous, glad and free, this is the Christian spirit. The response which Levi made is the one which all should make.

In his study especially of the call of the four in Mark 1. 16-20, Professor Bultmann concludes that these stories do not represent actual historical events, but express in symbolic form the general experience of the

disciples when through the wonderful power of Jesus they were diverted from their previous manner of life. He classes them as "biographical apophthegmata," which he regards as ideal scenes, not historical ones. That they are not historical is supposed to be proved by a lack of "adequate motives or historical verisimilitude."⁸ Once we recognize, however, the artistry of the Gospels, it becomes quite reasonable to suppose that while our story represents an ideal scene and is a symbol, yet it is a historic experience idealized and symbolized.

We have not yet, however, quite brought out the full meaning of our narrative. We designate it the call of Levi. But our artist is not primarily concerned with Levi. He is not really the central object of the picture. Rather we begin with Levi, but we end with Jesus. When our eyes become fixed upon this miniature, looking round about we see no one any more, save Jesus only. This is the artistry of the Gospels: "These books bring back the living image of that most holy mind."

⁸ *Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition*, 1921, pp. 13-14, 30, 34. *New Approach to the Synoptic Problem*, JI. of Rel., VI, 4: p. 353.

Vital Aims in Education

GEORGE A. BUTTRICK

THIS is a trespass on the field of education. We are not a teacher, but just a journeyman preacher—old enough to know that a cobbler should not forsake his last, and that trespassers should be prosecuted.

The trespass has mitigations. We were a teacher ourself until the seminary transferred an appointed doom from a day-school class to a church congregation. Furthermore, being a preacher, we are almost bound to have some knowledge of how life is lived: and perhaps education periodically needs the reminder that it cannot dwell in an academic stratosphere, but must walk the streets of the City of Mansoul. Again, we are a parent, and occasionally succeed in persuading three small boys to a semblance of propriety. Certain school experts apparently assume that parenthood has the strange effect of making people morons in matters educational, but here and now one parent signs his small declaration of independence. He is not even mildly impressed, let alone awed, by the oracles of some of these experts. He privately deems them not oracles, but a strange species of what our irreverent generation calls "blah." His children were not given of God to Professor X as little clinics for the testing of immature theories. Parenthood brings revealings; and it bestows, other things being equal, a modicum of educational judgment.

I

There is a satiric *Foreword* to Sinclair Lewis' *Main Street*. The book need not be unduly commended: it has a photographer's skill rather than an artist's insight, and apparently its author walked down only one side of Main Street. But that *Foreword* has its thrust:

Main Street is the climax of civilization. That this Ford car might stand in front of the Bon Ton Store, Hannibal invaded Rome and Erasmus wrote in Oxford cloisters. What Ole Jensen the grocer says to Ezra Stowbody the banker is the new law for London, Prague, and the unprofitable isles of the sea; whatsoever Ezra does not know and sanction, that thing is heresy, worthless for knowing and wicked to consider.

We have had in America certainly three or four generations of fairly thoroughgoing education. The resultant, it would seem, should be a finer industrial order than that which, in uncertainties of employment, monotony of toil, and unequal distribution of wealth, is properly symbolized by a

Ford car. There should be a more radiant political and religious faith than that espoused by the Ezra Stowbodys, who as a class have of late been somewhat unconvincing.

In the last page of that same book we see Carol Kennicott, who has vainly tried to vitalize the complacent drabness of Gopher Prairie, pointing still rebellious to the fuzzy brown head of her small daughter. "Do you know what that is?" she asks. "It's a bomb to blow up smugness. If you Tories were wise, you wouldn't arrest anarchists; you'd arrest all these children while they're asleep in their cribs." Yes, but—the bombs are somehow turned into duds. They are bombs at first. One of our own children asked about two Negro boys whom we passed in the street: "Daddy, are they really different from us?" There's dynamite!—celestial dynamite, the kind that destroys only what is prejudiced and cruel! Childhood is not a clean white page, as was once supposed: it is a vestigial record. But childhood has enough unblemished imagination, if given rightful chance, to revolutionize our world of orderly selfishness. These bombs to blow up smugness—who is turning them into duds? The home, and conservative middle-aged opinion? Yes. Ole Jensen and Ezra Stowbody, with their self-regarding, protective philosophy? Yes. The church and the school? I fear me, yes.

The church must bear its quota of blame. Only of late have its schools had a considered curriculum, specialized leadership, adequate equipment, or teacher training of consequence. Even now that improvement is not widespread; and, in the best event, the church school (of the Protestant order) cannot directly influence its scholars more than an hour or two a week, and its funds are voluntary and strictly limited. Moreover, people are not required to attend church. Many "do not choose to run" to church; and they teach their children both in word and example that a religious faith can be postponed or omitted—as though religion were a matter of taste (like the color of one's ties), instead of being the undergirding of an ideal life in which this world has its only ground. But secular education has highly trained teachers, ever-improved equipment, and considerable funds. Furthermore, its pupils are required to attend school, and they are there (at least in body) not one hour but between twenty and thirty hours a week. Admit the faults of the church: the secular school, in the light of that admission, certainly cannot be acquitted.

A few months ago there appeared in a New York magazine the picture of a timid but evidently cultured lady and her dignified husband standing in line outside a voting-booth. Behind them and in front were gangsters,

chestnut venders, and various other specimens of wayward or dull humanity. The little lady's timidity increased as she waited, but her husband reassured her: "Never mind, my dear; your vote counts just as much as theirs." That picture is almost a final comment on our democracy. Judging the graduates of our schools by their voting intelligence, if any (present-day Washington considered it is not much!), we cannot feel unduly elated. In quality of citizenship the prodigious outlay, monetary and personal, for education has had a sadly disproportionate issue. The mountain labors and brings forth a mouse. Occasionally it labors and brings forth a rat. It seems clear that education, whether or not it needs a new method, urgently needs a new emphasis and a new vitality.

II

Education cannot concern itself merely with the teaching of facts. Some observers easily assume that facts are its only province, whereas in truth facts are not even its major province. They might be if the mind were a bin into which facts could be poured like corn or potatoes, there to remain until needed; or if the mind were constituted to produce automatically a just interpretation of facts. But the mind is not a bin; it is alive. Nor can an immature mind unbefriended reach true interpretations. Facts taught do not remain facts even for one moment; they are immediately translated into hopes, fears, surmises, and resolves. We would not speak of "art for art's sake" if our specialized era had not blinded us to Plato's truism that life is a "whole" and that we must think in wholes. "Art for art's sake," "Knowledge for knowledge's sake," "Business is business," are impossible mottoes, for the sufficient reason that personality is a "whole" and cannot be segmented into the æsthetic, the scientific and the commercial. Everything, including education, must be for life's sake. Knowledge and experience serve their best purpose when so viewed.

Even if it were possible to confine teaching to the imparting of facts, such teaching would still be ruinous. It would be wasteful in money, time, and personality; for it would be better in that instance to substitute for schools carefully indexed compendia of knowledge, and to give most of present school time to ethical and religious centers which might evoke what is much more important than particulars of knowledge, namely, those responses and appreciations without which life decays. Such teachings would be equally ruinous in product: if you would conceive a horror worse than Frankenstein imagine yourself married to and every morning eating breakfast with an encyclopedia become alive!

Teaching cannot be thus cabined. A fact as soon as spoken

“ . . . suffers a sea change
Into something rich and strange.”

The earth has approximately sixteen hundred million inhabitants: that is fact. But almost as quickly as heard it is transmuted. It may become a quest: where and how do they all live? It may become a creed: they are but human dust, and when the tempest of life is spent they will settle again to their dust. It may become a selfishness: every man for himself in that mob, and the devil take the hindmost. But, whatever it becomes, it cannot remain a fact; for facts thrown into the soil of the mind are seeds which germinate into attitudes and purposes. If the teacher shrinks from interpretation he casts the child on the meanings given by the movies or by the street-corner gang; and responsibilities cannot thus be shelved. The facts regarding Italian life may be changed into the “dago”-doctrine of common prejudice or into the Mussolini-doctrine of contemporary politics, if the teacher gives no truer and more comprehensive appraisal.

The crux of the matter in short is this: Why teach geography if, in lack of high interpretation, nationalism disguised as patriotism must still misrule us, and the brotherhood of humankind go ever unhonored? Why teach history if its verdicts are tragically ignored and if the promise is not fulfilled: “Thou shalt hear a voice from behind thee saying, This is the way: walk ye in it”? Why teach technical skills, if, in lack of any indication of social goals, they lead only to overproduction and consequent poverty?

III

The trespasser is now in the middle of the field of education. If we are pursued by the irate farmer with an educational hayfork (which might be, for example, a course in high-school curricula) it is just as easy now for us to go on as to go back. So, with that mistaken psychology which persuades a man once embarked on sin to make a thorough job of it, we go on.

What shall be the new emphases in education? Vital education will teach the disciplines of liberty.

That statement exposes us to the charge of being obscurantist or, what is worse, of being mid-Victorian. Let explanation be made. We believe in liberty in education: otherwise we could not believe in its disciplines. We believe that educational method had lately become conventional and almost stagnant, and we are grateful for recent stirrings in the sluggish waters. Two of our boys were for three years in a progressive school until

parental patience burst its buttons. Our own church makes large place for discussion-groups, for drama and pageantry, and for use of the project method. Recently, we there witnessed the teaching of kindness to animals. That lesson was not by a teacher's voice, still less by rote: it was by three small boys who each brought his dog onto the church platform, and explained what his dog meant to him and how he thought he ought to treat his dog. The breed of the dogs could, best be described as assorted, but the truth that day was with power. We acclaim liberty, but refuse to blink the fact that liberty has integral disciplines. Perhaps modern education in a proper zeal for freedom has forgotten certain indispensable restraints.

There must be that discipline, if such it can rightly be called, whereby the scholar receives a teacher's outlook. It is not possible by pooling ignorance to discover wisdom. Humanity will always depend for guidance upon its true kings—its "*königs*," the men who are able, the men who can! Let Professor J. K. Hart, himself a progressive in education, here speak:

There are progressive schools, or perhaps individual teachers, who hold that the teacher must not permit herself to be used as a pattern, for that would mean the imposition of her own organization upon the child. But, without patterns of some sort, youthful activities must be random, sporadic, reaching desirable results by the sheerest accidents: without patterns youth must end either in the madhouse, in jail, in suicide, in hoboemia, or in the arms of the Junior Chamber of Commerce.

The progressive school fails at its most vital salient when it fails or refuses to offer its children the effective patterns that they need. Such failure or refusal can have but one result: the children must pick up whatever patterns or fragments of patterns they find lying around loose in their world—for they must have patterns. Naturally, they usually find less desirable ones. The teacher in the progressive school must be a foreshadowing of that more intelligent age to which all progressive education points. She must be this, or she has little business to be there. She can choose between being a pattern for the child on the one hand, and throwing that child back upon the casual patterns of the street, the playground, or the movies on the other.¹

Such a statement seems too true for rebuttal. The story goes of a small child arriving one morning at a progressive school and asking pathetically "Must I do what I want to do to-day?" Even adults would grow tired of exercising initiative every livelong moment! Moreover, such unresting choice leaves the mind frantic and bedraggled: psychologically, as well as educationally, it is a false emancipation.

Me this uncharted freedom tires,
I feel the weight of chance desires.

The mind makes its best excursions from a strong base of the accepted.

¹ Quoted by Justin Wroe Nixon in *The Moral Crisis of Christianity*, p. 57.

Why should a teacher abstain from the undogmatic offering of his own "patterns"? Presumably what is gained by longer study and experience is a gift to be shared. Teacherhood has a duty to childhood, or why did God compose society of older and younger? It would have been better otherwise if each generation should be born on one day, and die on reaching forty, to be replaced next morning by another generation. There should be the discipline whereby young minds receive the impress of maturer minds, and thus be supplied with a base on which to build.

Another discipline is both wise and, finally, inescapable—the discipline of routine toil. Again we would not be misconstrued: it is a major crime to foist an irksome round on tiny minds. Let multiplication tables be postponed until they are not a painful drudgery, but a load made light by due comprehension and larger powers of memory. But the growing boy and girl learn (as they have need to learn) that life has its unavoidable labors, and exercises its own compulsions. Education should in this instance also prepare them for life. Not that the routine should ever be offered merely as routine; it should be offered and required as the necessary prelude to life's higher satisfactions. The delicatessen is the ultimate death of appetite: only the discipline of domestic science brings true palatal joy. The radio is the ultimate death (in several senses!) of good music: appreciation in that field waits on a discipline that begins in five-finger exercises. The crowded arena, at Rome or in a modern university stadium, is the ultimate death of athletics: athletics are not by proxy, but by individual rigor and training. A friend tells with mingled amusement and despair of hearing certain "progressive educators" declare that grade and high-school students should be taught "stimulating literature," but not grammar or rhetoric or composition. These latter were pronounced "dull and demoralizing."² Well might he despair! How can anyone be taught to appreciate sovereign literature until he himself (a "mute inglorious Milton") has wrestled with recalcitrant words to make them ring like steel and shine like a cloth of gold?

Life has among more radiant aspects its routine and discipline: therein education must reflect life. But routine should not be meaningless and deadening, but rather chosen with eager incentive as the highroad to power and gladness. The long march alone grants the joy of bivouac. Only the haul on the ropes and the hard struggle with the sea can make the harbor sweet. Rewards without toil canker into wretchedness. The crown unearned pierces the head.

² Bernard Iddings Bell: *Unfashionable Convictions*, p. 106.

IV

Education should teach not only these necessary disciplines: it should gather its particulars of fact into universals of meaning.

Here illustration is better than exhortation. The teaching of American geography and history should issue in true patriotism. It is right that home instinct entangled with love for a mother tongue, for social customs and forms of government, and for a familiar landscape—the whole warmed by veneration for national struggles and heroisms—should become a fine patriotic faith. But it is not right that it should become a selfish prejudice. That man's name is written in the "book of life" who can say of his land:

"If I forget thee . . .
May my right hand lose her skill
And my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth."

But that other man's name brings no blessing whose patriotism, festering into nationalism, hates or despises or ignores other lands—the very lands, perchance, from which our population has been drawn. Strange that politicians should anathematize Europe and all her works, and never see that they thus indict their own blood! John Ruskin once remarked that "patriotism is an absurd prejudice founded on an extended selfishness." He meant, not patriotism, which is beautiful, but nationalism, which is ugly and which has wars as her uglier progeny. Surely geography and history properly taught will at least hint that other countries have their proper patriotisms—Switzerland has her mountains and her William Tell; Greece her Acropolis and Thermopylæ; France her vineyards, and her Jeanne d'Arc; and England to her own is a "little Eden," "a precious pearl set in the silver sea," and has besides Shakespeare and John Hampden. Nationalisms conflict, but patriotisms cohere. Two men each forsworn to his own home are not therefore enemies, but better friends. Surely our schools should be taught a patriotism which, just because it is firm in texture and lovely in design, is quick to understand and respect other patriotisms; and surely such teaching should not stop short of that universal written in a very red ink by Edith Cavell: "Patriotism is not enough." Only so shall we have deliverance from the jingoism which, age after age, has made the world's horizons black with burnings.

To cite another illustration, it is clear that our understanding of social goals has lagged far behind our grasp of technical skills. Such a book as Doctor Kilpatrick's *Education for a Changing Civilization* has established that unhappy issue. So highly have we developed our mechanical inven-

tiveness that we have at the moment more machines and buildings than we can use, and more production than we can consume. It is a safe guess that the automobile and radio industries in America are overbuilt to the extent of being able to manufacture twice as much as there is reasonable hope of selling. We have an economic order (only a professional humorist could have given it such a title!) in which millions are unemployed, with no defense against unemployment and old age. Those who are employed have little respite from a deadening monotony. Other nations (which we regard as backward) have experimented with unemployment insurance, old age pensions, inheritance taxes, and levies on unearned increment. We need not follow them, but we could learn from them—discarding the bad and keeping the true. We are so illiterate, however, concerning social goals that virtually our whole stock-in-trade is the flinging of epithets: “communist,” “capitalist,” “socialist”—as though that wordy warfare could answer any questions. In reality that vocabulary of abuse is now as outmoded as our alleged thinking, so swiftly has our world changed. Not long ago the textile mills of New England were closed. Why? Because the usual orders from a section of Korea failed to arrive. Why? Because the hair-net industry in that part of Korea had suddenly ceased. Why? Because American women had bobbed their hair! The world is so small that falling hairpins in America bounce off to stun Korea, and then ricochet to stun New England. But we are unprepared to live in this closely woven web of human relationships. Our minds are inhospitable, because uneducated. As for the average politician, his mind is not only inhospitable: it is tight shut; it has lived so long with ideas of votes and office that it is now gasping from the staleness of enclosed air. Why teach particulars of technical skill and industrial fact, if, in ignorance of social goals, our very skills become the instrument of our misery? Knowledge is little use and may be a curse, if it does not issue in wisdom.

We heard Dean Roscoe Pound lately tell of a small boy who, in a test of general knowledge, was asked, “What is the Matterhorn?” He answered: “The Matterhorn is a large horn that is blown when something is the matter.” We blow a final toot upon the matterhorn. Has education educed worthy ideals of personal living? Here we need no more for argument than certain glimpses of our times. Cigarette-advertising, usually inane and sometimes lying, occupies square miles of the forefront of our vision: herein is token of the grievous disproportion that afflicts us. Our large cities worship skyscrapers—which cannot lift us one inch nearer God, as though the hanging gardens of Babylon and the jewelled walls of

Nineveh were not long ago desert sand: therein is our lack of perspective and a sense of values. Corporations bribe city officials (both parties culpable), and gangsters count life cheap and money precious: therein is our materialism. Salesmanship urges us to become "brilliant conversationalists" (as though anything could be more horrible than a world filled with brilliant conversationalists and nobody to listen!), urges us to "sell ourselves" (which is just about the truth of it), urges us to "buy a car that our neighbors will envy," urges us in short to be like savages who streak themselves with blue paint to be conspicuous: therein is our barter of good name for cheap notoriety. Our movies and magazines are so sex-absorbed that we are in danger of assuming that marriage rests only on a sex-bond, as though that bond alone and unsublimated could ever be a strong enough foundation for a worthy and enduring home: therein is our fleshliness. No more glimpses! These are sufficient to show how tragically we lack high ideals of personal living. The world, the flesh, and the devil have always been gods which destroy their worshippers. True living is in a book, a friend, a roof-tree built of genuine affection, a courageous quest, a daily converse with that Spirit called by the Greeks "the good, the beautiful, and the true," a daily service of our fellows in that Spirit, a joy in nature's constancies, and now and then a kindling of the soul which is its own best token of immortality. Of such strands is real life woven. But does education so teach?

If it be urged that education should deal with facts, and not with disciplines and meanings, we would retort that to make the school an information-desk and the teacher an information-clerk is to belittle education. Facts and interpretations can never be severed. If facts are not gathered by the teacher into true meanings, they may be gathered by the pupil into false meanings.

The difficulties attending such teaching are easy to see. The dirty hand of the politician is sometimes laid on the school. Ole Jensen and Ezra Stowbody (what they do not know being "worthless for knowing and wicked to consider") are sometimes on the local school board. Sometimes an altar is set up with a teacher as sacrifice: perhaps it must be so, since the strange way of truth is from altar to altar.

So let us pay our humble tribute. The teacher working on a salary which a business man would despise rebukes our materialism. Content with lowly but useful toil he rebukes our notoriety. Serving an invisible kingdom of goodness, beauty, and truth, he rebukes our earthiness. His reward is in himself: it is a "well of water springing up into everlasting life." He is salt and light to every wayward generation.

The Student Mind

HAROLD F. CARR

“GET next to yourself,” is the playful admonition often flung from student to student. Such advice taken seriously involves the earnest effort of a growing personality to acquire mental furniture. A vital student is aware of the fact that he does not know his own mind, but he is not frantic about it. “Getting next to one’s self” is part of the job of living. A large part of education from a youth’s viewpoint is the finding of answers to questions. He cannot say to the registrar on matriculation day, “Here’s a list of the questions for which I would like to have answers sometime during the next four years.” He does, however, show an eagerness to know what questions he should ask in order to understand himself and his place in the universe.

First he has questions of a solid sort. They may have to do with the courses he should take or with etiquette. These queries are important to him and they yield satisfaction for he can get them out into the open and put them into words. The answer can be written into a well-rounded sentence with a period at the end of it indicating a full stop. Furthermore, the answer can be tested.

If the question is “Am I qualified to take an engineering course?” he can find advisers who can give him an answer or show him a way of finding one. If he wants to know how to get a date his fellows will soon instruct him. There is zest in this field of mind activity akin to the enjoyment children find in working problems for which answers are given in the back of the book. One arrives!

Is this dealing with ordinary thoughts worthy of a major classification in the mind of a brilliant student? If he asks none of these questions at the beginning of his college work he will spend a great deal of time and energy on them later. He will find that he is incapable of dealing in a wholesome way with some of the important and everyday relationships. Then he will drift into the room of one of the more ordinary thinkers during the last few weeks of school to make some homely and practical inquiries. University pastors expect busy office periods with the more intellectual students during the senior year. And their problems are in this class of substantial and answerable matters. A philosophy student who has spent his time in erecting a structure of personal belief will ask how he can find a church where he can fit in and serve. A youth who has an ad-

vanced social ideal suddenly wonders where he can work and still keep this ideal untainted. Often the very one who knows most about literature, drama or psychology will experience a flash of understanding in which he realizes that he must learn more about how to make friends. The student less gifted in purely academic pursuits asks these questions first. There is something about being a senior which brings these questions to focus for all students, especially for the ones who have not begun their academic career in the lowly fields of their practical problems.

The theoretical consideration of life's problems will interest and satisfy a youth for a while. But it often happens that the most sophisticated and blasé concerning the matters which college men discuss spontaneously are the first to seek counsel and guidance when it comes to considering these questions in relation to their own lives.

The practical medic is one of the most humble seekers after counsel as to his love affairs. He has thought of people as patients. He has engaged vociferously in fire-place discussion at the fraternity house about women. And then the shadow of the shingle which he is soon to hang out falls across the field of his thinking, and he thinks of a woman in a different relationship than he has before. Some girl is to be not a patient but a lover of his. Some lass now refuses to be classified as a part of a general discussion. He may not trail to someone's office for guidance in choosing a mate, but the definite and personal question has entered his mind.

Plutarch and his friends were so interested in academic philosophy that at a garden party they would amuse themselves by discussing such a question as, "In what sense does Plato say that God uses geometry?" But this same Plutarch was very careful to continue his duties as a citizen. While he occupied a high position in his city he took time to help count the tile. He said that this was a service to his country, but having watched the sustained efforts of scholarly men to keep balanced and wholesome it is easy to believe that Plutarch found a great deal of joy in doing something about which he could say to his family at the dinner table, "Well, we finished that job down by the river to-day."

The enthusiasm evoked in a classroom has to be sustained by connection with some of this satisfactory thinking. A new idea may bring an experience something like the old conversion experience. But the enthusiasm wanes and the experience is dulled unless the student sees the idea or enthusiasm connected with life's more active ranges. This may explain why so many students are won to a healthy and progressive interest in

Christianity through service in settlement houses and camps for children. Naturally, this type of service needs thoughtful interpretation as much as the classroom study of religion needs connection with service. If we become discouraged at the student's demand for things temporal rather than the eternal and unseen we can take hope in the belief that his demand is a manifestation of a deep desire for knowledge which has results mixed up in it. Even if we can't rejoice over this characteristic of his mind the least we can do is to further any reaching out of the mind for truth at any level. A physics professor would not give his students problems with no answers through the entire first year. But many of us who deal in subjects with less substantial evidence seem to think it unsportsmanlike to present first the parts which yield a sense of completion and satisfaction.

Any appeal through activity should also enlist the mind. Youth cannot be tricked into a genuine interest in religion and the church by the chance to put hymn books in the racks. It would take much laborious argument to make such activity seem to have a unique and appealing connection with religion. Carrying baskets to the poor can be linked more definitely with religious impulse. Christian idealism can give such activity a new and more alluring meaning.

The University of Pennsylvania Christian Association has experimented with this approach to the student mind, and has found that the student who feels that he is doing service to others has an asset in mental balance difficult to achieve in any other way.

Those who do creative work can sympathize with the youth in that second part of his questioning which refuses to yield itself to such definite handling. An artist may experience veritable misery before he decides what picture he will paint and how to paint it. The writer paces the floor while ideas are being born. And when the answer comes it is difficult to check it except in terms of satisfaction.

Urges in the youth's mind call for him to point his life in some direction. But these urges refuse to be tabulated. The questions will not come out in the open so that one can get at them, much less the answers! Still there is something in the mind to be uttered. The youth can learn about values and list them. The choosing of a vocation requires something in addition to this knowledge of values—an attitude toward them. He can test his ability along various lines of endeavor. But the question as to his fitness for a particular calling is more than a mere matter of ability. His philosophy of life, the opportunities afforded, friendships, family loyalties and affections have to be considered. These questions cannot be settled by

a series of businesslike interviews and diligent study of a few well-chosen books. To the facts one adds a creative something. The answers are tested by their consistency with experience and observation and by their results in satisfaction.

These creative questions and answers have an element of hope in them. Thinking is on the verge of accomplishment. The answers are not in the back of the book, but one does get a sense of at-home-ness if he feels that he has the right answer.

Studies in philosophy and kindred subjects aid in this field if the student does not allow them to be merely academic. A professor of medicine said recently that the wealth of knowledge in the medical field makes it difficult to teach medicine. His explanation was that a student can come to the place where he is baffled by the broad scope of knowledge before him. Then he has difficulty in remembering that the only knowledge which will ever heal anyone through him is the part which he makes his own. If he is academic in the right sense he will have knowledge and be able to use it. If he is academic in the wrong sense he will learn much, make high grades and be unable to do a good piece of medical work either as a practitioner or as a research man.

Students like to exercise their minds in this creative field of questions. They do so by thinking aloud in talk fests. When they talk about love or religion they do not do it because they think that they have an abundance of knowledge to share. They are taking their mental daily dozen. Their statements are bait to draw questions and answers from others. If they are successful in extracting or provoking a statement which seems true they will repeat it, seemingly unconscious of the fact that they are quoting. They often add an enthusiasm to these garnered phrases and facts because they have found something which fits into the picture they are painting of life.

There is a third realm of questioning in the student mind. In this area the result is either a continual restlessness and impatience or it is a satisfying consciousness of being a part of a good world. Very few are entirely impatient and no one is entirely at rest. In this field one finds the questions which are rarely answered. Success or defeat comes according to the attitude the youth takes toward working on the questions. Not realizing at first the vast reaches and complexities implied in his questions the student trustingly asks "What is truth?" He wants to know how to test and label right and wrong. He may not know the word "objective," but he yearns for objective reality. Most students are not posing when

they ask "What's it all about? What am I here for?" Pathetically eager, many a youth wants proof of the existence of God. He wants to know if right will win. He does not comprehend how slowly a vast humanity moves. Though he may bravely try to hide his yearnings he wonders why men drag so slowly toward their ideals. And because he is not familiar with all of these questions and may not have arrived at working conclusions on any of them, each one that comes into the range of his mental pursuits claims too much emphasis. Many a university pastor has been surprised to have some seemingly happy and frolicsome youth turn serious in a twinkling and blurt out, "Doc, I'm going to blow up if I don't find something to tie to." If there is any difference between the average student and the average adult at this point it probably is that the student experiences more difficulty in finding satisfaction by working at the problem. He must have an answer.

The achievements of the student's mind with the definite questions and answers plus his accomplishments in the creative field have much to do with the results in this third class of questions. Here he has to deal with faith, hope and love. Even his best heroes have few words, definitions or demonstrations to offer. The elders have more patience in solving the riddle of existence. They are willing to sit and ponder, but youth fairly aches to solve these problems. Sometimes they know the questions which cause this turmoil. At other times a fretfulness comes and the only consciousness is of growing pains.

Sometimes we criticize leaders and teachers because they raise too many questions for youth. We should, however, remember that youth is bothered by the confused questions which he is unable to bring forth from the darkness of inadequate statement into the light of identification. Youth is perhaps bothered more by the questions which remain unstated and thus in the atmosphere of worry than he is by the great questions which he can write on the slate and having writ admit his inability to answer. Many a fine student testifies concerning his gratitude to some friend who has helped him draw from his confused gropings some spear-point questions, especially if these questions have been unearthed in an atmosphere of confidence that a working relation can be established with the answer. A group of students making an informal and voluntary study of the Old Testament, had reached a unanimous conclusion that the Old Testament meant nothing to them in their effort to live a Christian life. Just then a counselor showed them a book on the religious teaching of the Old Testament in the front of which was a clear outline. When the students

saw that there are a few fundamental teachings and realized that there is a thread of development connecting the records of religious experience they were ready to continue their study and added to their willingness an attitude of expectancy.

Close observation is required in order to note any definite mental function in many students. If the average hustling college boy were given the subject, "The Student Mind," for a theme he would quickly add, "if any." The student is not a personified question mark with a knitted brow. His actions are sure and do not manifest a great hesitancy of mind. His apparent confidence in himself does not produce sympathy as a dominant emotion in his friends. At first acquaintance he appears to feel that he has fewer unanswered questions than his elders. We are not trying to make out that youth is a pathetic and weary seeker after a fleeting and badly frazzled shred of truth. And yet we have to remember that practically all of his conclusions are answers to questions. An older man may perform certain tasks in a business because he has performed them for many years or because he has been told to do so by a superior whom he has learned to obey. More often a youth acts or thinks as a result of a question which he has raised and answered. When he takes a certain course he has asked himself, perhaps half unconsciously, "Will this study be hard? Will it be something I can get through at all? Will it make me better in the vocation I have chosen? Will my best pal be in the class?"

Youth's questions do not fall clearly and totally in one of these classes: externally definite, creative or in the cruising-for-reality class. Take the question of objectivity of values. To adults this may be quite largely an abstract problem. But if to a youth it seems that he can prove through the temporary and provincial nature of morals that goodness is subjective, he may start to act on that theory. Or he may reverse the order and first do something which his parents say is wrong, believing that he can afterwards justify his actions. When a student confides that he does not believe in the time-honored standards of sex morality it is not difficult to predict by the amount of his vehemence about how long it will be before he opens his personal experience of dereliction. The question of value is linked with a very understandable and checkable answer in action. Here the student is in a unique situation. His theoretical decisions are geared directly to his actions. An adult is influenced as much by his observations and his experiences as by his conclusions reached in his moments of philosophizing.

The student has had little adult experience. And he is in an unreal situation. He sees little of age, infancy, poverty and other plain facts of

existence. Observation of these realities gives balance and direction to the adults and younger people at home.

The student can talk about the drinking of intoxicants as if it were a philosophical question of personal liberty. If he were in industry he would know that the question, "Shall I drink?" is to be answered after observing the plain, everyday effects of drinking. He would see more clearly that the use of intoxicants is not purely an ethical and theoretical question. For an older person a decision on this matter could be made on the basis of observation without considering ethics very much. It is easier to discuss such a question with an older person than with a student, even when the person has a radically different viewpoint. A student is more dependent on theorizing and is tempted to over-simplify the problem and become unreasonably dogmatic. Warnings and danger signals mean less. He has more faith in his logic. A healthy, wondrously happy youth is influenced very little by fears of what may happen eventually.

On the other hand there are ways in which a student seems too willing to divorce his thinking from his actions. In the more abstract realm he depends upon his conclusions in themselves for happiness more often than do his elders. But in his questions which lie between those of ultimate reality and the everyday judgments the student often shows a lack of desire to tie his convictions to good, solid work.

In one of our large universities an organization against prohibition was formed. Many students wore buttons signifying membership. The professional organizer secured a prominent and popular ex-football coach to address the organization. Although the meeting was well advertised only a half-dozen students showed up. They sat and talked football with the ex-coach.

The organizer admitted that in practically all of the universities he had failed to get a crowd. The students were not interested in an organization which would do something about their firm beliefs. They were anxious to discuss the question and enter into furious argument about it with other students, parents and teachers. And such discussion was enough for them.

An unsympathetic critic of youth would say that this shows insincerity or at least inability to think through. It may, on the other hand, show that abstract thinking is a real and satisfying part of a student's existence. Sometimes a student whose sincerity and mental strength are questioned is in the very depths, because an ideal which he has just adopted has not been accepted by the government, the church and the university.

Then the student finds that his ideal dims because he will not do comparatively unlovely and unromantic work about it. In another month we may find the same student discouraged because humanity at large is not agog over another of his enthusiasms. If we laugh at this or allow ourselves to be bitter we miss the point of our observation. Older folk have their experience of defeat to keep them from hoping with such divine and reckless abandon. And likewise the years have shown them satisfaction in slowly and carefully working toward a goal.

Every good teacher knows how important it is to see that students be engaged some of the time in an activity which yields results. To the average college student his four years in the university constitute one fourth of the part of his life about which he can remember anything. To a man of fifty his four years in college or any other four years are not likely to bulk as large in their influence upon his attitude, even though the four years be the last four years. The student's defeat in a managerial competition may mean more than any adult can realize. It may have been his first sustained effort to succeed. If he has failed, his batting average with life seems to the student to be zero. A business man fails now, but he has succeeded before and his average is still high. Because the area of experience for the student is smaller it is more easily made daylight by the sun of success. It can also be darkened by a smaller cloud of defeat.

If we believe that one incident may take on a vastly stronger emphasis with a youth than with an adult we can see the importance of balancing a student's reading. Many a student is amazed to see his faith slipping away when he has read a couple of well-written, cynical books. One student having decided to study religion during the vacation period took six books with him, every one of them attacking religion. In September he returned to school somewhat stunned. Close questioning revealed that he had never read carefully a single volume supporting or explaining religion. We would not think of apologizing because we carefully watch the feeding of a younger child in order to attain a balanced diet. But sometimes we hesitate to use our influence to see that students (and they are growing mentally) get a balanced ration of ideas. We innocently recommend mind-awakening books of criticism and stimulation. Certainly we do not want bland, self-satisfied students. But for every student who needs a large portion of irritation there are a dozen who need mental sustenance, a good plain meal of inspiration and information.

It is a hopeful thought, however, that a veritable avalanche of loyalty may be released through a humble experience. It is sometimes diffi-

cult to forsake the thought of what we think should happen in a given situation, while we look at what actually happens. We would like to think that carefully planned teaching and unassailable reasoning could win students to lively and personal thought about religion. But we have to admit that the beginnings of religious awakening often take place through lowly means. The foundation of the personal allegiance of course is deep. Training has a large part to play. But the actual beginning of loyal service and definite thought may happen in some unexpected way. The student may have been asked to straighten out the finances of a religious organization. While balancing the columns of figures a new vista may be given him and he sees for the first time what religion and its organized forces might mean in his life. The efforts of the classroom and chapel give a background that balancing books cannot give. Yet some comparatively insignificant duty may be the contact which ignites the personal fire of enthusiasm. More often a friendship with one who abounds in faith and good works will accomplish this most desired action of the student mind—the personal grasping of convictions and ideals. These humble influences of duties and friendships serve to awaken thought among the intellectuals as often as among those who love to visit but care not for strenuous and directed mental exercise.

Another variance between the adult and the student mind is that of responsibility. It does not cost a student very much to be radical, at least not as much as it would a man in a position of influence. This may be in favor of the student. One cannot impute motives so often. On the other hand it may make for carelessness of thought. Aside from this factor, however, there is another way in which a mind free of responsibility works differently. Many alumni who do not darken the door of the university pastor's office while they are in the university come back with problems after they have assumed the responsibility of a home and have been at work. And their problems are problems of thought! The most susceptible class of young people are those who are setting up homes. They realize anew the importance of thinking straight. They have built a philosophy, but under stress they may begin to doubt it. In the midst of some new joy they may feel that their ideas are not equal to the beauty and wonder of their experience. Many a senior or young alumnus seeks an interview with his university pastor, to say, "I have developed my knowledge of business and I believe that I have grown socially. Now that I am going into business and am to be married I believe that I should do something to catch up my religious development." And he says this as if the pastor could give him

spiritual instructions as complete and systematic as the information he has just received from some magazine about a family budget.

In most of these characteristics there is little difference between men and women. In a school where the business administration courses for men have the largest enrollments, the women who are in other courses will perhaps average a little higher in information about the world in general. They will think more in terms of philosophy and religion. But in a school where liberal arts courses are predominant the men show an equal interest in the questions of reality and in creative thinking.

The students who find the balance wheels for lack of responsibility are the ones who realize that they have to do more and better thinking about their philosophy of life. They work hard at the intricacies of business practice. They do not expect their philosophy to drift in on them unawares. The students who know something of literature and like it seem to supply their need for actual life contacts by making their imaginations function. They make situations which are not present to the senses actually dwell in the mind. To this conscious endeavor to think through, and dream through, the students who see life and see it whole are the ones who add a diligent effort to secure the right contacts.

Students are eager to know anyone who will be frank and friendly without trying to use them for further ends. If a student is contemplating the ministry as a profession one of the best ways to help him is to send him to young ministers who are just out of seminary and facing their great problems of adjustment. The student is then using the project method of education with a vengeance!

If we are right in the surmise that student thinking is a natural seeking for the right questions and answers and that much depends upon his attitude during the search, we can easily see the value of contacts with those who are finding out what questions ought to be asked and answered. College students are boys and girls just out of high school and away from home. They are independent. But with all their independence they do depend for encouragement, if not for guidance, upon those who have achieved clarity and poise in thinking. The modern student who has brought a problem to an older person may end the discussion with a sigh and the remark, "It's a personal matter after all." So it is. Any thinking is. The eagerness which students have for talking over their intellectual quests with "someone who has been on the job," shows that part of "the personal matter" is finding out what other persons have thought. The student mind is unique, but it is a part of the mind of our day.

The Misunderstood Epistle

JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM

SINCE Theology has come to be definitely recognized as the interpretation of religious experience its office is much better understood. Doctrinal ideas are seen to lie normally close to the heart of life and to carry important consequences. History bears ample witness to this, testifying not only to the good effects of the theologizing impulse when rightly exercised, but to the harm it may do when wrongly directed or when doctrine falls behind experience.

I

The most outstanding instance of the misleading and disastrous results of a misconceived doctrinal system is that of the Sovereignty theology which, although it embodies some very great and noble Christian truths and principles, as a whole is insufficiently grounded in Christian experience. After its long and repressive sway over a large part of Christendom its prestige is now rapidly diminishing, although its consequences are still thwarting the influence of the church over many minds.

The rise of this system of theology is attributed to the apostle Paul, assuming to rest upon certain parts of his Epistle to the Romans. The time has come for a thorough revision of this assumption. It can be shown, I believe, that there has been a serious and indeed tragic misinterpretation of one who might well be called "the Misunderstood Apostle" and this "the Misunderstood Epistle."

Paul was the great constructive philosopher and theologian of early Christianity. Yet he was never purely speculative, much less academic. His theology grew out of actual situations and concrete problems. The situation which confronted him in writing to the Romans was the (to him) astounding one of the Jews rejecting the Gospel and the Gentiles accepting it, and the problem was how to understand the meaning and forecast the outcome of this fact. Out of this situation, based upon his own experience of Christ, grew his interpretation of Christianity and its mission to mankind.

It is essential to the understanding of the epistle (that is, its doctrinal portion) to recognize in it two distinct parts. The first, extending to the close of the eighth chapter, sets forth the principle of salvation by faith. The second, beginning with the ninth and closing with the eleventh chap-

ter, contains Paul's condensed philosophy of history—the first significant attempt of the kind ever made. Failure to keep these two natural divisions with their separate yet related themes distinct has led to the formulation of a theology which is neither essentially Christian nor Pauline. A brief summary will make this clear.

II

Following his customary words of salutation and commendation, Paul commences his message to the church at Rome with a statement of what has been interpreted by Protestantism as the essential principle of the Gospel (1. 16, 17), this is, salvation by faith.

Salvation is no incidental or limited concern in the eyes of Paul, but an imperative human need attested by a universal sinfulness which involves guilt because it is disobedience of moral law—natural law in the case of the Gentiles, statutory law in that of the Jews. Paul draws a dark and (it must be admitted) probably exaggerated picture of racial wickedness in this introductory portion, for he is always a dramatist and cannot be otherwise understood. Yet it is wholly for the purpose of arousing his fellow men to their condition in order to hold out to them the boundless Divine grace and mercy now so clearly revealed. To avail themselves of this Divine grace they need only faith. In order to present a convincing illustration of the saving power of faith Paul adduces "the father of the men of faith," Abraham, and describes at some length the simplicity yet efficacy of his faith (Chapter 4).

Having set forth the primacy of faith Paul makes the next great advance in the dramatic movement of his argument, that is, the presentation of Jesus Christ as the incarnate bearer of the reconciling grace and love of God and as such the center of faith in the new Divine revelation (4. 24—5. 11).

In order to clarify and emphasize the redemptive character and mission of Christ Paul brings forward his striking parallel of the two Adams—one the physical progenitor of mankind, through whom sin entered into the racial life, the other the "heavenly" man, founder of a new spiritual race. The doctrine of the Fall, which has been mechanically taken from this passage, is not Paul's doctrine at all, but a Rabbinic doctrine that he seized upon in order to advance a belief that he held with intense conviction and desired to further with all the strength of his impassioned faith—that is, the saving character and mission of the Second Adam, the racial redeemer, Jesus Christ.

III

A serious danger, however, attends this free salvation—one that threatens to subvert the principle of the saving power of faith and all that accompanies it. It is the subtle error since called Antinomianism. Will not reliance upon Divine grace cancel the virtue of faith by giving rein to sin and thus lead to unbridled moral license? Here is a difficulty indeed. Paul's answer is at first only an indignant refusal. "What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? God forbid." This rendering of Paul's *οὐ γένοιτο* is quite too weak and unduly pious. "Nonsense!" (Moffatt's word) is a better rendering of this protest, or one might use that expressive exclamation of William James, "Bosh!"

Upon further thought, however, Paul is not disposed to put the matter aside thus curtly. He proceeds to meet the objection by showing that it loses all force in view of the experience of a renewed moral life in which sinful impulses have lost their power and become virtually dead (6. 3—7. 6). The spiritually renewed life, he points out, seems to negate law but in reality fulfills it.

Yet Paul is too honest with himself and others, and too well aware of the conflict within, to leave the matter thus up in the air. And so, with characteristic frankness, he unfolds (in chapter seven) his own experience, picturing with dramatic force the battle of good and evil within himself which leads to the despairing outcry: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" His answer to this poignant question is best given in Moffatt's translation: "God will! Thanks be to him through Jesus Christ our Lord!"

IV

Upon this dramatic climax there ensues—as when a river breaks tumultuously through a mountain gorge and flows out into the serenity of quiet meadows—the Apostle's *Hymn of the Spirit-filled Life* (Chapter 8), an incomparable picture of the peace and power of the renewed life.

In the course of this inspiring spiritual lyric, Paul's wide-ranging mind gains a momentary vision of the sympathy between man and Nature—engaged, as he sees them, in a common struggle and aspiration (8: 19-23)—a passage which remains to this day one of the most suggestive insights ever reached into the deeper meaning of Nature as related to man. Nature waiting for adoption into the liberty of the sons of God: here is an anticipation of a higher level of existence such as Emergent Evolution might well recognize as the forecast of a new stage in the ascent of life.

V

In this eighth chapter occurs the brief but fateful passage (vv. 28-30)—meant apparently to enhearten and reassure this little band of Christians in the midst of a great pagan city—which, misconceived and mechanized, has been made one of the cornerstones of the unwarranted and unchristian doctrine of Decrees. Foreknowledge, predestination, election, justification—these rigid doctrines constitute a wholly unjustified and misleading extension and mechanization of Paul's hasty, tentative summary of the successive steps in the progress of the Divine redemption of his people. Literalized and stretched far beyond any warrant, this eager attempt of Paul to reassure his fellow Christians has been erected into an iron-clad system, not only guaranteeing the salvation of the elect, but (in connection with 9. 17-22) affirming the condemnation of the last, according to a decree by which "from all eternity by an eternal and immutable counsel God has once for all determined both whom he would admit to salvation and whom he would condemn to destruction."¹ This intolerable act of predetermination to destruction is held by Calvinism to be both right and reasonable, for "there is no discordance between these two things—God's having appointed from eternity on whom he will bestow his favor and exercise his wrath, and his proclaiming salvation indiscriminately to all."² It would be difficult to surpass this Calvinistic doctrine in inhumanity and irrationality—and all in the name of the Grace of God.

It would be unjust, however, to lay the whole burden of this unchristian theology upon Calvin. Much of it he shared with the other reformers as a heritage of Augustinianism. He was trying to be true to what he thought was Scripture. In his ardent but blind devotion to the letter—which Paul declared a deadly thing—Calvin (in strange inconsistency with his doctrine of the text, *Monium Sancti Spiritus*) was the representative of that reliance upon the "flesh" of intellectual formulation that Paul saw could be overcome only by "the mind of the Spirit."

VI

That this should be the apostle and this the epistle upon which a severely logical theology built its iron-clad system of Decrees, Original Sin, Predestination, Election and Eternal Punishment, is almost incredible. Could there be a greater and more complete misinterpretation? In place of Paul's tender concern for his fellow men (in spite of his scathing de-

¹ *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, III, 21, 7.

² *Ibid*, III, 24, 17.

nunciation of sin) and his longing that all may be saved, a deliberate consigning of all save the elect to eternal perdition! Surely a hardening of heart for a time befell Christian theology from which it fortunately has been delivered, by the grace of God, only after very long controversy and heartbreak.

Yet it is not for our released and light-minded generation to condemn the serious and devoted Christians of a period less privileged than ours. In all good faith they accepted what they thought they must and "wrought in sad sincerity" deeds that have purified and ennobled their heritage to us and done much to offset the evil effects of their doctrinal system. It is for us rather to be grateful to such clear-minded and courageous theologians as Arminius, Grotius, Wesley, Wm. M. Taylor, Finney, Channing, Bushnell, and the rest, who at length broke through the hard-and-fast system and delivered theology from its Egyptian bondage.

At the conclusion of his majestic *Hymn of the Spirit* Paul lifts the pean of victory (8. 31-39) which closes his survey of the motive and outcome of the divine-human economy of Salvation by Faith: "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? . . . For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."

VII

In the second part of the Epistle, beginning with chapter nine, Paul takes up more explicitly the situation which has caused him such deep perplexity and pain—the rejection of Christ by his own people. The result of his reflection may be called the first comprehensive philosophy of history.

The words with which he introduces the subject reveal the intensity of his feeling. "I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost, that I have great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart." Over what? Over this problem of rejection that is so evident and distressing that Paul does not even name it explicitly but proceeds, after dwelling a moment upon the high prerogatives bestowed upon his people, to introduce the solution which he has come to regard as the only possible explanation of the enigma.

This is, in fine, the principle of the Saving Remnant. Although most of his people are rejecting Christ, a few have received him by faith and are

realizing a great transformation. Is not this in clear accord, he asks, with the whole movement of history? Always it is the chosen individual, or the small group, that carries forward the Divine purpose and saves the day. As an instance of this Paul bids his readers consider, first of all, Abraham. Chosen for a great mission this hero becomes the father of the faithful. Then come Isaac and Jacob, each the instrument of God to further His ends. Later emerge the four hundred who did not bow the knee to Baal.

VIII

Yet, if this is the Divine method, it involves, clearly enough, a process of exclusion as well as of selection. If Jacob is loved, Esau seems to be "hated." Taking a broader outlook, Paul adduces Pharaoh as related to the Divine direction of human affairs, as an example of the principle he is enunciating. In order to explain the dramatic deliverance of Israel from Egypt, under Moses, it seems to Paul necessary to interpret Pharaoh's "hardening" as due to God's deliberate working, according to which there are "vessels of dishonor," to be the bearers of the misdeeds of humanity, as well as "vessels of honor" to serve higher ends. How else can rebellious and evil deeds and men be understood, asks Paul—except as under Divine control and thus compelled, in the end, to serve beneficent ends? If Pharaoh's hardness of heart were solely his own free will and act, and thus entirely fortuitous, what becomes of God's hand upon the movement of history? Might not men thwart His will and defeat His merciful purposes? No; Paul cannot escape the conviction that the whole course of human events is directed, not merely contingent.

Does this involve an injustice to those who play the villain's part? Not in the eyes of Paul. God has His own counsels and His own methods. It is not for man to question them. "Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?"

It is difficult to accept entirely Paul's view at this point—or at least his presentation of it. He has apparently overstated his case in order to emphasize his conviction that God has all human events, and all who play a part in them, in His own hands. It is like Paul, with his ardor and dramatic instinct, to push on, at times, to conclusions without stopping to make qualifications. Yet he must not be taken too literally. There is more than one indication in the course of his argument (for example, God "endured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath") that he did not intend to deny either the freedom, or the fault, of offenders.

IX

Moreover it must be kept in mind that Paul is dealing with the "vessels of dishonor" not with reference to eternity, but with reference to history, to the part they play in a drama designed to eventuate in the good of all men. If he consigns them to "destruction" it is as evil doers—along with their bad designs and deeds—who impede but cannot frustrate the Divine purpose. It is a destruction that has to do with their earthly career, not the life beyond death. With this the discussion here has no direct concern. Conditions after death are not in Paul's mind here at all, so far as we have any right to assume. Yet the application of his words made by the Augustinian-Calvinistic theology is chiefly to the future life. To infer from this passage (mistakenly associated with 9. 29, 30) that the vessels of dishonor were selected (or "passed by") for eternal punishment and then to apply this judgment to all men in all ages—ignoring what follows—is to do a great injustice to Paul, to say nothing of the God whose ways Paul was seeking to justify.

X

And now Paul makes ready to give his principle of the mission of the remnant its full application and to draw from it an astonishingly confident and comprehensive forecast of the future course of the Gospel and of mankind.

Before making this application, however, in order to relate the revelation of God in Christ to the general revelation in Nature which he has already affirmed (chapter one) he devotes his attention (in chapter ten) to what might be called the Antecedent (or Preparatory) Gospel which has been given to all men everywhere. He conceives the Gospel of Christ, which he is presenting for acceptance with such earnestness, as no strictly new or unheard of thing, unrelated to the great cosmic and historic revelation of God to mankind. On the contrary, appealing to psalm and prophecy, he declares the Gospel he is presenting to be continuous with, and the culmination of, an age-long, world-wide Gospel. To his mind the Word of the Gospel which is now being preached is but the fulfillment of that Word of God (10. 18) which has gone out throughout all the earth and to the ends of the world (Ps. 19).

All the commentaries, without exception, that I have consulted fail to follow Paul in the scope and significance of this conception. Their writers do not see that this is an integral part of his whole conception of the Gospel and in complete accord with his idea of the Eternal Christ,

pre-present with Israel (I Cor. 10. 4), and also with his paradox of the "Christ mystery," that is, the *open secret* whose full meaning has been "hid through the ages and generations" (being only partially revealed by "the law") "but is now made manifest" (Rom. 16. 25; Col. 1. 26, 27).

XI

Thus at length the apostle returns, with accumulated corroborative force, to what he conceives will be the outcome of the Remnant Plan, bringing the whole force of his argument to bear on the fact that in Israel at the present time also there is a remnant according to the election of grace (11. 5) who are receiving Christ through faith. Here is the key to the situation. The remnant has saved the nation. As for the majority, they have indeed stumbled—yet have not fallen. In fact the future is pregnant with promise for them. For here Paul advances a surprising conjecture, namely: (1) through the fall of Israel salvation is come to the Gentiles and (2) when the fullness of the Gentiles is come in, jealousy, provoked by the evident blessing which is coming to the Gentiles, will move the Jews as a whole to repentance. And so all Israel shall be saved (11. 26). Here indeed is a bold venture of faith—and of prognostication.

To clarify his prediction and make it vivid, Paul makes use of his arresting analogy of the olive tree. Israel is an olive tree some of whose branches are now being broken off in order that a wild olive (the Gentiles) may be grafted in. After this the broken branches will also be grafted back upon the original stock. Thus the enlarged and restored olive tree typifies the whole world saved through faith in Christ.

XII

Having thus discovered, as he believes, the outlines of the majestically beneficent purpose and method of Divine grace in bringing about universal salvation, Paul recalls the state of universal sinfulness which he pointed out at the beginning of his epistle and which is now seen as the precondition of universal redemption: "For God hath concluded them all in unbelief that he might have mercy on all" (11. 32).

And now, again, as at the conclusion of the first division of the Epistle (chapter eight), his enthusiastic and devout spirit breaks forth into an outburst of praise: "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past tracing out. . . . For of him and through him and to him are all things: to whom be glory forever and ever" (11. 33-36).

The remainder of the Epistle is given to practical issues and ethical instruction, not less important than the doctrinal portion, but with which we are not here concerned.

XIII

Looked at as a whole, it can hardly be questioned that this much misunderstood Epistle, so far from presenting the theology of Elective Exclusionism, such as has been extracted from it, is an ardent argument for provision for Universal Salvation. It is the *magna charta* of Divine grace. The apostle's intense feeling for mankind at large is only equalled by the boldness of hope for the final issue.

But what of Paul's predictive vision? Has his philosophy of history proved true or false? From the vantage ground of nearly twenty centuries after, with all the disclosures of the intervening years, Paul's view of history seems (necessarily) provincial, lacking in perspective, and therefore, on the surface at least, a miscarriage. The course of events has not been as he anticipated. The olive tree is still dismantled. New races and religions have come into view of which Paul did not dream. The whole scope and movement of human life and history have been immensely enlarged.

XIV

And yet, granted an unlimited extension of time and inclusion of all the factors involved, who can say that the great apostle's underlying confidence in the Divine grace and in the leavening power of the revelation of God in Christ may not yet be justified? Never was the gospel of universal peace and goodwill—even though confronted by enormous obstacles—so near to fulfillment. Jew and Christian are closer to each other than ever before. Jesus Christ was never so widely known and loved and never exercised so great a saving power. May not Paul's glowing vision of humanity redeemed—however remote and however differently from the way he conceived it—yet, in effect, come true? Who knows?

Is Preaching Becoming Obsolete?

GAIUS GLENN ATKINS

THE editorial conference which suggested this topic had a nice sense for the use of words. Obsolete is a considerate word; it eases off the inexorable and dismisses to oblivion what has finished its course without the distressful publicity of "ashes to ashes and dust to dust." Neglect is its agent; it does not repeal, it ignores. "Laws," said Woodrow Wilson, "become obsolete because silent but observant and imperative custom makes evident the deadness of their letter, the inapplicability of their provisions." "Obsolescent" is the verdict of the Time-Spirit upon whatever has fallen out of step with its movement; obsolescence the painless process of slow decay. Has preaching come to that?

There are two answers, either of which would considerably shorten this article. First: Preaching is not obsolete nor has it fallen into any kind of decay, being a necessary instrument of the Christian religion, particularly of Protestantism and more particularly of Evangelical Protestantism. One could support this conclusion by history, defend it by argument, and illustrate it by the unimpaired extent of preaching in our own time, the vital and inclusive character of contemporaneous preaching, the power of outstanding preachers, the amount of sermon literature printed and presumably sold and read, the demand of the churches for preachers and their pious patience with any kind of preaching at all. Which would seem to close the case for the defense. To it could be opposed some gradual wearing away—or at least an arrested development—of churches depending predominantly upon preaching, the relative stronger force of churches established in sacerdotal and sacramental conceptions of religion, the happier estate of churches with a broad basis of liturgical worship, the disregard in which preaching is held by strong groups of intelligence and social good will, some vague but hostile articulation of the Time-Spirit and the feeling, even of the friends of preaching, that it is an inadequate support for the weight religion has to carry in a confused, critical and secularized age.

The function which preaching has hitherto exercised, it may also be urged, is distributed among religious educators, editors, moralists, essayists, dramatists and novelists, the critics of literature and life, the more serious students of our going human enterprises, and politicians just before election. Also that which once thundered from the pulpit now crackles out, punctuated by static, from the radio; and more to the point than anything

else is a general and haunting perplexity of preachers themselves. When craftsmen begin to doubt the validity of their own craft, the "moving shadow" has already begun to write. This is, broadly, the case for the prosecution.

* * *

The defense has on its side tradition, the good will of the churches and their sound instinct, the quite telling question "If not preaching, what have you?" and the inertia of a going concern which is more ponderable in religion than any other department of life. These will not eventually be enough. The attack is bringing into action considerations which can not be dismissed until they are disposed of. The function of preaching, the impartial observer must at least conclude, is coming up for re-examination and there are arresting evidences that it is "lagging" in very necessary readjustments.

"Things are what they are," said Bishop Butler with a wisdom which, if we should heed it, would save us a deal of useless protesting. Preaching *is* in competition with a wide range of useful agencies. A good many thoughtful writers are actually doing more toward a constructive interpretation of life than most preachers, and the pulpit may wisely welcome their co-operation in a task now too vast for any single group. They may in the more remote hinterlands of their inspiration be more indebted to the preacher than they acknowledge—no matter. Intensified competition will not necessarily send preaching to the scrap heap. It might actually vitalize it and through the limitation of it to its own proper field contribute to its significance. The main concern of preaching is not with its competitors, but with itself. If it is being out-moded, it is not because potential congregations have now other and more alluring alternatives than listening to sermons, but because religion itself (I mean Christianity, of course) is facing conditions which preaching, through the very nature of it, can not adequately meet. This I take to be the crux of the question.

* * *

There are definitions enough of preaching and a variety to suit every taste. Outside the pulpit it is a way of naming—or misnaming—unsolicited advice involving moral attitudes and issues, given with complacent self-superiority and likely to be wearisome. Almost any earnest-minded or emotionally effective public address takes on, when it reaches a certain level, some of the qualities of preaching. Roosevelt, Bryan, and Wilson were among the more effective preachers of their time, being driven or lifted to preaching through some unescapable necessity of temperament or

theme. And it is hard to see how we shall ever escape this. Preaching is so easy and so immediate. It needs only something to stand on, something to say which the preacher believes must be said, and it will get a congregation in the wilderness. It was the first resort of neolithic statesmen urging a foray or tribal reform, it will be the last resort of the mourner lamenting a dying civilization.

It is generally either a crisis resource, or the soothing overtone of a happily going concern; which (this last) is about what preaching was from the first adjustment of religious faith to evolution in the 1880's to the World War. The outstanding English and American preachers of that halcyon period made a finished art of their work, delighted congregations for whom their sermons were weekly events, quoted *In Memoriam* to set a doubt to music, Matthew Arnold to validate God, Carlyle to supply a gusty period, and Browning to embellish hope. They seemed to carry their churches by such preaching—and did in a way, though all the while some deeper current carried the whole social order of which they were a part. And no one foresaw toward what perilous descents they were being borne.

They examined life with meditative insight and triumphantly readjusted faith to evolution. They found in the Cuban War an affair of manifest destiny, laid "the white man's burden" upon their congregations, rejoiced that the little red school house and the Protestant pulpit were to be carried to the Philippines. They were growing a bit uneasy about the essential Christianity of the economic order; the more clear-visioned had begun to envisage a better order for "Christianity and the social crisis" had risen above their horizons. They rang in, on New Year's Day, "the thousand years of peace" and found in their world an assuring anticipation of the "one far off event" toward which the whole creation was moving. Such preaching maintained, of course, the inherited Christian faith and was made a vehicle for the edification of the saints and the growth of the churches. But it was vulnerable.

The sermon was too much an end in itself—the culmination of whatever movement of worship the service exhibited. The very spaciousness of the regions through which it moved left its frontiers open, and if it were no more than a rhetorical or literary *tour-de-force* then whatever was better by these tests than preaching made a strong drive to dispossess it. The more definitely directed preaching of that period was evangelistic, the liberal wing being occupied with the reconciliation of science and religion, or else the bearing of higher criticism upon the authority of the Bible. This gave to liberal preaching a didactic quality, to conservative preaching

a defense motif, and to preaching on both sides a controversial character. All preaching assumed accepted beliefs and positions which furnished preaching its base.

Propaganda—save in a highly technical Roman Catholic use—was not yet a generally accepted word, but preaching was, as it always had been, essentially a propaganda technique. Propaganda itself, being the setting out, with appeal, of systems, tenets, doctrines, is a defensible method of sustaining accepted and advancing cherished causes, but it has of late fallen out of favor with a high-minded group who not only object to the association of the word, but dislike the whole method. Preaching should not be scrapped because it is propaganda, but propaganda preaching is greatly handicapped in an age whose principal problem is not to propagate its beliefs, but to face its doubts and find out what it can believe. We shall have to find something to propagate again before propaganda can recover its prestige. More definitely, propaganda preaching is not suited to a critical age. It has always been difficult to time either preaching or politics to patient inquiry and dispassionate analysis. Preaching without passion is denatured. As soon as it begins to weigh and balance virtue is gone out of it. Its dominant notes must be positive, some élan of assurance must carry it up and on.

The want of the positive just now so evident, the lack of any élan of assurance, has given a somber cast to the contemporaneous mind—even the contemporary religious mind. We need, it is held, now the examining mind more than the homiletic mind—a mind with a scrupulous regard for facts rather than the dubious power to raise false hopes. Our movement for a while is bound to be slow and experimental. Let the preacher wait, they say, till we have re-established the great assurances before he sounds his trumpet.

There is then a region of contemporaneous religious, social, and ethical concern in which preaching is self-limited. One yields too much in repeating the commitment service over it, but there is much against it in the circumstance and temper of the time. The considerable disappearance of "platform addresses" from the programs of councils and conferences is significant. We are at grips with issues which can not thus be disposed of. Even the efforts of our political spokesmen ring hollowly. When the shouting and the tumult dies nothing which was not there to begin with has emerged; nothing which the shouting and the tumult challenged seems much changed.

Preaching is further handicapped just now by burdens it was never

meant to carry. Our churches are over-built, over-organized, over-multiplied, over-budgeted, over-pretty-much-everything save over-Christian. When preaching must hold its own against the church on the other corner, rent the pews or raise the budget, pay the church debt, build a church house and report at the year's end intricate statistics, it is too hard driven. There is little time on a journey like that to meet the intricate perplexities of questing minds. Just when preaching needs above all time to think, the inexorable tempo of our time has urged it on breathlessly.

Preaching is out of rapport with outstanding needs of life and religion for another reason. Preaching tends naturally to dramatize its subject matter, it always has dealt with a drama beside which every other drama is colorless—the drama of the embattled soul and the vaster drama of the human enterprise between two eternities, or else it is at grips with some antagonist, seen or unseen. These qualities serve preaching admirably in periods of tension or high action. They do not serve it so well when to dramatize a situation is to force it out of drawing and to make an antagonist of disturbing factors in thought and faith is to turn inquiry into controversy. The very word “issues” which I have been using itself suggests the power and limitation of preaching. For preaching wants an issue to attack or defend, whether it be the issue of the soul in mortal peril, or the issue of an age caught in the cross current of competitive forces, or else some issue of reform or moral advance.

This gave its evangelistic character and power to the preaching of an earlier period and its crusading character to the preaching of the last period. The crusades of the twentieth century were the evangelism of the nineteenth directed toward some form of social salvation. The crusades themselves were undertaken partly through the temper of the period and partly because preaching, feeling some loss of *raison d'etre*, welcomed joyously the action, the ideals and the slogans of the decade before the war, and then the war itself—the crusade of crusades. The failure of the crusade motif—it may be only temporary—has left preaching groping for a new sanction. All this does not prove preaching obsolete. It does complicate the readjustments without which it may become obsolete.

* * *

The renaissance of a concern for worship now much in evidence in the non-liturgical communions bears directly on the theme. Ever since the Reformation the pulpit has, in the Reformed Churches, dominated the altar. There it was, high and lifted up, with the “Book” upon its velvet cushions. The altar, shrunk to the communion table and stripped of its

lights, its symbols, and its mystic sanctity inherited from an immemorial past when the first altar was stone or sod red with blood, stood at the foot of it. The preacher climbed to the pulpit, an awesome and lonely figure whose task was to expound the Book between whose covers was assurance and salvation.

He typified the intellectual and mystic-theological approach to religion, he offered salvation through faith and knowledge and, because man's need of salvation was desperate, the congregation hung upon every word which bore upon it. Even in the liturgical communions the pulpit maintained its supremacy for centuries. "My friend, Sir Roger," said Addison, "being a good churchman has beautified the inside of his church with several texts of his own choosing: he has likewise given a handsome pulpit cloth, and railed in the communion table at his own expense." Sir Roger incidentally made the exercise of common prayer more comfortable by the gift of a hassock for every kneeling petitioner, but the communion table was only a communion table. Newman and his fellow-workers changed all that. Why? One may explain it as he will, but surely some instinct which underlay Newman's tremulous fear of rationalism, instructed him that preaching was going to have hard going in a rationalistic age, that the altar would prove a stronger fortress for faith than the pulpit, and religion itself rediscover immemorial but neglected channels.

What was then released has finally reached and to some degree affected all communions. Prayer books—though not always so named—are coming back; the communion table has taken a central position in the chancel, and the shadowy outlines of the altar begin to show through it. Sir Roger would no longer be permitted to adorn the walls of his parish church with Scripture texts of his own choosing. In the Anglican Communion the table has long since gone and the altar arrived.

All this is far more than a rearrangement and renaming of church furnishings. It dates an epoch. As long as the "Book" was or is supreme, God's word, preaching, was and is indispensably secure. The Book has heretofore given to Protestant preaching its authority. The sermon articulated some account of the Holy Ghost. It was a man's work, but it was undergirded by God's Word. How could any symbol assert itself over the living Word?

The new concern for worship—sincere as it may be—is coincident with an ebbing faith in the inspiration and the authority of the Bible, and preaching acknowledges the ebbing tide. It does not often expound, it is topical, not textual, it neglects the texts it takes, and the younger men are

beginning to take no text at all. This is driftwood, the current which carries it is the thing. That current is the whole changed Protestant mind—at least the liberal mind—toward the Bible, and it is carrying the authority of preaching with it. What is happening is the answer of the churches to this situation. They are seeking a sacramentarian approach to religious experience, the establishment—or re-establishment—of religious experience in mystical emotion, and the subordination of reason to religious experience.

The sacramental aspect of preaching is thus displaced by an order symbolically sacramentarian, the authority of the "Word" is supplanted by the authority of the church. Preaching is more or less shown the door in this order though it is commonly let in again by the window. Such an order does furnish an inclusive, constant and dependable support to the "public worship" of the churches. Inherited Protestant worship was often balanced too precariously on the minister and the quartet—though I think there is just now a tendency to underestimate the reality of devotion which attended the worship of our fathers. An excessive dependence upon symbols may be actually a witness to some dimness of the soul. I have seen the light fall through windows of clear glass in plain meeting houses upon faces which looked upon the unseen. There is an incense of the soul as well as the incense of censers, and the wonder of it may hallow any communion of the saints.

In the traditionally non-liturgical communions services of exceptional liturgical significance have usually been built by and around an outstanding personality and preacher (Orchard, for example), and have lost something of their power if continued through a less sympathetic pastoral medium. The Anglican prayer book will stand up and has stood up against much vocal mishandling of its noble English (which Hillaire Belloc says is the secret of its ascendancy), but it likes better to be nobly read, nor do the most timeless of prayers come alive unless the spirit of prayer is again breathed into them by those who repeat them. The power of personality is still an asset for the sacerdotal and sacramental. The highest of our high churches still do better if the priest can preach. But, on the whole, religious experience is seeking more various and inclusive supports and preaching is vitally involved in the process.

* * *

All this is some examination of the currents in church and secular life and the limitations in preaching itself which would seem to be carrying preaching toward oblivion. I do believe they indicate both conditions and considerations of which all friends of good preaching, and especially profes-

sors of homiletics, need to take account. They do not spell oblivion but they do spell an altered status of the pulpit, to which still other conditions contribute. Creative preaching demands a setting which the frayed margins of an excessively divided and over-churched Protestantism can not supply. I shared as leader a little while ago the services of a pathetically reduced church in the "blighted" area of a neighboring city. Almost everything which could lift up the hearts of worshipers, save the brave devotion of humble folk to their little church and their fathers' faith, was wanting. Their minister, whose place I took, had wisely taken "sermon" out of his calendar. He called his own exercise a "meditation."

Those folk needed something their own church setting could not supply—beauty, emotional release, some sense of vaster comradeship, contagious fellowship of praise and prayer. No preaching they could command could furnish them that. The preacher himself—unless a man of unusual force—could not stand against that atmosphere. If he had unusual force, he would soon be called to "a better opportunity." If not, his note would be subdued to the somber minors of the life he shared. No wonder the official head of a great denomination has said that most ministers over forty are now in a defeatist mood. Preaching and sectarianism combined have brought them to that.

The evening of the same Sunday I shared, as a member of the congregation, a service in another city. The great auditorium was filled—really filled. All the elements of the service were skillfully combined in music, light, color, and movement toward one end, and when the golden spotlight fell upon the preacher his hour and the hour of the congregation had come. The sermon lifted the lives of the young men and women of a city built above coal-mines to issues and relationships which saved them from the numbing insignificance to which their station, their tasks, and their time had doomed them. Nothing could have taken its place. Preaching like that will not grow obsolete as long as insight can speak to need.

Preaching might well in the future become the function of those who have the strange unanalyzable gift for it which cannot be imparted by any instruction. And since these are few enough, they should be so used as to amplify their power. The present estate of denominational Protestantism lays upon the generality of really earnest ministers a burden their preaching is not strong enough to bear. Some division of function is due, though I do not know myself how it can be defined or secured. Preaching *may* preach an out-moded church organization into oblivion—but it will itself survive that desirable and improbable event.

Because, though not usually reckoned among the primitive human instincts, the impulse to preach was soon acquired and has persisted, and the paradoxical impulse to be preached to while protesting the experience is equally old and persistent. There will always be among us, as there always has been, those under such compulsion to say what has laid such hold upon them that until they say it they can have no peace. And their saying it will have a power to gather and hold men to hear it and, perhaps, release within or through them some force to change a soul or a society. Christianity has hitherto been deeply in debt to such as these, and it is difficult to see how with so much else to challenge it there is any substitute for some accent of a living word so spoken to living men. The very confusion of an age which seems to make preaching futilely difficult may actually contribute to its appeal.

The political campaign just ended certainly showed how a perplexed time will listen to any voice which promises help—even though the promise may be only another path to disillusionment. The abuse of a great instrument only suggests what might happen if it were more nobly used. Preaching will go on because with the best will in the world there is no complete substitute for it in the Christian Church. The Roman Catholic Church has achieved a multiplication of the vehicles of religious appeal which we shall be long in achieving—if we ever achieve it—but it has not been able to dispense with preaching nor sought to do it. If there were a unity of temperament in the Protestant churches, which is far from existing, and that temperament were essentially sacramental and liturgical, preaching would still in a measure keep on. Nothing I think can be called obsolete, even though its function may be limited and its exercise far from ideal, which is an indispensable element in any human enterprise so vital as the Christian Church.

* * *

Perhaps it all comes back to temperament at last. Those who are now for good reasons impatient of preaching and feel—quite justifiably—no need of it, having in themselves some lonely adequacy to the conduct of life, are very likely to go further; they acknowledge little need of the church itself. I have known many high-minded men and women of whom I believe this to be really true. Their support of the church was a social contribution and their patience under preaching an exemplary grace of soul. The æsthetic will find their own roads to religious reality and the preacher will oftener obstruct than help them. The religiously and intellectually self-sufficient who have in addition access to literature and groups

of like-minded men and women will ask of the preacher little or no help in their quests.

They may in so doing impoverish the intellectual life of the churches and leave them the fellowships of the less adventurous. They may even impoverish themselves, since they are fed by springs from the ancient hills of Christian faith, and if these springs can find no human channels to flow through, our religious future may be arid indeed. But they have their own sources now of faith and action.

There remains another temperament for which religion is in some form an intellectual exercise, adequate or inadequate—no matter. Such as these are dependent upon some such mediation of the everlasting reality of religion as preaching has always supplied. They possess a power to transmute it into something finer than its imperfect essence—into strength and understanding, into courage and faith. It is always the spirit which truly institutes the sacrament. This is true even of the elements upon the altar. The real presence is not in paten and chalice, but in recipient faith. The communicants' sense of the significance of sacrifice dyes the wine a deeper crimson, his dear-bought understanding of the cost of service makes the broken bread the timeless symbol of the supreme sacrifice. There has been, and persists, in the devout countless congregations a power also to make a sacrament of broken words; as long as this is true preaching will not be obsolete.

Whether it will be as effective in the future as it has been in the past is another matter. It must in the long run reflect the changing phases of the Christian mind. It can not live on its traditions. Its constant function is, more likely than any other, the interpretation of experience in terms of religious values and relationship; its power to serve an age depends upon the preacher's understanding of his time and his power to deal positively with its needs. Preaching, as an end in itself, is increasingly out-moded. As a means to something beyond itself, it may be of indispensable value. The roots of parochial preaching are in the pastoral relation, in the preacher's sympathetic knowledge of what his people seek or suffer, and all the play of light and shadow, not across the surface of their lives, but through the texture of their souls. He is, by virtue of that knowledge and any power he possesses, helpfully to use it as an influence which they repay with loyal affection and a gratitude sometimes almost pitiful. This regard becomes perhaps the final secret of the power of preaching. It may be inadequate enough in itself, but some weaving of unseen filaments between preacher and congregation give it a quality beyond its substance. It is recast

in the alembic of affection and devotion and becomes for preacher and congregation a commerce with God.

There is now some common agreement that we are confused, disillusioned, entangled in the contradictions of our common world and greatly questing. These needs can not be adequately met with liturgy, symbol, or sacrament. They must, I suppose, be considered through a far more intimate and critical exchange of opinion than preaching makes possible. There may be, not too far below the horizon, a possible group technique of the religious life in which preaching will have no place, to which it may, indeed, be an obstacle. The "Oxford Group Movement" seems symptomatic of that and may become a force to be reckoned with.

But the need for dominant voices, wise in interpretation and creative in message, is now almost desperately insistent. If such voices are to rise to levels of commanding power, they need the stimulus of waiting congregations, the contagion of a spirit which only massed human appeal can supply. The prophet may come out of solitude, but he does not come for conference. He comes to announce, "Thus saith the Lord." He has been often enough misled as to the divine authority of his message; he has again and again said the timeless word. That mission is not obsolete.

Books on Worship

JESSE HALSEY

I

A HUNDRED books on various aspects of worship have appeared in recent years. Some are composed entirely of prayers; others contain orders of worship; and some deal with technique and theory. Here is spiritual treasure; much of it in earthen vessels; and some as golden bowls full of incense—the prayers of saints. We seek, from a parish minister's point of view, to briefly review a few of the many useful and suggestive volumes that have come to our notice.

Many persons who have power in prayer cannot put into print the spirit of their praying. Most do not try, but there are four among our contemporaries—three living and one dead—who convey to a remarkable degree the ineffable quality of great praying. Both for private devotion and public use they furnish definite petitions having poetic diction and imaginative quality. They make us feel the yearning of the human spirit and the reality of the divine response. These are William E. Orchard, J. Fort Newton, L. Maclean Watt, and John Hunter.

And first we must place Orchard, that strange figure lately gone to Rome. Watching his curious methods at the Weigh House Chapel—moving from heights of ritualism to the simplicities of low Evangelicalism—his broad scholarship, deep piety, and supreme honesty, you saw a priest of the temple conversant with all the emotional winds that blow across the æolian harp of the soul. These mystical, lyric qualities are on every page of *The Temple* and present, though less surely, in *Divine Service*.

The solemnities of "the grand style" alternate with the prayers of "humble access." He must speak for himself—

O God, who dwellest in light unapproachable and full of glory, why dwell we in darkness and the shadow of death? O God, infinite in Mercy, Love and Power, hear the cry of thy children, meet our deep necessities, and answer our unutterable desires (p. 32). Eternal God, who art above all change, all darkness, whose will begat us, and whose all-present love doth enfold and continually redeem us, Holy Ghost who indwellest, and dost comfort us; we have gathered to worship thee, and in communion with thee to find ourselves raised to the Light of our life and the Heaven of our desires (p. 165).

Here is a different mood (Orchard varies in emotional pitch):

O God, too near to be found, too simple to be conceived, too good to be believed; help us to trust, not in our knowledge of thee, but in thy knowledge of us;

to be certain of thee, not because we feel our thoughts of thee are true, but because we know how far thou dost transcend them (p. 29).

The prayers in *The Temple* fall into five divisions: The Outer Gate, The Inner Court, The Evening Sacrifice, The Altar of Incense, The Holy Place. Many are specific and short, such as "For Sincerity," "For Revelation," "For Assurance," and "For Endurance"—

O God, who hast sent us to school in this strange life of ours, and hast set us tasks which test all our courage, trust and fidelity; may we not spend our days complaining at circumstance or fretting at discipline, but give ourselves to learn of life and to profit by every experience. Make us strong to endure. . . .

Grant by thy grace that we may not be found wanting in the hour of crisis. . . . If we faint, may we not be faithless; if we fall, may it be while facing the foe. Amen (p. 56).

In *Divine Service*, Doctor Orchard has given revised versions of Morning and Evening Prayer of the English Prayer Book. There are also litanies of "Labour," "For the Sick," "Of the Holy Ghost," "Of the Trinity," and "For the Church." There are services for Christmas and Eastertide, for Maundy Thursday and Good Friday; orders for Prime, Vespers, and Compline. An elaborate Communion Service and rituals of baptism, marriage, and burial appear in the book. Special prayers and collects for Sundays and Saints' Days—many original—round out the volume. This is one of the earliest and most complete modern prayer books done by one hand and, in nearly all cases, these services have stood the rigorous test of the meticulous standards and usage of the author's London church.

One can see the direction in which Orchard was moving, but it is folly to let any prejudice blind us to the beauty of his work and its unique features. Most noteworthy are his genuine confessions and the litanies (see the tenth service in *Divine Worship*).

"An authentic gift for public prayer is not common," but Joseph Fort Newton has it, and in *Altar Stairs*, which he calls in a sub-title "A Little Book of Prayer," and in the dedication "A Book of Worship," we have him at his best. The great days of the year—civil and Christian—are transfigured into meaning. Patience, Awakening, Dedication, Togetherness, The Good Part, The Choir Invisible—there are over two hundred subjects in this "little" book!

This work is consistently more nearly at Orchard's level than any known to us. It is more akin to our thought forms than is Orchard's. It has a sustained beauty of diction that almost never obtrudes itself between

the soul and a natural approach to God. Doctor Newton knows how to use adjectives effectively.

Thy beauty, O God, is upon us; autumn splendor everywhere! Days lucid with vision, or dim with mist, haze, and smothered sunshine; nights wistful with summer memories (p. 38).

Or this—from "The Rythm of Faith":

Eternal Father, thou art the Love that never forgets, the Light that never fails, the Life that never ends; humbly we seek thee in the fellowship of prayer. As we bow together the cares of life become easier to bear, and the lonely hurt of our heart is healed by a great peace. Teach us to live always in the sense of thy nearness and the vision of the infinite meaning of life, making trial of a great trust in thee (p. 44).

The service book of Glasgow Cathedral has been printed lately, as *Prayers for Public Worship*, and is the work of the minister (dean) of the church (Saint Mungo's)—Dr. Lauchlin Maclean Watt, Moderator of the Church of Scotland, a poet and great preacher. Here we find the Scottish sense of "decency" and orderly thought coupled with high Celtic imaginative and poetic expression. Strength and beauty dwell in this sanctuary. Twenty-one services are included (best example in the New Year's Day prayers). Invitation to Worship, with a keen perception and discrimination in the use of Scripture; Confession ("We have sinned against thy love, following dreams that died and joys that faded. The road is steep before us, and the shadows thicken. Doubt and fear have walked beside us in the darkness. . . . O Love Divine, be pitiful"); Adoration, Thanksgiving, Supplication, Intercession; these move along, in ordered sequence, through each service, without repetition. Variety, depth of feeling, high aspiration, moral enthusiasm, and hope are here. This is Reformed Worship at its best.

The beginning of wisdom for the parish minister who aspires to make his public prayers more helpful to his congregation, is in John Hunter's *Devotional Services*. Thirteen editions have been run since 1913, indicating something of the usefulness and popularity of the book. No minister should be unfamiliar with its contents. Hunter was an English Congregational minister serving at the King's Weigh House Chapel (where Orchard ministered until recently). He has the liturgical sense, and a gift for composition.

His prayers are everywhere copied, and to one familiar with his phrases it is easy to find Hunter unconsciously (or deliberately) used in most later collections. His Service of Commemoration is followed in practically every good office of remembrance that we have seen. In the useful book, *Prayers*

for *Occasional Use*, printed by the Cathedral Church of Saint Paul in Boston, Hunter is largely drawn upon, and in *Acts of Devotion* (an anonymous book of great value and published at an extremely low price by Macmillan), where no sources are given, Hunter is used repeatedly. Most strangely, in Suter's *Devotional Offices for General Use*, the prayers of Intercession, Thanksgiving, and "In Time of Trouble" are all lengthy prayers of Hunter's, but credited to "Occasional Offices" of the Boston Cathedral! In *The Grey Book* (one of the several proposed revisions of the English Prayer Book), Hunter's Service of Commemoration is quoted in its entirety as "A Litany of Remembrance." These examples of its use are cited to show the quality of Hunter's work. He is unsurpassed in the field of modern devotional literature adapted to "common" worship.

The influence of Martineau is often apparent in Hunter, and he copies liberally, but he is himself a very great liturgist. Nowhere else is this quality (variety and quantity) available. To read, mark, and inwardly digest this book is an education in (non-conformist) liturgics. He has dignity and beauty but never leaves the earth and the needs of life. Some of his prayers are in the collect form, but his long and comprehensive pulpit prayers often have that same sharp definitive quality that is supposed to characterize the collect.

Devotional Services contains eighteen prayers suitable for use as the "long" or "minister's" prayer. There are six morning and six evening services complete with appropriate prayers. There are services of Adoration, Confession, Thanksgiving, Intercession—"Concerning One's Duty"—and "A Prayer for Help"; also short prayers and collects for practically all occasions, baptism, burial, marriage, and ordination.

"The language of the market place is raised to the nth power," and the book is a *vade mecum* to the pastor who wishes to meet his public ministrations with dignity and helpfulness. Hunter's numerous and natural references to the other world and "those that make the unseen heaven as home of our hearts" are especially helpful in the ministry of consolation. In his order for the observance of the Lord's Supper there is a prayer of surpassing beauty, from which we cannot forbear to quote a paragraph.

Most Holy and Most Merciful God, our Heavenly Father; led by Jesus Christ we draw near to thee. Beneath the shadow of his cross, in the light of his revelation, in the communion of his Spirit, in the fellowship of his church, we should meditate and pray. Help us to yield ourselves to the influence of this hour of holy memories and immortal hopes. May our spirits be tender to thy touch. May the appeal of thy love enter our hearts. May the sanctities of our Christian faith be more real to us than the things that are seen and temporal.

The Book of Common Worship, just published (November, 1932), is an anthology of the best from many sources. The authors, Bishop Thirkield and Dr. Oliver Huckel, have large experience in liturgics. They aim to make a liturgy that will "express the life of to-day, not forgetting the riches of our inheritance." The ideal of the editors is most ambitious, for they hope to make this book one of the rallying points for church unity, and have attempted to include services "based on the general usage of many Congregational, Presbyterian, Baptist, and Reformed Churches."

They follow the psychological formula of Vogt's "Festival of Life" (as does the Methodist Commission of Worship). And likely this is the correct formula, though one doubts its application to all services in all churches. To make Communion Services that will appeal in all the churches would seem impossible, but these editors have attempted even that, and with fair success.

We like their rubrics—for example, "It is fitting that there be one or two large silver cups or flagons as a symbol of the ancient usage, even where individual cups are used." This reminds us of the numerous suggestions that have helped to raise the level of dignity in worship for another group. Dr. Henry van Dyke, in the Presbyterian *Common Worship*, introduces many helpful suggestions by this method. "For Voluntary Use," "Any Church which so Prefers," are wise counsels in churches where sturdy independence and pride in nonconformity have prevailed. A prayer book to most Protestants can be only suggestive. As such this new *Common Worship* will go far. Ten orders of worship, eight litanies, burial and marriage rituals, confirmation and dedication services, and a psalter that retains the antiphonal form of the Psalms—all these features are included in the book.

The strength and lasting value of this book will lie in the wide variety of its prayers, its simple language, and its inclusiveness; for example, "An Order for the Blessing of Little Children," as well as "An Order for the Baptism of Children"; and *two* Communion Services. The Prayers for use in the Family are superior to any we know; "Children's Prayers" appear here and in no other church prayer book with which we are familiar; and the Personal Devotions and Intercessions are unusually helpful. One could wish that the authors had indicated sources more generally and used another title, as Presbyterians have almost pre-empted "Common Worship." They are to be congratulated on their accomplishment. All the churches are in their debt, and the publisher is to be thanked for the nominal price of the book, which will help promote its wide use.

In the *Church Book of Worship* Dr. Charles W. Merriam gives forty-two services as used in the Park Congregational Church, Grand Rapids, Mich. They are compiled from many and varied sources and have a unity lacking in most similar compilations. They represent years of labor and experiment and are the product of a church's experience in worship. They are modern in the best sense, alive and of the day, but they come from fields ancient as well as modern. Twenty or more "Confessions of Faith," in addition to the Apostles' Creed, appear in these pages. These are based, says Doctor Merriam, "on the realities of Christian experience where most people agree, rather than on theological interpretation, where many people differ."

One remarks on the unity of these services, their movement, the use of "creedal affirmation," and the *natural* use of a structural skeleton—praise, confession, assurance, dedication, instruction—"a pathway traveled across the centuries."

Hubert L. Simpson, a Scot, now minister at Westminster Chapel, London, has printed a large number of his pulpit and other prayers in *Let Us Worship God*. These are uneven, some of a high order, and represent the output of a man, primarily a preacher, but gifted beyond most in the making of prayer.

Blair's *When Praying in the Holy Place* is much more prosaic than any of the above, but it is suggestive and more nearly on the level of expression used by most ministers. It suffers by contrast with Orchard or Watt, but will furnish encouragement to the man whose honesty forbids him to use another's words, but whose sense of fitness prods him to put his own thought in decent dress.

A Free Church Book of Common Prayer appeared in 1929. Two editions were quickly exhausted. It follows the general order of the English Prayer Book. There are significant omissions and much new and excellent material is introduced. A valuable index of prayer sources appears at the end of the volume. An admirable piece of work, is this, and of superlative literary and liturgical quality. One is informed that Dr. Lloyd Thomas is responsible. Its praise is in all the churches where worship is a chief concern.

The Grey Book is the most used and most often quoted of all direct revisions of English "Common Prayer." In Part III, "The Kingdom, the Power and the Glory," are found some of the most useful materials anywhere available. "Prayers and Biddings" are most suggestive; then the eighteen services of "Praise, Thanksgiving and Intercession."

The Suggested Prayer Book of the English Church Union will be of interest only to churchmen, indicating some of the interesting changes proposed to meet the demands of high-church groups.

Presbyterian Common Worship, just published in its revised form, will prove useful to members of other communions. Twenty-five years ago Dr. Henry van Dyke and Dr. Louis F. Benson produced the major portion of this excellent book. The older prayers are largely from Reformed sources, but many original ones are from the above named and other modern authors. To the revised edition, the Rev. Shackleford Dauerty has added an extensive index of sources. This, and a similar index in *The Free Church Book*, represent large research and are invaluable contributions.

"The Treasury of Prayers," included in *Common Worship*, is the best available collection of short prayers in the modern (rather than archaic) style, for use in public worship. Five general prayers and five litanies suitable for use in an ordinary congregation are included in the revised edition. The latter are Doctor van Dyke's work. Prayers by Drs. Henry S. Coffin, William P. Merrill, William Adams Brown, Robert E. Speer and other contemporary preachers appear in the new edition.

Acts of Devotion, sponsored in England by the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, has an American edition. No phase of the modern man's life is neglected in this short but inclusive collection. . . . "Worthy and dignified expression is given to those aspirations of the modern world which are firing the hearts of the younger generation."

Elmore McNeil McKee, formerly chaplain at Yale, has given us a useful book in *Communion with God*. Many of his own prayers used in college and the pastorate are here, and they stand unashamed beside the ancient and more formal usages of other days. Anyone charged with the conduct of worship for students will need this, as also *A Book of Prayers for Students*.

Here should be mentioned the Scottish books—*The Book of Common Order* of the United Free Church and the older *Book of Common Order* of the (Established) Church of Scotland. (The oldest of the Anglican Bishops told the writer that he has, for years, used the prayers of this book for funerals in place of those in "Common Prayer.")

The Book of Common Prayer one takes for granted and is always in its debt, whether he acknowledges it or not. It contains enough material, such as the General Confession, by Calvin (or his school), and the General Thanksgiving, written by an English Presbyterian, Reynolds, that the

straightest of the Puritans need not neglect it entirely. The latest American revision (1929) has many new collects, improved marriage and burial services and excellent family prayers.

For those who observe the Christian Year and who like the most formal collect type of prayer, the following might be mentioned: *Ancient Collects*, William Bright, and Addison's *Prayers for the Christian Year* (more recent and most complete).

A book of *Offices and Prayers*, by two Presbyters, is an old book and has been used by many, both in and out of the Episcopal Church.

Devotional Offices for General Use is edited by the masterly hand of Dr. John W. Suter, Sr., and has twenty beautiful litanies that do not lack for ethical vigor. This, likely, is the best introduction for the non-liturgist, to the finest of the wheat that current devotional effort in the Episcopal Church has to offer. Here a churchman, having drawn from all sources (Hunter, for example), offers his brethren, in and out of his church, the best, regardless of its succession.

For rugged ethical quality, prophetic passion, human insight, and social enthusiasm, none can approximate Walter Rauschenbusch. His *Prayers of the Social Awakening*, first published in 1909 in a popular magazine, have had a great and useful history. They have no equal anywhere in their expression of the social aspiration of modern ethical religion and are the most often quoted of any modern prayers. They are adapted and used in many quarters and were, likely, the first "outside prayers" to find their way to any large acceptance with the Episcopalian churches. There is nothing, outside of the Hebrew prophets and Nehemiah's confession, that can compare with the "Prayers of Wrath." Gaius Glenn Atkins, in *Religion in Our Times*, says:

Nothing quite like this had ever been done before. Time sifts prayers as it sifts everything else; his will eventually find their own place in the world's treasury of prayers—a most revealing treasure if we only knew how to appraise it—but the influence of what he began may now be traced through all the recent liturgies of the Protestant churches. Prayer has thereby been given a new spirit and content. What gets into prayers gets into the very structure of the religious spirit and mind with a power to persist and direct far beyond exhortation or teaching. It is therefore, as poetry is, a part of the enduring deposit of the human quest.

John S. Hoyland has composed many prayers suitable for public worship, though his main interest is to promote private devotion. All have high spiritual and ethical quality. *Prayers Written for Use in an Indian College* acknowledges a debt to Tagore. "The book was written to express

the searchings after God of men belonging to several differing religious systems." They were first published in 1921. Three other unusual books have followed. (See lists.) The variety of interests is large; the expression varied; the printed form (semi-versification) arresting.

Bishop Brent's prayers and meditations have been edited by Drury and recently published. He practiced his own preaching and many of the prayers embody his principles. "With three counsels, I would bid men to prayer: Aim to see God before you address him. In the course of time, this practice will become an unbidden habit. You can see him at least as clearly as you can the absent friend with whom you correspond, for the human lineaments are in the Divine. Pray with your intelligence. Bring things to God that you have thought out and think them out again with him. This is the secret of good judgment. Repeatedly place your pet opinions and prejudices before God. He will surprise you by showing you that the best of them need reforming, and some the purification of destruction."

Francis Greenwood Peabody has published *A Book of Prayers* in which his saintly character, keen intellect, and ethical judgment shine through. He understands the ways of God and "knows what is in man." There are prayers suitable both for private and public use.

A Chain of Prayer Across the Ages, compiled by Selina Fox, contains hundreds of short prayers and is the most complete anthology extant. There are examples from nearly every Christian century up to our own, but very little contemporary matter. This is a mine that one should work. The book badly needs an adequate index.

The Enrichment of Prayer, compiled by David R. Porter in 1918 for the Y. M. C. A., is more usable than *The Chain* by ordinary folk. It has the modern feeling, though George Herbert and George Wharton Pepper stand side by side, Anselm and Bishop Gore, Jowett and Pope Gregory.

Dr. Samuel McComb has given us a book of original prayers for the various necessities of life, growing out of his ministry of health and consolation at the Immanuel Church. In his other book he gathers prayers of many authors for all sorts of conditions of men and circumstance.

Marshall Dawson, in *Prayer that Prevails*, makes suggestions for effective praying and gives many examples in prayers, both original and selected.

The Quiet Room, despite its title, is suitable for introduction into public use.

A Book of Prayers for Students sets a high standard. It is direct and

real. Several of these prayers have been widely copied and, like the *Grey Book*, it has good litanies with everyday content.

Bishop Thirkield, who heads the Federal Council's Commission on Worship, and who has had charge of the Methodist group dealing with the same study, is the author of a little book, *Service and Prayers for Church and Home*.

The Throne of Grace, by Bishop Quayle, speaks the language of the man. His love of nature, of poetry, of man and of God breathes through his devotions.

H. J. Witherspoon, of Saint Oswald's, Edinburgh, gave us in 1905, in his *Kyrie Eleison*, a manual of private prayers that has much value for the minister in the quiet of his study. It stands on our shelf beside Bishop Andrewes and Doctor Martineau. Old, but ever new, *The Private Devotions*, by Bishop Launcelot Andrewes, should be on any list for a minister's personal use.

II. TECHNIQUE OF WORSHIP

Christian Public Worship, by Thomas L. Harris, will furnish a good introduction to the whole subject. It has a brief but adequate historic survey of the development of Christian Worship and gives the rationale of "common" worship (corporate as opposed to private). The author then proceeds to illustrate his principles in a dozen orders of worship. Old material is adapted, new modes suggested.

Dean Sperry, of Harvard, in his *Reality in Worship*, has made the most fundamental and provocative study of the period. He calls his book "A Study of Public Worship and Private Religion," but it is in its former aspect that it has found the largest response. Its wide circulation is indicative of its sound scholarship and also of a deep contemporary interest in the problems which it presents. "Everybody quotes Sperry." Chapter XIV, on the "Order of Service," deals in a thoroughgoing way with the basic psychology of the conduct of worship. "The average minister," says Sperry, "beyond picking a Scripture lesson and a hymn to anticipate his sermon and another hymn to follow his sermon, does not give five minutes a week to the rest of the service and has no definite theory as to what is supposed to be happening and what he is theoretically doing in conducting public worship" (p. 287).

Doctor Sperry states in his conclusions thus: "Within the pattern of the love of God, we have thesis, the inevitable antithesis, and then the resolution of these correlated ideas and emotions." In the call of Isaiah,

in other Scripture passages, in hymns, the Mass, and in the Prayer Book Service he traces this course—"This is not an arbitrary type of literary construction, it is simply the formal transcript of the spiritual life."

Von Ogden Vogt's *Art in Religion* was one of the first books to voice the discontent of contemporary Protestantism with much of its architecture and worship. His Lowell Lectures on *Modern Worship* go much further and constructively present orders of worship, materials for worship, and basic principles. Based on the study of the Mass and ancient orders of worship, he gives us the following progression: "Preparation, Vision, Humility, Vitality, Recollection, Illumination, Dedication, Peace" (see Chapter II of *Modern Worship*). This is the formula that contemporary liturgists are adopting more or less in its entirety, as witness the orders of service in Thirkield and Huckels' *Common Worship* and in the excellent pamphlets published by the Methodist Commission on Worship, and also the *Orders of Worship* arranged by Dr. Oscar T. Olson.

Sclater, in his Yale lectures, simplifies and visualizes the worship process. The principle of Alternation, the swing from God to man, from man to God; our need of help, the Everlasting Mercy—this, coupled with the Principle of Ascension, makes the effective service. We rise, then fall back only to attempt, and reach another summit. Professor Brightman states the process thus: "Reverent Contemplation, Revelation, Communion and Fruition." Sperry lays great emphasis on the alternation, as does Slater. Vogt and Brightman picture a more steady climb from the depths to the heights.

Professor George Walter Fiske, of Oberlin, has done good service for his brethren in his *Recovery of Worship*. He exposes the weaknesses of Protestantism, but has constructive suggestions, and best of all he gives many examples in his own prayers that conform with his theories. Fiske deals with the place and use of music, and even more at length do the authors of *The Technique of Public Worship* treat of music and other things germane to the service. Prayer is not the only element in worship, though most of our authors here noted are dealing with this, the primary vehicle of worship.

For an older generation Dr. Robert Simpson conducted the worship of the High United Free Church, Edinburgh, with great dignity. The reverence of the cathedral was there, with no feeling of medievalism. In *Ideas of Corporate Worship*, a posthumous volume, many of his principles and ideas are elaborated. This book, which is nearer the practical point of view of the ordinary nonliturgical minister than are the others mentioned

above, will repay study. His *Worship, Witness and Work*, notes on classroom lectures, is also very rewarding.

In Percy Dearmer's *The Art of Public Worship* is found an illuminating chapter on "The Art of Making Collects." This, we predict, will lead a nonconformist to a further study of rituals and their significance and a more intimate knowledge of prayer books.

III

Another type of worship material is being extensively used in church schools and other parish groups. The most effective use of such extra-Scriptural materials has been made by Dr. William Norman Guthrie in his dramatic services at Saint Marks in the Bouwerie, New York City. In *Offices of Mystical Religion* and *Evangelical Offices of Worship* he gives us the best that a great poetic soul, trained in the Episcopal Church, has been able to annex from all imaginable sources and translate into forms of beauty and devotion for a churchly setting.

Stanton Coit's *Social Worship* is a thesaurus of such material, and his leadership of the London Ethical Culture Society for many years makes him a capable compiler and guide.

Services for the Open gives a wide variety of nature poetry and prose, with good music, arranged appropriately for outdoor use. Anyone responsible for worship in camp will find ample and helpful material here in small compass.

Most denominational and commercial hymnals have for some time included "worship material" both from Scripture and from nonscriptural sources. Professor Augustine Smith and his colleagues in Boston University have made many noteworthy contributions in this field. As one example we cite the unique and effective use of different Bible translations in unison and responsive readings found in the *American Student Hymnal*. Professor Smith's *Lyric Religion* embodies the results of a long and enthusiastic study of the great hymns. Seventeen denominational and other hymn books that we have examined contain "Worship Services" and liturgical material.

Responsive Readings in all versions, and in hopeless combinations of versions, are available. One should study carefully the content of such selections before introducing them to a congregation. Authors and editors take great liberties with Holy Scripture. Much of this editing is to good purpose, but we protest against numerous changes of words or phrases to suit editorial taste, and we have a strong predilection for the King James

Version for liturgical purposes. An example of fine editorial judgment is to be found in the responsive readings that are to appear in the *New Methodist Hymnal*. An example of undue editorial liberty is to be found in verbal changes introduced into the Authorized text as it appears in *Revised Common Worship*. Discriminating taste, however, is displayed in this editor's selection of passages and in the parallelism effectively carried over from the Psalms.

In *The Free Church Book* the Authorized Version of the Psalms is pointed for use by choirs that desire to chant the Psalms to Anglican chants in accordance with the natural speech rhythms of each verse. Heretofore such chants as were used in non-Episcopal churches were taken from the Church of England Version. Not only ought this to promote a larger use of the chant in our churches, but the minister who reads portions of the Psalms in his service will find many helpful suggestions in these musical signs that will enable him to read the Ancient Psalter more correctly.

IV

In the development of a prayer attitude one seeks help not only in written prayers but in counsel about praying. "To be equipped to lead in prayer is a better thing than to be prepared with prayers for next Sunday." Baron von Hugel, William E. Orchard, Edward Shillito, Professor Otto and Doctor Fosdick can contribute much, each in his own way, to these attitudes.

Professor Frederick Heiler, of Marburg, has just come to us in English (thanks to Doctors McComb and Park) in a thorough and lengthy study of prayer, its history and psychology. Chapter XI deals with public worship and should be placed beside Sperry and Brightman. The place of prayer in mysticism and in prophetic religion are interesting studies, but the short chapter on "Personal Prayer" (of great poets and artists), and the final one, "The Essence of Prayer," have a devotional quality that makes this book valuable as an aid to the understanding of the deep things of the Spirit. Professor Heiler was born a Roman Catholic and is now a Protestant. He understands the tides of the Spirit. "Prayer is not man's work of discovery or achievement; but God's work in man."

V

There are so many theories, so much unrelated and undigested material, so little sympathy with experiment in most congregations that one hesitates. Doctor Sclater half predicts "that the Puritan will hand back to

his brethren of the Anglican tradition a liturgy in which all can unite." This is most unlikely, but Dean Sperry overstates the truth when he bluntly tells us that "the present chaotic condition of worship in the nonliturgical churches holds out little hope of any solution of the problem, save by the merest random accident of the laws of chance."

Doctor Coffin welcomes the signs that "worship is to be the next chief concern of our churches." Certainly material, theoretical and practical, is not lacking. Many are experimenting. "Take the pattern with which you are most familiar and fill it with the largest possible spiritual content." This is Dean Sperry's sound advice and practice. "Most of our 'enriched and beautified' services are lifeless mosaics, betraying a mechanical ingenuity on the part of an editor and compiler, but no originality and no immediate inspiration. Editorial work, however erudite and clever, will never create a good order of worship" (p. 297).

Any minister can safely introduce portions of Holy Scripture at the opening of worship, for use in the Offertory, and in invitations to prayer. Responsive readings from the Psalms will be acceptable in even the least ritualistic of our churches. This is only a beginning, but it is one germane to the Reformed tradition. A further bit of ritual may be introduced in the Invocation, which may be a formal prayer from some ancient source, or a carefully prepared modern collect. Beyond this, one will proceed with great caution, seeking to introduce, little by little, "things new and old" that take root and grow in the worship life of the congregation. Simplicity and naturalness must be maintained. One makes haste slowly. "Avoid musical elaborations," said a wise Scottish teacher.

A brief summary of emphases in the books introduced above, and listed below, may prove of value to the reader. Those especially rich in unusual prayers are Watt, Orchard, Rauschenbusch and Newton. Merriam has the best collection of "Creeds." Hunter and Watt use Scripture effectively. Nonscriptural material is introduced in *Unitarian Congregational Worship* and by Vogt. "Bidding" prayers are found in *The Grey Book* (Part III) and in *Acts of Devotion*. The best Litanies appear in *Common Worship, Revised*, in Hunter, Suter, *The Grey Book, Acts of Devotion*, and *Divine Service*. The uses of silence are indicated in Fiske (p. 85), Harris (p. 123), *The Student's Book* and *Acts of Devotion* (p. 85). Effective combinations of Scripture and poetry appear in Saunderson and Augustine Smith. For private ministration to the sick and troubled McComb is unsurpassed. And for any occasion Hunter will have "something of beauty and of use," to employ his own phrase.

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Book Reviews

Educating for Citizenship. By GEORGE ALBERT COE. New York: Charles Scribner's Son. \$2.00.

ONE of the most stimulating interpreters of religious aspects of our culture has again focused attention upon a critical issue. Doctor Coe has an extraordinary faculty for putting his finger on weaknesses we are likely to overlook, and for so analyzing the situation as to make clear just what is wrong and in what direction the remedy lies.

Too long have religious leaders been neglecting to come to grips with the problem of church and state, and such discussions of the problem as have appeared have for the most part failed to note the ambiguous position into which the national state is placed by its assumption to itself of both ethical sovereignty and the right to teach. The nature of sovereignty in a democracy and the nature of training for citizenship, which is the necessary corollary of an ethical view of the state, are set forth in this book with vigor and clarity. Are there any schools of citizenship? Is education a device for prejudicing or freeing the minds of young citizens? What is the Federal Government doing in the schools? Who is master of the schoolmaster? Does the state possess ethical sovereignty? These are some of the questions Doctor Coe asks and answers.

The views expressed might be anticipated if one is familiar with Doctor Coe's writings. Many of the facts stated will be news to most readers, and their significance for the course of social and political events will be appreciated far more clearly because of this discussion. It is in the schools that children for the first time face the state officially, but they face it to-day not as citizens in their own right, not as sharing in the sovereignty they are obliged to acknowledge, but as subjects who are taught to

take toward a vague and undefined ruler an equally vague though powerful attitude of submissive respect. Our problem is to release the citizen in the teacher in order that ruling and teaching may be distinguished and education in its civic aspects may become "experience of children and youth in the gradual assumption of the responsibilities of sovereignty. In our society, obeying and ruling must be consciously fused into one."

Of specific interest to religious leaders is the author's discussion of private schools, including those conducted under religious auspices. Obedience to the political sovereign is encouraged by most of these schools without clear definition of who or what this sovereign is nor of the reciprocal relations which subsist between ruler and ruled (if indeed the terms be at all appropriate) in a democracy. This haziness of accustomed theory is most conspicuous and damaging in higher education, though here the denominational schools are pointing the way to state institutions.

This is the opportunity of religion. Doctor Coe's challenging book should call us all to review and reconstruct our present muddling practice.

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The Religious Situation. By PAUL TILlich. Translated by H. RICHARD NIEBUHR. New York: Henry Holt and Company. \$1.50.

TO-DAY, when all the historic faiths are being engulfed by secularism, Paul Tillich, professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt, maintains that there are genuine religious values in secularism itself. In his book, *Die Religiöse Lage der Gegenwart*, translated into English by Dr. H. Richard Niebuhr,

of the Yale Divinity School, under the title *The Religious Situation*, he contends that science, metaphysics, art, politics, and all other spheres of life have meaning for religion. But he finds the real significance of this age in the revolt which is taking place against the whole spirit of capitalist society. Viewing capitalist society as a culture rather than a mere economic system he finds its antithesis in a religious attitude far deeper than communism, for communism in many respects is but another expression of the spirit of capitalism. Like Spengler, he maintains that Karl Marx cherished the same basic values as the capitalists he attacked.

But capitalism, in this broader sense of an ultimate attitude toward the world, expresses itself everywhere in our life to-day. It is essentially irreligious because it rests content with the present order. It does not seek to transcend it and reach out for the eternal. The spirit of capitalist society "is an extreme example of a self-assertive, self-sufficient type of existence." To-day this self-sufficient, this-worldliness of capitalist culture is being disturbed. "Questions and doubts are arising on all sides; they point toward something beyond time and threaten the security of a present which has cut itself loose from the eternal." The battle is on. It is a battle against the forces which have claimed the minds and souls of men for nearly five centuries. How goes that battle? In every sphere of life "from the natural sciences to ritual and dogma" there is a turning away from the spirit of the capitalist society. And if we ask what shall the righteous do in this hour, Tillich replies, "Take the attitude of Belief-ful Realism." By this he means an attitude in which the reference to the transcendent and eternal is present, that is Belief-ful. But "Belief-ful" is not enough; indeed alone it is romantic and dangerous. To this must be harnessed "Realism" which looks at the

world through the sober eyes of the scientist. Thus in combining Faith and Realism we find the correct approach to this hour of crisis.

This is only the merest outline of Tillich's thought. His book cannot be summed up in a paragraph or a page. It is by no means easy reading, but for those who are seeking the significance of this age it deserves careful study. Naturally his analysis is more applicable to the German situation than to any other, but what is true of Germany to-day will probably be true of America to-morrow. His formula "Belief-ful Realism" is no magic open sesame to the solution of our world religious-economic problem. I believe, however, it is a pass-word which can admit us to the company of those who alone have any chance of solving it.

EDMUND B. CHAFFEE.

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Lyra Mystica. Edited by C. ALBERTSON. New York: The Macmillan Co. \$3.00.

He who undertakes to compile an anthology invites, and generally receives, both praise and blame. Those who discover within its pages their favorite authors and lines experience such satisfaction that at once they approve the results of the compiler's labor. Those who do not will wonder why what seems to them essential has been omitted and so much that seems to them incidental has been included. Not far in this direction lies indifference if not hostility. With an anthology of religious poetry this likelihood of both praise and blame is greatly increased. If people feel at all about religious poetry they are likely to feel deeply.

Mysticism is the outgrowth of many differing modes of thought and feeling. It is like pantheism in that it conceives the resolution of all into one metaphysical substance or power. It is unlike it

in that its inmost motive is religious. Even philosophical mysticism has a distinct religious implication. This essentially religious drive in mysticism as distinguished from pantheism is shown no more clearly than in its constant and sometimes painful effort to overcome an admitted alienation from the Divine.

Lyra Mystica, edited by Dr. Charles Carroll Albertson, with a most illuminating introduction by Dean Inge, makes easily available the noblest expressions of mysticism in poetic form from all ages. It sweeps all the strings of that melodious harp of feeling that is evoked in the quest and discovery of the Divine. From early Egyptian to modern Irish, from Akhenaton to William Butler Yeats and George William Russell, all voices that have witness to bear for God it bids speak. It makes clear in most convincing fashion the immense antiquity of our very modern hungers and desires, and reveals anew how "beaten with many feet" is the pathway by which the human soul draws near to God.

In the Editor's Note, Doctor Albertson says that the compilation of such an anthology covers years of time. It is easy to believe that. The fields from which its blooms are gathered are immense in their extent, and the profusion of their blossoms makes the segregation and selection of those finally chosen a time-consuming task. In this instance it has manifestly been a labor of love. Even where the reader may have some question as to the propriety of the inclusion of a given poem in an anthology of mysticism, he is likely to end up in such keen appreciation of its beauty and power that he forgets his original demurrer.

Preachers in particular should find *Lyra Mystica* one of the most useful of books. Preachers who love poetry will. Others who do not will scarcely find a single volume more likely to awaken an appreciation of what it is the poet is try-

ing to tell us, or to illustrate his success in doing so. Incidentally, preachers can well afford to cultivate the poets to-day. The economic collapse, the widespread confusion in the political world, the hard days for the churches have brought a sense strain in much of our preaching. There is no repose in us. Sampling a volume of contemporary preaching is apt to induce fatigue, not because it is not good preaching, but because of the tension of it. So much of it seems to issue, not from lofty and unshakable convictions that lift us above the storm, but from a frantic and somewhat confused desire to have the last word upon subjects which themselves do not greatly matter.

We need the poets. They, like the apostle, are generally sure that our salvation is much nearer than when we first believed. Their confidence in beauty and truth rebukes our strident excitement over nonessentials and helps us to see whence our help cometh.

These troubadours of God who speak to us in *Lyra Mystica* usher us into a world unshaken by panicky stock markets, unbalanced budgets, and increasing taxes. It would not be well for us to live continuously in that world; but it will greatly improve the flavor of our ministry and message if something of its atmosphere of repose and confidence clings to us.

WALLACE H. FINCH.

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Christianity. By EDWYN BEVAN.
New York: Henry Holt & Co.
\$1.25.

This short exposition of the history and modern situation of Christianity presents a wealth of interpretative ideas. The standpoint is that of a cautious liberal who avoids negative avowals even where he cannot make the old affirmations. He declines to assert or deny the resurrection of Jesus, with the statement

that this is a matter on which "mere historical inquiry can yield no answer." But he holds that belief in the divinity and divine office of Jesus has been of unique moral value, and that Paul's teaching of the Cross has "counted for more" than the Sermon on the Mount. Well equipped with knowledge of the Hellenistic world, Doctor Bevan interests his readers in the quest of what was peculiar to rising Christianity. This he finds to have been not a new code or commandment, but a new announcement of what God was and would do. The treatment of the period of the Ecumenical Councils contains some striking remarks by way of apologia for the process of making creeds. The rise of Christian asceticism is one of a number of issues on which there appears an effort to quench old fires of controversy between Catholics and Protestants. This interest, indeed, largely controls the treatment of the Reformation, where such subjects as image- and saint-worship, merit, and priestly orders, are handled with irenic liberalism. The refutation of Fundamentalism, while scarcely necessary, is admirably skillful. The author views with no favor, on the other hand, what he calls "the drift to Unitarianism"—by which he means a kind of Jesus-centered Humanism. This repudiation of extremes is not, however, accompanied by any clearly-enunciated statement regarding the essential character and purpose of modern Christianity. The reader is, after all, left to work out his own solutions. A few statements may be challenged. One is surprised to read at this date that the issue regarding orders between Romanism and Anglicanism "turns simply" upon the question of "what precisely happened in the case of Archbishop Parker." But the value of the book as a thoughtful exposition of the most significant movement in history should not be measured by these defects. It bears the marks of fair-minded schol-

arship, and on the whole admirably fulfills its purpose as a member of the Home University Library series.

JOHN T. MCNEILL.

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Jesus After Nineteen Centuries. By ERNEST F. TITTLE. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

When these Yale Lectures on Preaching were given, I heard all of them but one, and they produced in my mind and heart a tingle which is there yet. This volume which contains them is a great book. I have "read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested" it, with the result that I "embrace and hold fast" with a firmer grip "the blessed hope of everlasting life," begun here and to be continued in an endless advance.

Here is a refreshing combination of robust realism with the most tenacious idealism. "Jesus needed not that any should tell him what was in human nature—He knew. He had abundant reason to know. He knew that men can lie—they called him a glutton and a drunkard. He knew that men can be petty—they found fault with him for healing on the Sabbath. He knew that men can be cruel—they crucified him. . . . But he saw as no one before him had ever seen, the marvelous possibilities of the human heart. He believed that the weak could become strong, the crooked be made straight, that publicans and harlots could enter the kingdom of God, and that the poor and the oppressed had undreamed of capacities."

Here is the dogmatism of high faith, ready to go the second mile and then follow on clear to the end of the road. "Preparation for war leads to war and war to-day threatens the dissolution of civilization. No good, but only evil, may now be expected to come from *any* war. There would seem to be but one proper position for Christians to take—

they should set themselves in opposition to war and to everything that invites it. How can a Christian justify consent to anything from which only evil can be expected? This sounds dogmatic—it is dogmatic. . . . Let halting governments be driven to the conclusion that the people are not only sick of war but *through with war*, and they will find it possible to abolish the instruments of war and in actual fact 'renounce war as an instrument of national policy' and proceed to settle their disputes by pacific means."

The author points out with unsparing candor the defects of our present church life, yet he loves the church and cherishes a great warm hope for its future. "The church is being born again. Can an institution when it is old recapture the vision and courage of its youth? The church, I believe, is beginning to do so." Then he presents an imposing array of facts to witness to the validity of that claim.

He sees good in the present depression. It has shown us that not by might nor by power, not by train loads of machinery and huge warehouses full of things, but by the spirit of the Lord of Hosts, does permanent human wellbeing come. "In the days of our pseudo-prosperity, some of us, whose investments brought forth plentifully, pulled down our barns and built greater, only to discover that these greater barns contributed not to our happiness, but only to our anxieties. We find ourselves wondering whether a life of simplicity blessed with peace is not preferable to a life of luxury tormented with anxiety. Unburdened with so many material possessions and with the problems involved in their retention, we have more time to give to our friends, with no desire to outstrip them, or dominate them, or get anything out of them, but to experience a pure, rare joy in just loving them. Does this represent 'a lower standard of living' or rather a far higher

standard of living than most of us have yet achieved."

When Doctor Tittle stood there in Battell Chapel uttering these and other radiant truths, the word of preaching became alive and dwelt among us full of grace and truth. I quote these samples, just as the train boy goes through the car giving each of the passengers a single peanut, thus whetting their taste to the point where they will want to buy whole bags of them. To laymen and ministers alike, I would say, "Get this book, and read it, and you will thank God and take courage and push ahead with a surer stride."

CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN.

The Divinity School, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.

Introduction to Religious Education.

By J. M. PRICE, J. L. CARPENTER,
and J. H. CHAPMAN. New York:
The Macmillan Company. \$2.25.

This book is intended for use as a college text in religious education. It has twenty-four chapters, each by a different author. It is hard to produce a book on so fundamental a subject by composite authorship, and the one under review does not rise above the usual limitations of piecemeal treatment and much repetition. My judgment is that the book covers too many subjects and treats many of the fundamental aspects of religious education too lightly for effective use as a textbook to introduce students to religious education.

Many of the individual chapters, however, are excellent (for example, the one on Educational Emphasis in the Old Testament) and suggest that as a reference book it will be found valuable. The viewpoints expressed are forward-looking—especially so when seen against their denominational background.

The authors are drawn almost wholly from the Association of Southern Baptist Teachers of Bible and Religious Ed-

ucation, and it is natural to find the denominational viewpoint running through it, such phrases as "our church" being not infrequent.

PAUL H. VIETH.

The Divinity School, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.

Life Beyond Death in the Beliefs of Mankind. By JAMES THAYER ADDISON. Houghton Mifflin Company. \$3.00.

Lest we forget what manner of men we are, it is well at times to hold the mirror up to life. In a volume of about three hundred pages James Thayer Addison, of the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Mass., presents a panorama "of all the important beliefs about the future life among uncivilized peoples and in the great religions of the world." He writes not for the scholar, but for the general reader, and does not argue nor defend, but simply describes.

The early chapters, dealing with conceptions found among primitive peoples, are so many rooms in a museum of curiosities. *Manes* and vampires, Sheol and Aralu, Charon and Cerberus, Osiris and Yen-wang appear, duly labeled. A readable style, however, relieves the monotonous effect of mere cataloguing. In this part of the book one misses the perspective that might be suggested by the expert even under the limitations that the author has set for his work. The implication (pp. 92-94) that an after-world bridge originated as a test or ordeal would be hard to justify.

In the later chapters, which set forth beliefs held by adherents of the higher religions, I was lost in sheer repining. What an amount of human imagination has been wasted in devising tortures for the damned and in trying to make a heaven out of sensuous pleasures! Perhaps the indifference of many to belief in a future life finds its explanation largely in failure to give that life any true appeal. I wish Doctor Addison had

closed his book not with the poetic visions of even *Revelation* and *Paradiso*, but with his reference to the modern way of thinking—that human beings are essentially active, and whether in this world or another can be contented only when "moral activity and moral growth are constant and genuine."

GEORGE A. WILSON.

Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York.

Literature in the Bible. By GEORGE SPRAU. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$3.50.

The author and publishers of a book dealing with the literary values of the Bible shoulder a heavy burden of proof. With scores of accessible volumes dealing with practically every phase of Biblical scholarship, one cannot help wondering by what unique quality another work can justify its existence.

Neither originality of material nor brilliancy of style can be claimed for *Literature in the Bible*. Its outstanding merit is its assembling a wealth of Biblical information and interpretation not massed in any other book. The second chapter deals with "How We Got the Bible," and the third is a "Historical Sketch of Israel," both of which are excellent examples of skillful condensation. The following three hundred pages give the quintessence of modern thought in regard to the books of the Bible. These are grouped under the heads of "The Law," "The Prophets," "The Apocrypha," and "Books of the New Testament." The author is a professor of literature and in the preface apologizes for a lack of Biblical scholarship. The book itself is ample evidence that the apology is unnecessary. Although it does not concern itself with minute details, it shows unmistakably that it is the product of a disciplined mind and wide reading. The bibliography which is appended to the work is open to criticism for its lack of

any mention of a number of important books produced during the past ten years. There is an hiatus between the title of the volume and the material which it contains. Of course, the Bible is a book of literature, and no discussion of it can ignore that aspect. The present study, however, pays surprisingly little attention to its distinctively literary characteristics. There is absolutely no literary atmosphere, for example, like that which we find in Culler's *Creative Religious Literature*.

Doctor Sprau's book is not a study of Biblical literature, but an introduction to the Bible, and an excellent one. It would make an admirable text for college classes and a fine reference book for private and college libraries.

LEWIS H. CHRISMAN.

West Virginia Wesleyan College, Buckhannon, W. Va.

Character in Human Relations. By HUGH HARTSHORNE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50.

In the whole field of education what book is more needed than one on the general problem of character education and who is there better qualified to write it than Doctor Hartshorne? We may well be appreciative of the significant contribution which he has made in *Character in Human Relations* in bringing together a wealth of material from the fields of psychology, philosophy, and education and in adding discriminating logical analysis to reports of scientific investigation.

The plan of the book is comprehensive. In Part I we are given a careful study of the present situation. First there is a survey and evaluation of the types of method now in use, including discipline, ordeal and vigil, ceremony, the story, law, exhortation, play, counselling and mental hygiene, propaganda, discussion, practice, participation. Then follows a description and evaluation of the work in the independent societies such as the

Boy Scouts, and of plans for school use such as the Junior Red Cross, the Iowa plan, the School Republic, the 4-H Club, military training and a number of others. Part II of the book contains a critical examination of theories of character, including trait theories, habit theories, pattern theories, and self theories. In Part III we have an elaboration of the author's theory of character and in Part IV a discussion of educational method and organization.

It is probably fair to say that there is no chapter in the book that is not interesting and suggestive and well worth reading for its own sake. But if the largest value is to be obtained from the individual chapters they need to be taken in relationship to each other. Certainly if any criticism is to be offered it should be in the light of all that the author has said and not on the basis of a part of his discussion.

Consider, for instance, the question of the method of character education. A reading of parts of the book might give the impression that character is to be built wholly by participation in moral behavior or "apprenticeship," as Doctor Hartshorne calls it. But if one turns to Chapter XXIII he will find clear recognition of the deep significance of thinking in character formation. Similarly one cannot read the book without being deeply impressed with the author's conviction that moral conduct is specific rather than general. Extensive quotation is made from the findings of the *Character Education Inquiry* in which the statistical evidence is almost entirely on the side of this theory. But in another place (page 215) note is made of the fact that some children seem to show integration of character. In the discussion of the work of the Boy Scouts the experimental evidence adduced indicates that nothing has been found by the *Character Education Inquiry* to show that the Boy Scout program itself really contributes to virtu-

ous behavior. However, the author hastens to point out that "common sense" tells us that boys in this organization cannot escape the wholesome influences of its fine leadership. Again he states with emphasis (page 13) that the story "has probably done more harm than good when used as a means of moral education," but in Chapter XXIII he shows how, in his opinion, the story may be effectively used, and quotes as an example the well-known story of "What Bradley Owed."

Perhaps the most fundamental of the questions from a scientific point of view is that of the specificity of habit. Is it true that each bit of good behavior is a thing quite by itself and that habit developed in a given situation will function later only if the situation be so similar as to be practically "identical"?

Educational psychology has tended strongly toward the idea that behaviors are decidedly specific, that the fact that a person is honest in one situation is not an indication that he will behave similarly under somewhat different circumstances. The experimental findings of the *Character Education Inquiry* appear to be overwhelmingly on that side.

And yet there are competent scientists in the field who feel that the last word has not been said on the topic. It is not a question of denying the validity of the statistical results, but of asking whether or not all of the needed experiments have been made and whether or not the data already obtained fully warrant the interpretations put on them. Even if it is true that the behaviors of the children studied by the *Character Education Inquiry* are as lacking in correlation as the statistical results seem to show, is that due to the inherent nature of conduct or may it be due rather to the defective educational method so far adopted?

Let it not be supposed that the book deals merely with academic or highly technical questions. That would be far

from true. In the closing section Doctor Hartshorne indicates what seems to be the essential steps involved in a system of character education through participation. As the word implies, young and old must work together at projects of interest and value to both. The method advocated here is something more inclusive than the project method in that it provides for a consideration by the group of the character-making values of the shared enterprise. At its best, this evaluation becomes an experience of worship and hence religious. Those who have followed Doctor Hartshorne's work through the years will not be surprised that a book packed with scientific data and critical analysis should close with this emphasis.

HAROLD J. SHERIDAN.

Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio.

Religion in Various Cultures.—By HORACE L. FRIESS and HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER. New York: Henry Holt & Co. \$3.00.

THIS book draws upon the wealth of material available through scientific and critical study of the development of religion, its cultural forms and social functions, its bodies of belief, doctrines, and ideals. It is offered as a guide for those beginning the study of religion and its aim as set forth in the preface is to promote a more direct and varied acquaintance with religion as a factor in the life and organization of particular cultures. While a vast amount of historical information is presented the main interest is to explain the significance of the various religions in the places where they have achieved conspicuous power, dignity, and beauty.

The authors wisely have confined their studies to certain typical religions. They have approached their task with the purpose of suggesting opportunity for inquiry and reflection rather than of pass-

ing judgment upon religious beliefs and institutions. The book seeks to show the religious' relation to and effect upon the cultural life in which they existed rather than to compare them with each other. With this objective in mind the authors have set forth in a lucid and fascinating style the various forms in which the human spirit has expressed its outreach toward some power beyond it in the realm of the spirit.

Beginning with prehistoric religions the study traces the development of religion in primitive cultures and portrays the manifestation of certain typical religions indigenous to the Far East, including Shintoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The religions more intimately related to the Western World included in the study are the Greek, Jewish, and Christian. The discussions reveal a wide knowledge of the available materials and a genuine appreciation of the spirit and significance of the religion and culture considered.

A large section of the book is given to Christianity, tracing its development from the beginning through its myriad manifestations. The treatment of the changes in theological thought is especially clear and comprehensive. The portrayal of present-day trends and forms of activity within the Christian movement shows both insight and perspective.

The work of the authors has been enhanced by many fine illustrations and by an unusually complete bibliography.

WILLIAM E. SHAW.

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The Literature of the New Testament. By ERNEST FINDLAY SCOTT. New York: Columbia University Press. \$3.00.

Biblical Introduction has been traditionally the driest of all subjects. It was to be expected, however, that when Professor Scott took the subject in hand he would even here produce a readable book.

Without footnotes or specific allusions to other scholars, he guides his readers into the essential problems presented by the group of little books comprising our New Testament. The experienced student will be aware of the fact that no vital question has been overlooked. The average reader will scarcely realize that behind the facile exposition lies an evaluation of the work of generations of scholars.

Some will call Doctor Scott's point of view liberal because he rejects the Pastorals in their present form as Pauline, and denies apostolic authorship to James and 1 Peter. Others would describe it as mildly conservative because he accepts Ephesians as Pauline and defends the Lucan authorship of Acts. The author takes a very cautious attitude toward some of the new hypotheses and does not even mention certain theories regarding 1 Peter. But it is to be remembered that his purpose is not to introduce readers to modern criticism, but to the Literature of the New Testament.

It may be asked, however, if the title of the volume is not somewhat confusing. The arrangement of the material is not according to types of literature, as in Dibelius' fresh survey of *The History of the Early Christian Literature*. The separate books of the New Testament are discussed practically in order, except that the Gospel of John is transferred to the group of Johannine writings. Incidentally the treatment of the Johannine problem seem eminently fair and judicious though much less place is given to the Jewish features of the Gospel than an increasing number of scholars would recognize. Probably our greatest interest lies in the origin of the synoptic tradition. Professor Scott sees no need to postulate a more primitive Mark. Our Mark arose at Rome about 70 A. D., based on the memoirs of Mark. "Q" is to be looked upon less as a document than a body of tradition which has the same similarity

in Matthew and Luke that the materials in two different hymn books would possess.

It is not to be expected that a volume of this kind would be rich in sermonic material. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to read the chapter on 1 John without receiving thought-provoking suggestions. While the book is not designed to meet the needs of the technical student, it is the best general Introduction to the New Testament which we possess for the wider reading public. Professor Scott is to be congratulated upon adding another to his long list of invaluable books.

CLARENCE TUCKER CRAIG.
Graduate School of Theology, Oberlin
College, Oberlin, Ohio.

The Rockefeller McCormick New Testament. Edited by EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, DONALD W. RIDDLE and HAROLD R. WILLOUGHBY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Three volumes. \$50.45.

This superb manuscript was written in the imperial palace at Constantinople, presumably for the use of the Emperor Michael Paleologus, during the period 1265-1270. It is not very large—the pages measure about six by eight inches—and the text, while graceful, is not particularly ornamented. But it is illustrated with a profusion of miniatures executed with every resource of the Byzantine illuminators' art; despite the loss of a few pages, ninety-eight of these are still preserved, and despite a certain fading of the colors they retain an exquisite charm. The discovery and publication of the codex consequently constitute an artistic event of the very first importance.

The manuscript has had a checkered career. It remained in Constantinople until the fall of the city in 1453, when it was carried into what is now Rumania. A certain local governor had it bound in silver-gilt covers and presented it in 1570

to a "Convent of the Saviour," apparently on Athos. Perhaps rescued from the destruction that came with the Greek war of independence about 1828, it found its way somehow into Asia Minor and remained there until the close of the nineteenth century. Somehow it passed into Turkish hands, and in 1910 was sold to a Paris firm of dealers in antiques. Seventeen years later Professor Goodspeed saw it there, and reported it to the late Mrs. Rockefeller McCormick, who purchased it; at present it rests, as part of her estate, in a Chicago safe-deposit vault.

But as soon as the manuscript reached her (in April, 1928) she lent it to the University of Chicago experts for detailed study and had color reproductions made of all significant portions. It is these reproductions and the results of these studies that form the present edition, which is done with such minute exactness as to render it almost a perfect substitute for the original manuscript itself. Volume I is in two parts. Doctor Goodspeed tells the history of this New Testament in nontechnical language as an introduction, and then come the color reproductions, which have been executed with almost incredible fidelity. Volume II, "The Text," is by Doctor Riddle. His treatment and conclusions are highly specialistic, and it must suffice here to say that he proves that late Byzantine manuscripts do not always have what critics call a "Byzantine text." Volume III, "The miniatures," is by Doctor Willoughby. To understand his analysis—or, in fact, to appreciate Byzantine art at all—readers must remember that in the Middle Ages two contrary tendencies were at work. In depicting a Biblical scene one school, influenced by Greek traditions, aimed at a lifelike representation; the event should be made to appear somehow as it actually happened. The other school, the Oriental, held that in Biblical events not the outward appear-

ance, but the inward meaning is all-essential; that in place of earthly activity the figures should point to God's eternal calm. When this manuscript was illuminated a compromise had been reached; the figures and their action are made lifelike, but by flattening the perspective and using an unbroken gold background each scene suggests a depth of spiritual values unknown to modern art.

The price of the three volumes is necessarily high, although vastly less than would have been the case had not Mrs. McCormick's generosity paid the immense cost of the reproductions. Even as it is, no wide distribution is possible. But those who have access to a library that contains the work are urgently recommended to study the miniatures with all the care they can give. Those who do so will have a new idea of the possibilities of Christian art.

BURTON SCOTT EASTON.

General Theological Seminary, New York City.

Studies in the Birth of the Lord. By ELWOOD WORCESTER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50.

Apart from the more "popular" discussions of the subject—whose historical value is generally slight—an immense amount of investigation has been devoted by specialists to the New Testament stories of the birth of Jesus. In 1930 this material was collected and analyzed by Dr. J. Gresham Machen in his *The Virgin Birth of Christ*. Doctor Machen's research is always exhaustive, and he did not omit the slightest scrap of critical opinion that in any way bore upon the theme. As a result, of course, his volume is for the serious student, not the ordinary reader. And his volume has another quality which will be judged as a virtue or a defect according to the reader's point of view: it has throughout an unyielding apologetic standpoint. Doctor Worcester, accordingly, who had

long been interested in the topic and was preparing a book of his own, felt that there was place for a second volume less technical and, in his opinion, more open-minded.

Its treatment is likewise very full, discussing not only the New Testament evidence, but the general question of non-Christian influence, going as far afield as presumed Buddhist parallels. But he has confined himself to essentials, stated simply and clearly; the nontechnical reader is given all that he really need know. And the open-mindedness is very genuine; while his conclusions are not those of Doctor Machen's he gives no evidence of a "counter-apologetic" spirit, except in so far as one is implied in his general conception of the nature of religion: from this, of course, no one can rid himself.

As regards his contentions he would be the first to say that he has nothing novel to offer in so well-trodden a field. Everyone to-day knows, or ought to know, that there is evidence which indicates a stage in Christianity when the doctrine of the Virgin Birth was not yet taught. Opponents of the doctrine point to this as proof of a later origin; defenders argue that it need indicate only that those who knew the facts did not reveal them until (say) after Mary's death. Much depends here on whether or not the teaching originated in Jewish or Gentile circles, and in this case the evidence is inconclusive. That the Jews knew nothing of an expectation that the Messiah should be born of a virgin is probably demonstrated, but this very fact is seized upon to defend the tradition: the lack of such an expectation shows that only the actual birth of Jesus from a virgin mother can explain how the story arose. To this the reply can be made that later Jewish Christians did not accept the story; a contention met by the rejoinder that these Christians are outside the regular circles of Christianity.

And so on—perhaps indefinitely. As has been said, the individual's general religious outlook is probably the determining factor in this particular debate. But, at least, books like Doctor Worcester's prevent the general religious outlook from becoming confused by a misunderstanding of obvious facts.

BURTON SCOTT EASTON.

General Theological Seminary, New York City.

The New Morality.—By G. E. NEWSOM. London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson. \$2.00.

THE interest manifested by the reading public in changing views of marriage and the family has led to a flood of publications upon these and related topics. Most of these books and pamphlets are of ephemeral value; a few are important, and of this small residuum the reviewer has no hesitation in assigning to *The New Morality* a leading place. The author, G. E. Newsom, Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge, is a churchman of distinction and a sociologist of acknowledged competence. He writes as a sociologist rather than as a churchman. His defense of monogamous marriage and of the institution of the family is not vitiated by *a priori* reasoning, or by question-begging appeal to the conventional views which are being attacked. The Master of Selwyn meets the advocates of the "new morality" on their own grounds, with knowledge of anthropology and biology equal to theirs, and easily has the best of the encounter. His analysis of the program of those who would subor-

dinate the rights of the family to the rights of free sex, and to "disentangle the life of sex from the net of social purpose" is devastating in its effectiveness. Mr. Newsom is on the side of the angels, but the weapons with which he contends are forged on the anvil of science and tempered in the fires of modern thought.

The author takes as his point of departure the belief that sex is essentially a function of the family and that there is a whole world of meaning and value in the family; that the relation of husband and wife is the highest and completest form of personal union; that this union is sacred not only in itself but also in its character as the creative source of life, individual and social; and that the family is the original and fundamental institution of human society, the vehicle by which vital tradition is passed on from generation to generation, the nursery of all social virtues, the only safeguard of the deeper values of human life. He believes that in attaining its full end and development, the energy of sex becomes tributary to *social* life, and pours its vital energy into the stream of moral and social culture, and that it is this integration of the life of sex with the life of parenthood and family which is the core of our tradition of the home. Christians generally, and especially Christian social workers who share these convictions with the Master of Selwyn, will welcome with eagerness his robust and hopeful arguments in their defense.

HOWARD CHANDLER ROBBINS.

General Theological Seminary,
New York City.

Bookish Brevities

DR. FREDERICK W. NORWOOD of London's City Temple has added to his fame and favor by another visit to America. Overflowing audiences greeted him wherever he went. His lecture upon "The Bible—An Unfinished Opera" received special approbation.

Arrayed in tan attire, becoming to a youngish New England lady of seventy-five, appears the Jubilee Number of the *Atlantic Monthly*. Some thirteen of the most notable contributions of the decades comprise the contents. Near the top is an essay by Dallas Lore Sharp, author of *The Romances of the Old Testament*. As are all his writings, the essay is distinguished by an understanding love of nature expressed in language of rare purity.

In his *Red Russia* Theodore Seibert asserts that the "Gosizdat," the state publishing agency of the Soviet Republic, is the biggest publishing house in the world. In ten years it issued almost five hundred million books and pamphlets. No sugar-coating is provided to disguise the propagandist aim of this output. In it are some sense of human wrong and some sympathy for human suffering, but principally it is arrogant campaigning for an atheistic materialism. Such recognition of the puissant influence of the printed page by its enemies may prove to be the chief stimulus to a renewed appreciation of the value of Christian literature.

Mark Sullivan, in the fourth volume of his *History of Our Times*, declares that so devoid of acumen and integrity were the books produced in America during the first decade and a half of the twentieth century that hardly one is now rated as a permanent or indispensable ad-

dition to literature. To such a statement the surviving authors of that period can enter qualifications. During the intervening years the public taste in painting, music and literature has radically changed. Twenty years ago, the fondness of the Victorian Age for narrative and description was still widespread. The influence of Lewis and Dreiser in the United States and of Wells and Bennett in Great Britain were but beginning to be perceptible. Now the art of securing extraordinary effect by the massing of ordinary but cogent detail prevails. The result is an outmodishness corresponding to that which obtains when women's attire undergoes a striking change.

We are cowardly in countenancing much that appropriates to itself the name and form of poetry. The noble elevation of the best of Charles Wesley's hymns would be more clearly recognized had his inferior verses received the interment they deserve. For poetry which touches the skies Wordsworth would have had many more readers had his prosy lines been permitted to perish. If abuse or defiance had not paraded the rubbish of Whitman, long ago particular persons would have known that American poetry reached its peak in "When Lilacs Last in the Door Yard Bloomed." As for the versifiers whose lines do not lift, whose obscurity comes from nonsense and whose rhymes are contrivances, they should be brought before the mirror of reality that they may resolve to spend their talents upon that which is less pretentious but more helpfully productive.

A youth meeting, with an attendance of eight thousand, was recently held in Albert Hall, London. Sir Harold Mackintosh, the chairman, is the president of

the World's Sunday School Association. He remarked that he kept Wesley's *Journal* at his bedside, from which when he was overtired he read a few sentences and soon felt that he did not know what work is. Basil Mathews was introduced as perhaps having done more than any man living for the youth of the world. He asserted that anti-religious Bolshevism is the most tremendous thing on the horizon of humanity. Doubtless the author of *The Clash of World Forces* would admit the preface—Next to Christianity. The principal address was made by that young preacher of genius, Leslie D. Weatherhead, author of the forthcoming volume, *His Life and Ours*.

Agatha Harrison, who has been working with C. F. Andrews, writes that the world can never know the supreme part Mr. Andrews had in the fast of Mr. Gandhi when the fast seemed to be about the most important happening in the world. For two weeks unceasingly he carried on in a co-operation of reconciliation and interpretation which spanned several oceans. Concerning some comments upon his world-known book, *What I Owe to Christ*, Mr. Andrews states, "I am aware that I often employ phrases in an unusual sense, and especially the word 'Christian.' I wanted to shock people into thinking, 'Who is really a Christian?' In words that were written not without agony, I have tried to record a love for Christ which is beyond all telling in human words."

Samuel Chadwick, principal of Cliff College, died at the dawn of an October Sunday, leaving as his last message, "I am ready for the roll-call in the morning." His death has evoked tributes of such extraordinary affection as to puzzle American readers. The *London Times* said of him—"A man of sterling character, with a great gift for preaching: he

exercised an enormous influence upon his audiences and upon his students." He was described as an evangelist, the greatest of the generation if not of the century; as a reformer who sought no man's favor and feared no man's frown. That he had a gift of wit was evidenced when the counsel of a brewer, against whose application for a license Doctor Chadwick appeared, scornfully suggested that the court-room was no place for a minister who should be looking after his sheep. "My sheep are all right," was the answer, "I'm here to look after the wolf."

Scattered through the American ministry are former students of Cliff who have maintained their devotion to their principal. When he visited the United States in 1924 they prepared for him a way of triumph. It is enough to say it did not prove to be such. His book, *The Path of Prayer*, has continued across the ocean to be one of the best sellers among religious books. Though several American evangelical leaders have announced that the practice of its teachings would revitalize Christian faith in this country, its appeal among our people has been limited. More than anything else this may signify a deficiency in present-day American spiritual sensibility.

The late Arnold Bennett was regarded to be one of the most comprehensive readers of the age. From his twentieth year he maintained steady habits of reading books which were highly selected. Yet he commented—"With only one author can I call myself familiar, Jane Austen. With Keats and Stevenson I have an acquaintance. Of foreign authors I am familiar with Maupassant and the Goucourts. I have yet to finish Don Quixote. I have never even overlooked large tracts of Shakespeare, Bacon, Spenser, nearly all Chaucer, Congreve, Dryden, Pope, Swift, Sterne, Johnson, Scott, Coleridge,

Shelley, Byron, Edgeworth, Ferrier, Lamb, Leigh Hunt, Wordsworth (nearly all), Tennyson, Swinburne, the Brontës, George Eliot, Morris, Meredith, Hardy, Landor, Thackeray, Carlyle."

It is easy to comment that Bennett, rather than regretting what he had missed, should have rejoiced in what he had read. Yet what a comfort is he to those who have condemned themselves for not reading enough to be socially respectable or who have been supposing that if they had only had time to read a little more they would have been more content.

History will record with amazement the easy compliance of our generation with the teachings of what has been called the new paganism. Books which denude what the race has honored as love, romance, fidelity, comradeship and purity have been admitted with respect into the homes of the cultured. A lady of intelligence and conscience who lives in sympathetic association with from two to three hundred girls remarks that she begins to wonder whether her standards in morals have been anything more than convention as she sees girls, apparently as high-minded as she ever was, countenance that which she was taught to think of as ethically false and socially dangerous.

Against all this the reaction which for sometime has been overdue begins to appear. In his book, *The New Morality*, G. E. Newsome, master of Selwyn College, Cambridge, valiantly and vigor-

ously insists that the license which has been painted as freedom is the most remorseless of tyrannies and that which has been called repression is loyalty to one's best self.

The Spanish mystic, Don Miguel de Unamuno, is coming to be quoted in the United States. Waldo Frank describes him as the strongest moralist of the day, beside whose well-aimed uproar the voices of Wells and Shaw are thin. Two of our brilliant younger thinkers, John A. Mackay and Reinhold Niebuhr, pronounce his *Tragic Sense of Life* to be one of the great books of the era. Doctor Mackay considers the prologue to his *Life of Don Quixote* to be the most incandescent piece of prose writing in contemporary literature.

Unamuno believes that the challenging problem of modern civilization is not the distribution of wealth but a distribution of vocations into which one can put one's whole soul. Truth breaks and life is fulfilled only upon the Road where one is pressing onward in loyalty to the heavenly vision by undertaking each task with a religious sense of its importance. His assurance of a personal providence and a mapped-out destiny reveals a soaring spirit who beats his wings against the Veil to pierce beyond its mysteries.

Doctor Mackay discussed Unamuno in giving the Merrick Lectures for 1932 at Ohio Wesleyan University upon *Wilderness Voices of Yesterday and Today*.